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Member of the Commission with special responsibility 
for competition policy 
The annual Competition Report always pro-
vides an opportunity to take stock of the 
Commission's activities on the competition 
policy front and to sketch out plans for the 
future. This year's report follows on in this 
more than a quarter century old tradition. I 
shall not dwell here on the traditional objec-
tives pursued by the Commission through its 
competition policy (improving the competi-
tiveness of businesses both large and small, 
opening up markets, improving the allocation 
of resources, increasing consumer choice, 
etc.), as readers are doubtless familiar with 
them. Nor shall I hark back to matters already 
expounded in previous reports such as the 
increasing globalisation of the world economy 
or the gathering pace of technological 
progress. I intend instead to address issues 
which are impacting the policy for which I am 
responsible and turning it towards horizons 
beyond those of the present-day concerns out-
lined in the body of the report: economic and 
monetary union (EMU), employment and en-
largement of the Union. These three topics are 
so many challenges to be faced by competition 
policy in the years ahead. 
Economic and monetary union 
and greater competition 
One of the major events of the next few years 
will undoubtedly be the completion of eco-
nomic and monetary union, which I am certain 
will provide the best of frameworks for the 
most effective possible interplay of competi-
tive forces. The adoption of a single currency 
in an increasingly integrated market will gen-
erate factors that will intensify the competitive 
process. 
Monetary union will enable European busi-
nesses to eliminate the risks and costs inherent 
in currency fluctuations which still influence 
their investment decisions or their decisions to 
enter non-domestic markets and which, indi-
rectly, contribute to a partitioning of those 
markets. It will also help considerably to bring 
down the overall cost of intra-Community 
trade by reducing the transaction charges that 
are still included in exchange costs. European 
businesses will be encouraged as a result to 
trade more within the Union. Competition will 
be greatly stimulated by this trend towards 
more closely integrated markets. 
This development is likely to trigger much-
needed restructuring in certain economic sec-
tors. The Commission will have to keep a 
particularly watchful eye on the inevitable 
increase in merger activity and on the State aid 
measures that will accompany the restructur-
ing drive. 
There is likely to be an increase in the number 
of mergers in the years ahead, just as there 
was when the single market was created. 
There were already signs of this happening in 
1997. The Commission will be especially vigi-
lant when it comes to monitoring the forma-
tion of tight oligopolies in the Community 
market as these may lead, in certain mar-
ket situations, to anticompetitive parallel 
behaviour. 
Those economic sectors which are suffering 
from chronic structural problems and which 
will have to restructure in order to meet the 
'challenge of stronger competition will doubt-
less be tempted to seek government support in 
order to ease the immediate constraints stem-
ming from the completion of EMU. Clearly, 
the Commission will have to monitor scrupu-
lously compliance with the Treaty rules on 
State aid inasmuch as the resulting distortions 
of competition will necessarily be amplified in 
a bigger, more integrated market. 
The single currency will lead to greater price 
transparency throughout the European Union. 
It will make it possible to compare the prices 
charged in each Member State using a com-
mon yardstick, the euro. This new transpar-
ency will facilitate and stimulate trade be-
tween Member States, including parallel trade 
between distribution networks, because pur-chasers will be able, for one and the same 
product, to base their choice on the price 
differentials between European producers 
without worrying about the impact on the final 
price of currency movements or transaction 
costs. This will necessarily lead to a down-
ward convergence of prices. Such a sharpen-
ing of competition might provoke a defensive 
reaction on the part of certain traders, who 
may be tempted to delay or slow down the 
process rather than make the necessary effort 
to adapt to the new situation. It will be for the 
Commission to act against such traders and 
the Member States protecting them and to take 
a particularly strict stance in such matters 
inasmuch as their anticompetitive behaviour or 
the aid they receive will, in a highly integrated 
market, have a very strong impact in terms of 
economic inefficiency. 
As a harmonising factor, the single currency 
will highlight the differences between national 
tax and social security systems. This new 
transparency will weigh heavily in decisions 
to allocate capital and hence on the economic 
efficiency of such decisions. A number of 
Member States have accordingly asked the 
Commission to review its policy on State aid 
in the form of tax concessions in order to 
combat 'fiscal' distortions of competition inju-
rious to monetary union. Others are calling for 
a minimum of harmonisation in the social 
security field. 
A policy in support of employment 
At an extraordinary European Council meeting 
on employment (the first European summit 
entirely devoted to the subject), which was 
held in Luxembourg on 20 and 21 November, 
the Member States agreed on 'guidelines' to 
back the European Union's activities in sup-
port of employment. One is struck when read-
ing the guidelines by the many forms the 
struggle against unemployment takes and by 
the many remedies that are needed to relieve 
it. Several of the priority measures identified 
involve competition policy, either implicitly as 
in the case of that tool of growth, a 'genuine 
internal market', to which the policy regarding 
the opening-up of markets and the drive to 
reduce administrative costs for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) — in which 
we have participated by applying to SMEs a 
more favourable regulatory regime — actively 
contribute, or explicitly as in the section 
entitled 'Community policies in support of 
employment', of which competition is one. 
The Luxembourg summit clearly assigns a 
role in the employment sphere to competition 
policy, especially as it relates to State aid. 
Paragraph 27 of the guidelines states that 'it is 
important to focus on aid arrangements which 
favour economic eflBciency and employment 
without causing distortions of competition'. In 
my view, the scope for action on the competi-
tion policy front in support of employment is 
wider. 
Competition policy can contribute to the suc-
cess of an overall employment policy. 
Through its effect on the structure of markets, 
it directly influences the competitiveness of 
the European economy and its rate of growth 
and hence helps to orient the Union's macro-
economic framework towards employment. 
The Commission's endeavours through its 
competition policy to open up markets in the 
Union are making a major contribution to the 
completion of the single market, that guaran-
tees more trade and faster growth. The control 
of State aid, as paragraph 27 of the guidelines 
underscores, makes it possible to ensure that 
such aid helps to create businesses and lasting 
jobs while safeguarding fair competition. 
Competition policy is clearly one of the keys 
to winning the struggle against unemployment 
in Europe. 
The policy regarding the liberalisation of the 
energy, transport and telecommunications mar-
kets (which the Commission is pursuing with 
restraint as services are involved which are of 
general economic interest), is likewise helping 
to support employment policy. The exposing 
of former monopoly operators to competition 
and the introduction of new entrants to these 
markets leads almost immediately to an in-
crease in productivity and a reduction in run-
ning costs, leading in turn to lower charges for 
users and final consumers. This downward 
trend in the cost of utility services is a decisive 
factor in the competitiveness of European 
industry as a whole. The general strengthening 
of the competitiveness of our economy is 
supporting growth and employment. The liber-
alisation process generates rivalry among busi-
nesses looking for new products and services, 
an effect which is likely to stimulate job 
creation and consumer demand. The Commis-
sion's policy on the opening-up of such mar-
kets to competition will thus ultimately have a 
favourable impact on employment. FOREWORD BY MR KAREL VAN MIERT 
Of course, more competition also leads to 
restructuring, with the weakest going to the 
wall, which inevitably results in the short term 
in plant closures and job losses. In such 
circumstances there can be no getting away 
from the fact that measures to promote com-
petitiveness are in some cases, at least in the 
short run, job-destroying. Beyond growth-
based solutions, to which competition policy 
can actively contribute, a social response must 
be found to these short-term effects because, 
as Mr Santer has said, Europe cannot be just 
an economic project. I am a firm believer in 
the social dialogue: not only does it meet 
human needs, but it fits in with a new way of 
thinking about economic efficiency. Involving 
workers in strategic decisions of this type is, 
to my mind, conducive to greater competitive-
ness. A degree of flexibility must doubtless 
also be introduced into the labour market, as 
already recommended by the Commission's 
White Paper on growth, competitiveness and 
employment and as the Luxembourg Council 
rightly reiterated, workers must be encouraged 
to be more mobile both occupationally and 
geographically so as to facilitate redeployment 
in the new job-creating markets. 
There is another important area where the 
Commission applies the principle of economic 
and social cohesion, namely that of the moni-
toring of State aid. It is not for nothing that the 
conclusions of the Luxembourg summit focus 
on this aspect. Although Article 92 of the 
Treaty prohibits the granting to certain enter-
prises of government assistance which might 
distort competition in the common market, it 
does authorise aid to facilitate the restructur-
ing of firms in difficulty provided such aid, 
being definitively limited in time, is intended, 
not to keep firms afloat artificially, but to 
re-establish their long-term viability within a 
reasonable period. As regards regional aid, the 
Commission seeks on the basis of economic 
criteria to determine which are the least-
favoured areas of the Union and to establish 
for each of them the level of aid intensity so 
that the aid is targeted at those parts of the 
Union which are really experiencing difficul-
ties. The monitoring of State aid thus makes a 
decisive contribution to the economic and 
social cohesion of the European Union as a 
whole. 
I should lastly like to stress that the Commis-
sion pays particular attention to State aid 
measures for employment. Generally speak-
ing, it tries to ensure that such measures, 
which may take the form of, say, a reduction 
in social security contributions in one or more 
specific industries, do not have the effect of 
protecting those industries in one Member 
State, thereby merely exporting unemploy-
ment to other Member States. On the other 
hand, the Commission has shown flexibility 
and been favourably disposed towards em-
ployment aid for the least well-off categories 
of unemployed people and for deprived urban 
areas, while at the same time ensuring that the 
necessary safeguards are in place to ensure 
that the objective of the net creation of stable 
jobs is in fact attained. 
Enlargement of the European Union 
As the 21st century approaches, the European 
Union will in all probability welcome into its 
midst a number of new Member States for-
merly belonging to the central and east Euro-
pean bloc, the economies of which are, if not 
yet recovering, then at least convalescing. The 
Commission put forward proposals as part of 
its 'Agenda 2000' package with a view to 
preparing the ground for this new enlarge-
ment, which will not be without its difficulties. 
It recalled in this connection the conclusions 
of the Copenhagen European Council, which 
stated unequivocally that membership requires 
'the existence of a functioning market 
economy'. 
The Commission's priority task is to support 
the countries of central and eastern Europe in 
their drive to introduce and develop an attitude 
of competition-mindedness such as underlies 
any market economy. This is the objective of 
our cooperation with those countries, geared 
as it now is, following an initial phase of 
collaboration aimed at creating a body of 
legislation based largely on Community law, 
to providing technical assistance in the practi-
cal application of the competition rules. This 
provision of assistance is in my view particu-
larly important for a number of reasons. First, 
there can be no liberalised economy without a 
competitive spirit. The adoption of a competi-
tion culture in these countries, which have 
lived for more than 40 years under a con-
trolled economy system, is to my mind essen-
tial if there is to be a successful transition. 
Similarly, there can be no liberalised economy 
without safeguards to ensure that markets do 
function competitively. It is absolutely essen-
tial, therefore, that the authorities have at their 
disposal the legislative, institutional and hu-man means of policing those markets. This 
holds true today when the countries concerned 
are liberalising their economies, but it will 
apply with even greater force when they actu-
ally join the Community. When they accede to 
the Union, the countries of central and eastern 
Europe will thus be in step with their partners 
and better placed to take up the challenges of 
the single market. From the existing Member 
States' point of view, the adoption of this 
competition-minded approach will ensure a 
level playing field. 
The enlargement of the Union will inevitably 
lead to an increase in the number of notifica-
tions of agreements and State aid measures, 
and this in a tight budgetary situation which 
will doubtless not admit a parallel growth in 
the Commission's material and human re-
sources. Mindful of the need to redirect our 
monitoring effort more towards cases of mani-
fest importance to the Community as a whole, 
I have embarked upon a reshaping of policy 
on the notification of agreements of minor 
importance, approached national competition 
authorities about decentralising the application 
of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty in cases of 
a purely national nature, launched a wide-
ranging debate on vertical restraints and 
adopted a Green Paper on the subject, some of 
the proposals of which seek to establish 
thresholds below which there is a presumption 
of exemptability. This modernisation of Com-
munity law and practice in the competition 
sphere would no doubt have been needed 
anyway, but the prospect of eastward enlarge-
ment of the Union has speeded up the process 
and made it a top priority. 
This review of the main challenges facing the 
Community institutions bears out my view 
that competition policy can be expected to 
play a federating role in the years ahead. To 
the extent that, as I have just explained, the 
policy can contribute to the successful attain-
ment of the Union's principal objectives, I 
believe it is our duty to act in a spirit of even 
closer cooperation with other Community 
policies. The coordination of the Commis-
sion's various areas of activity is already 
highly developed, but it must do more than 
just ensure a necessary degree of administra-
tive efficiency, being given instead the force of 
a political principle. In the discharge of my 
responsibilities, I undertake to contribute ac-
tively to the achievement of this principle. XXVIIth Report 
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1. In European competition policy 1997 was 
a landmark year. The signing of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam confirmed the Commission's role 
as a competition authority, efforts to modern-
ise competition legislation were stepped up, 
and the Commission again demonstrated its 
intention of applying the European competi-
tion rules with measure and determination. 
1. The Amsterdam summit confirms 
the Commission's role(
1) 
2. The Amsterdam summit reaffirmed the 
Commission's role as the authority responsible 
for enforcing the competition rules, despite a 
proposal to quite the opposite effect which had 
been put forward at the Intergovernmental 
Conference; the Treaty likewise acknowledged 
the compatibility of the principles of free 
competition and services of general economic 
interest. This positive outcome should be in-
terpreted as a recognition on the part of the 
Member States of the work done by the 
Commission and the policy it has striven 
reasonably but firmly to pursue. 
3. Some Member States sought to question 
the application of Article 90 of the EC Treaty, 
which deals with tasks of general economic 
interest, and prohibits restrictions of competi-
tion going beyond what is indispensable to the 
performance of such tasks. They advocated 
'balancing' the provisions of the Treaty on this 
point, which they felt gave the concept of free 
competition too great a primacy over the 
concept of public service. 
4. The Commission has always taken the 
view that the Treaty does strike a balance 
between the two concepts, as it explained in 
its communication 'Services of general inter-
est in Europe' of 11 September 1996. The 
compatibility between liberalisation and the 
maintenance of high-quality public services is 
guaranteed by the wording of the Treaty itself. 
5. The debate ended with the inclusion in the 
Amsterdam Treaty of a new Article 7d dealing 
with services of general economic interest, 
accompanied by a declaration following the 
final act. The new article spells out the Com-
munity's attachment to the general economic 
interest more explicitly, by saying that public 
(') Karel Van Miert, 'La conference intergouvemementale et la 
politique communautaire de concurrence', in Competition policy 
newsletter. Number 2, Volume 3, summer 1997. 
services must be able to operate 'on the basis 
of principles and conditions which enable 
them to fulfil their missions', without preju-
dice to Articles 77, 90 and 92 of the EC 
Treaty. 
6. Other items concerning public services 
were also approved at the Intergovernmental 
Conference. These were a protocol on public 
broadcasting and a declaration on public credit 
institutions in Germany. 
7. The outcome of the conference is thus a 
satisfactory one from the point of view of 
competition policy, as the great institutional 
and legal balances of the Treaty have been 
preserved, and are given fresh legitimacy in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, and especially the 
new Article 7d. 
2. The modernisation of competition 
law 
8. To prepare itself for the next century, 
competition policy must adapt to the economic 
realities of the contemporary world, including 
such factors as the single market, technologi-
cal progress, and globalisation. Present legisla-
tion and practice are still rooted in the early 
years of the common market in the 1960s. 
Despite periodic alterations it seems clear that 
the legislation is out of step with the require-
ments of an effective policy, which has to 
consider the needs not only of businesses but 
also of a public authority responsible for 
protecting competition in a single market, with 
15 Member States, a market that is moving 
towards an economic and monetary union 
which will increase the comparability of prices 
and intensify trade, and preparing for enlarge-
"ment towards central and eastern Europe. A 
huge effort to modernise Community competi-
tion law is consequently under way. 
2.1. Antitrust policy 
9. In the antitrust sphere there were six 
legislative initiatives completed or launched in 
1997. The Council adopted the revised Merger 
Regulation. The Commission adopted a new 
de minimis notice; a notice on cooperation 
between Community and national competition 
authorities; and a notice on the definition of 
the relevant market. A review of the Commis-
sion's policy on vertical restraints, where a 
Green Paper has been followed by a process 
of consultation, should culminate in a formal  13 proposal in 1998, and a similar review of 
horizontal restraints has just begun. The objec-
tives being pursued in the modernisation pro-
cess are threefold: to adapt the legislation to 
market realities, and consequently to make it 
more effective both for the authorities and for 
the business community; to ensure dialogue 
and openness; and to apply the principle of 
subsidiarity. 
10. On 30 June the Council adopted a 
regulation amending Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations be-
tween undertakings (the 'Merger Regulation'); 
the proposal had been put forward by the 
Commission in 1996. The amended regulation 
entered into force on 1 March 1998. It simpli-
fies the vetting procedure for most of the 
mergers which hitherto had to be notified in 
several Member States, and harmonises the 
treatment of full-function joint ventures (')· 
Looking beyond the procedural improvements 
which were needed, the Commission wanted 
to resolve the major problem facing firms 
which were required to notify one and the 
same merger to the competition authorities of 
several countries unless the planned transac-
tion reached the turnover thresholds necessary 
to qualify as a transaction with a Community 
dimension. The Commission proposed to 
lower the thresholds across the board, but the 
Council did not accept this. The original 
thresholds have been maintained, but the 
scope of the regulation has been extended to 
include certain cross-border transactions be-
tween firms with turnovers below the thresh-
olds, which would not otherwise be caught by 
the regulation. Four special thresholds are laid 
down for such cases, all of which must be met. 
The Commission believes that this new frame-
work will allow most of the problems of 
multiple notification to be resolved. 
The second major point in this review is the 
extension of the scope of the regulation to 
include all full-function joint ventures. Busi-
ness people wanted to see the treatment of 
joint ventures simplified and harmonised, and 
the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission, has here decided to make no 
further distinctions among full-function joint 
ventures, which will all be subject to the 
procedures and deadlines laid down in the 
Merger Regulation. If there is coordination 
between the parents of a joint venture, the 
Commission, as well as considering the ques-
tion as to whether a dominant position is being 
created or strengthened, will also examine the 
transaction under Article 85 of the EC Treaty, 
but will do so in accordance with the proce-
dures laid down in the Merger Regulation. 
11. In order to lighten the administrative 
constraints on firms, and consequently to im-
prove the effectiveness of its own supervisory 
function, the Commission adopted a new no-
tice defining agreements of minor importance, 
known as de minimis agreements (
2); these are 
agreements that are not caught by Article 
85(1) of the EC Treaty because they have no 
appreciable effect on competition or trade 
between Member States. The notice is in line 
with the policy of helping small and medium-
sized enterprises in that it provides for a form 
of favourable treatment for such firms. It also 
makes for more openness in Commission 
practice as regards the application of Article 
85 of the EC Treaty. 
The main changes made to the earlier versions 
of the notice concern the thresholds below 
which any effect on competition or trade 
between Member States is not considered to 
be appreciable. The turnover threshold is done 
away with, and the market share thresholds are 
differentiated depending on whether the agree-
ment is between firms at the same level of 
distribution or marketing (a 'horizontal' agree-
ment) or between firms at different levels (a 
'vertical' agreement). There was previously a 
turnover threshold of ECU 300 million. Re-
moving it means that the notice will now 
apply to large enterprises with small shares of 
the relevant market. The market share thresh-
old stays at 5 % for horizontal agreements, 
and goes up to 10 % for vertical agreements. It 
may be that Article 85(1) will apply even 
below these thresholds, however, if the agree-
ment comprises any of a number of listed 
restrictions of competition which are contrary 
to the objectives of competition policy on 
account of their gravity, such as price fixing, 
production quotas, or market sharing. But as 
long as the effect of these agreements is felt at 
domestic rather than Community level, the 
Commission considers that in the first place it 
is for the authorities and courts of the Member 
States to take action. The Commission will 
intervene only when it considers that the 
14  (') Council Regulation (EC) No 1310/97 of 30 June 1997. OJ L 
180, 9.7.1997. 
(
2) Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 
372,9.12.1997. INTRODUCTION 
interest of the Community so demands, and in 
particular if the agreement impairs the proper 
functioning of the single market. Thus the 
notice is once again applying the principle of 
subsidiarity in the competition sphere. 
12. On 10 October the Commission adopted 
a notice on cooperation between national com-
petition authorities and the Commission in 
handling cases falling within the scope of 
Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty('). The 
notice pursues the goals of sound administra-
tion and subsidiarity. 
The notice is aimed at ensuring that where a 
case falls within the scope of Community law 
the enforcement of the Community rules will 
be the responsibility of just one competition 
authority. A one-stop shop has the advantage 
of simplifying the administrative process that 
firms have to go through, and improving legal 
certainty by removing the danger of contradic-
tory decisions. This division of labour will 
also make for more effective policing by the 
separate authorities. The Commission will be 
able to concentrate on cases with a real Com-
munity interest, while the national authorities, 
with their more thorough knowledge of do-
mestic markets, will be able to take more 
appropriate decisions at that level. 
To achieve this, the national authorities will 
have to be prepared to apply Community law 
themselves, or failing that to apply their own 
domestic law in such a way as to achieve a 
result similar to what would have been done 
under Community rules. It is desirable that the 
same substantive law should be applied, or 
that case-law be aligned, to prevent the devel-
opment of divergent interpretations of the 
competition rules; this would bring with it the 
danger of forum shopping, with firms seeking 
out the jurisdiction of the authority they feel 
will be most favourable to their interests. The 
notice accordingly calls on those Member 
States which have not already done so to 
adopt legislation enabling their competition 
authority to implement Articles 85(1) and 86 
of the EC Treaty effectively. 
The notice outlines an acceptable division of 
labour between the Commission and the na-
tional authorities. As a general rule the na-
tional authorities should handle cases whose 
main effects are felt inside their jurisdiction 
and which do not appear prima facie to 
qualify for exemption under Article 85(3) of 
the EC Treaty: the Commission continues to 
have exclusive power to grant such exemp-
tion. 
13. The Commission adopted a notice on the 
definition of the relevant market for the pur-
poses of Community competition law(
2), and 
in particular Council Regulation No 17, which 
implements Articles 85 and 86, and Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, the Merger 
Regulation. The notice is based on existing 
case-law and practice; it increases the trans-
parency of Commission policy in this complex 
area, and makes it easier for companies to 
anticipate its approach. The definition of the 
relevant market is a very important step in the 
analysis of cases, since it provides the frame 
of reference against which competition be-
tween the firms concerned has to be assessed. 
The relevant product market and the relevant 
geographic market form the basis for the 
measurement of market shares that convey 
meaningful information regarding market 
power for use in assessing dominance or 
applying Articles 85 and 86. The Commission 
generally bases its analysis on demand substi-
tutability: in other words, the relevant market 
comprises the products or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable by the consumer 
in a given geographic area, by reason for 
example of their prices and intended use. But 
the Commission does not rule out the possibil-
ity of referring to supply-side substitutability 
in certain circumstances. 
14. Last year the Commission invited debate 
on the review of its policy on 'vertical re-
straints', or agreements between producers 
and distributors. The Commission wants the 
best possible machinery for combating anti-
competitive restrictions of this kind, which 
can act as an obstacle to the achievement of a 
dynamic and efficient single market, and 
wherever possible would like to lighten the 
administrative burdens imposed by the present 
system. 
The Commission published a Green Paper on 
the subject on 22 January (
3). It sets out four 
options: maintaining the current system; wider 
(') Commission notice on cooperation between national competi-
tion authorities and the Commission in handling cases falling 
within the scope of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 
313, 15.10.1997. 
(
2) Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997. 
(
3) COM(96) 721.  15 block exemptions; more focused block exemp-
tions; and the introduction of a rebuttable 
presumption of compatibility with Article 
85(1)0). 
In the course of the consultation process 
which followed the publication of the Green 
Paper, the Commission received over 200 
written submissions; it also consulted the 
Community institutions and the authorities in 
the Member States. It organised hearings at 
which compames could put forward their 
views. Certain tendencies have come to the 
fore, but no consensus has yet emerged. Mem-
ber States appear to favour a thoroughgoing 
reform of the present system. Business like-
wise wants change, but emphasises that any 
new system would have to guarantee legal 
certainty. On the basis of these consultations 
the Commission hopes to put forward a pro-
posal in 1998. 
15. The Commission has decided to under-
take a comparable exercise with respect to 
'horizontal' agreements. The objective here 
would be the same, namely to adapt the 
existing law and practice, especially the block 
exemptions for research and development 
agreements and specialisation agreements, 
whose validity has been extended for three 
years pending a possible review. In the course 
of the year the Commission sent a question-
naire to a broad sample of European busi-
nesses in order to assemble information on the 
nature of horizontal cooperation, and to evalu-
ate the relevance of current law and practice. 
2.2. State aid 
16. The Commission regularly has to adapt 
its policy on State aid to take account of 
developments arising out of the growing inte-
gration of markets following the establishment 
of the single market. It frequently revises the 
competition rules in this respect. In its 'Fifth 
survey on State aid' the Commission observed 
that the volume of public aid continued at high 
levels; in the 'Action plan for the single 
market' it undertook to present new guidelines 
for regional aid, to tighten its guidelines on 
rescue and restructuring aid, and to carry out a 
more detailed examination of major cases, 
using a set of cross-industry guidelines or a 
'multisectoral framework' which would re-
quire notification of all individual cases in 
which fairly substantial aid was to be granted 
under regional schemes (
2). The Commission 
reached decisions on regional aid and the 
multisectoral framework in 1997. 
17. The Commission makes constant efforts 
to improve openness or transparency, and to 
simplify the rules in force. It presented a 
proposal for a Council regulation, to be 
adopted under Article 94, which would em-
power the Commission to exempt certain cat-
egories of horizontal aid from the notification 
requirement, subject to certain conditions. It 
will shortly be presenting another proposal 
under Article 94 for a procedural regulation 
codifying all the procedures applying to State 
aid measures. 
18. As part of the work in progress on 
measures to limit harmful tax competition, the 
Commission considers that some clarification 
is needed of the application of Article 92 of 
the EC treaty to tax measures. In a communi-
cation to the Council entitled 'Towards tax 
coordination in the European Union' the Com-
mission undertook to present 'a communica-
tion that clarifies and refines its policy on the 
application of the State aid rules to fiscal 
measures in the light of developments in the 
single market.' (
3) 
3. Statistics on Commission activity 
in applying Community law in 1997 
19. The Commission continued to demon-
strate its determination to apply the Commu-
nity competition rules with firmness. Once 
again there was very intense activity in all 
areas within the Commission's competence. 
The total number of new cases was 1 338, 
comprising 500 cases under Articles 85, 86 or 
90, 182 mergers, and 656 State aid cases (
4); 
this is an appreciable increase over 1996, 
being 92 cases more. The increase is not 
spread evenly over the three categories: the 
number of new State aid cases was steady, 
while new merger cases grew substantially (up 
31 %). The number of cases closed was 1 165: 
there were 517 Articles 85 and 86 cases, 146 
mergers, and 502 State aid cases, which is an 
increase of about 104 by comparison with the 
previous year. 
16 
(') 1996 Competition Report, points 46 to 50. 
(
2) ECS(97) 1 final, 4.6.1997. 
(
3) COM(97) 495 final. 
(*) Including 10 ECSC mergers. INTRODUCTION 
20. In the antitrust sphere the Commission 
dealt with more than 500 cases. It took one 
decision under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, 
finding against an exchange of sensitive infor-
mation, and one decision under Article 86 of 
the EC Treaty condemning the abuse of a 
dominant position. In many cases it granted 
exemption under Article 85(3) of the EC 
Treaty, or terminated Article 86 proceedings 
after the firms involved changed their agree-
ments or showed that they had put an end to 
the offending practices so as to resolve the 
competition problems identified by the Com-
mission departments. 
21. The Commission took 146 formal deci-
sions in merger cases ('), including one prohi-
bition decision and seven conditional authori-
sations granted on a second-stage inquiry, after 
the notifying parties had given undertakings 
which resolved the competition problems 
identified. There were particularly tough nego-
tiations in some delicate cases, an example 
being Boeing/McDonnell Douglas. 
22. Turning to compliance with the competi-
tion rules on the part of public enterprises and 
State monopolies, the Commission adopted 
three decisions finding conduct to be incom-
patible with the EC Treaty under Article 90: 
two were against port authorities in Italy, and 
one against the Flemish authorities in Bel-
gium, who had given a private television 
channel the exclusive right to broadcast adver-
tising aimed at Dutch-speaking viewers in the 
country. 
23. The number of State aid cases being 
dealt with continues to be high; the total 
number of Commission decisions increased 
slightly in 1997. The year was marked by an 
increase in the number of decisions to initiate 
more detailed inquiry proceedings. Given a 
steady volume of new cases, this implied a 
further burden of work for the Commission 
departments. The increase in the number of 
cases in which inquiry proceedings were initi-
ated is also symptomatic of the growing com-
plexity of the cases the Commission has to 
consider. 
4. The liberalisation process 
24. In accordance with the principle of ac-
cess for all Union citizens to services of 
general economic interest, the Commission 
actively supports a policy of liberalisation of 
public monopoly network industries such as 
telecommunications, energy and transport, be-
cause it is convinced that liberalisation of 
these markets brings benefits in terms of im-
proved productivity, lower operating costs, 
and lower consumer prices. It is in transport 
and in telecommunications that the process 
has advanced furthest. The liberalisation of air 
transport took effect on 1 April 1997, and the 
liberalisation of voice telephony services on 1 
January 1998. 
25. Following on from a Council resolution 
of 22 December 1994, a Commission directive 
of 13 March 1996 (
2) provided that competi-
tion was to be introduced in voice telephony 
and the provision of infrastructures on 1 Janu-
ary 1998 (
3). This liberalisation programme 
was boosted by the signature of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement on 
basic telecommunications services, which pro-
vided for a gradual liberalisation of the tel-
ecommunications markets of most of the Eu-
ropean Umon's trading partners, 
26. To ensure the success of this liberalisa-
tion drive the Commission took a number of 
measures. It wanted to be sure that the Mem-
ber States had satisfied their obligations under 
Community law, and transposed the directive 
into their domestic law in time to ensure that 
the regulatory framework was ready by 1 
January 1998. On 29 May the Commission 
approved an initial report finding that most 
Member States had transposed the whole of 
the regulatory framework, or would have done 
so by the end of the year. But there were also 
countries where only the main principles 
would have been transposed by then. The 
Commission would strive to ensure that the 
measures adopted were completed and prop-
erly applied. The Commission also observed 
that in some Member States the domestic 
regulatory framework was very advanced and 
went beyond the requirements of the directive. 
Bearing in mind the different levels of net-
work development in the Union, the Commis-
sion wanted to pursue a balanced liberalisation 
policy; it thus acknowledged the need to give 
some Member States (Ireland, Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and Luxembourg) more time, so 
as to allow for the state and dimensions of 
(') Including 10 ECSC decisons. 
(
2) Commission Directive 96/19/EC amending Directive 
90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full competi-
tion in telecomunications markets, OJ L 74, 22.3.1996. 
(
3) An extension has been granted to five Member States.  17 their networks. None of the dates for liberali-
sation is beyond the year 2000. 
27. The Commission likewise believes that 
the absence of a single liberalised market in 
energy is a serious competitive disadvantage 
for European businesses as compared with 
those of its main trading partners, who gener-
ally enjoy lower costs. At the end of 1996 the 
Council adopted the directive the Commission 
had proposed regarding common rules on the 
single market in electricity, which, once it 
enters into force in 1999, should lead to more 
than 50 % of the market being opened up on 
average('). The central ideas here are the 
liberalisation of production and access to the 
market by outsiders, which will allow some 
electricity buyers to exploit price competition 
between power generators. From an opera-
tional point of view the directive proposes an 
alternative: either direct access to infrastruc-
tures, or access to the market via the operator 
of the network, who would become the sole 
buyer and seller of electricity. The Commis-
sion has also put forward proposals for com-
mon rules governing the single market in 
natural gas(
2). The Council meeting on energy 
held in December signalled the Council's 
agreement to the Commission proposals. 
28. In addition to its legislative activities, the 
Commission plays a watchdog role in that it 
supervises the liberalisation process by initiat-
ing infringement proceedings against Member 
States under Article 169 of the EC Treaty. In 
1997, for example, it initiated proceedings 
against seven Member States for failure to 
implement the liberalisation of telecommuni-
cations. 
30. Central and eastern Europe offers enor-
mous scope for bilateral action on the part of 
the Commission in the competition sphere, 
particularly with a view to future enlargements 
of the Union to take in these countries. The 
association agreements between the Union and 
the countries of the former eastern bloc call on 
the eastern countries to adopt the principles of 
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty and the State 
aid rules in their own legislation. The Com-
mission is to monitor this, and to help with the 
introduction of the new rules. An annual con-
ference at which all the competition authori-
ties of these countries are represented allows a 
regular stocktaking, which is particularly im-
portant ahead of forthcoming accessions. 
31. In the year under review the conference 
took place in Sofia in Bulgaria. The Commis-
sion expressed satisfaction at the enactment of 
new antitrust legislation in Hungary and 
Romania, and the preparation of competition 
legislation in Estonia and Slovenia. New 
needs are being felt with respect to the appli-
cation of this legislation, and the Commission 
said it was ready to provide the necessary 
assistance. 
But State aid policy is nowhere near as devel-
oped in the associated States. The authorities 
responsible for supervising State aid have, as a 
rule, been set up only recently. One of their 
greatest difficulties is the lack of transparency 
and of an inventory of State aid measures. The 
Commission is encouraging its partners to 
continue with their reforms, and undertakes to 
help them to introduce State aid guidelines 
which take account of the special circum-
stances of these economies in transition. 
5. International relations 
29. The Commission's competition policy 
would be less effective if the Commission 
were not also active at international level. The 
increasing globalisation of markets has neces-
sarily led the Commission to interest itself in 
extra-Community trade. This is reflected in 
bilateral cooperation with non-Community 
countries, and in active collaboration on the 
part of the Community authorities in multilat-
eral organisations dealing with competition 
questions. 
18 
(') Parliament and Council Directive (EC) No 96/92 of 19 Decem-
ber 1996, OJ L 27, 30.1.1997. 
(
2) COM(91) 548 final and COM(93) 643 final. 
32. Cooperation between the Commission 
and non-Community competition authorities 
takes place under bilateral agreements aimed 
at combating anticompetitive practices with a 
global dimension and those that national and 
regional systems cannot deal with. This is the 
case with the agreement between the European 
Community and the United States concluded 
in 1991 and approved by the Council in 1995. 
This type of agreement essentially provides 
for coordination between authorities, rules of 
international comity, and an exchange of infor-
mation regarding operations affecting the mar-
kets of the two partners, always subject of 
course to the obligation of confidentiality. The 
agreement does not prevent differences of 
view, but it has proved a useful way of 
improving the effectiveness of the competition INTRODUCTION 
machinery on both sides of the Atlantic. Nego-
tiations have recently been going on with a 
view to improving Euro-American coopera-
tion. The draft of a new agreement provides 
that under mies of international comity one of 
the parties is to adjourn or to stay its own 
supervisory activity in respect of an anticom-
petitive practice which primarily affects the 
territory of the other, provided the other is 
disposed to act. If adopted the draft should 
reduce the extraterritorial application of com-
petition rules. The Commission hopes that the 
draft agreement can be approved shortly. 
33. In the past the two parties' competition 
authorities have had fruitful exchanges on the 
basis of the existing agreement, sometimes in 
quite sensitive cases, such as Sprint/Sandoz-
Geigy, without encountering major difficulties. 
There was satisfactory cooperation this year 
too, in cases such as Santa Cruz/Microsoft and 
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan. In Guinness/ 
Grand Metropolitan, the Community and US 
authorities had identical views on the solutions 
to the competition problems they had identi-
fied on the spirits markets in the United States 
and Europe. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas is the 
only case in which the two authorities did not 
adopt the same point of view. The Commis-
sion's inquiries led it to the conclusion that the 
merger might help to strengthen a dominant 
position already held by Boeing on the world 
market in large commercial jet aircraft. The 
only remaining competitor would be Airbus. 
After tough negotiations with the companies, 
the Commission considered that the undertak-
ings offered by Boeing were enough to re-
move the competition concerns. The case 
shows that the Commission is capable of 
ensuring compliance with the Community 
competition rules on markets with a global 
dimension. It also shows that the European 
Union and the United States can take diver-
gent views of some transactions. Here the 
Commission showed its willingness to apply 
the European competition rules without calling 
into question the principle of close and 
frank cooperation with the US competition 
authorities. 
34. A similar cooperation agreement be-
tween the Community authorities and the 
Canadian authorities was finalised at the be-
ginning of the summer. It has to be adopted 
jointly by the Commission and the Council 
after Parliament has first delivered its opinion. 
35. The Commission's international activi-
ties in the competition sphere are not confined 
to these bilateral relations. The Commission is 
also active in multilateral matters; in particu-
lar, it participates in meetings of the WTO and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO, which met in Singa-
pore in December, set up a working party to 
study problems arising in trade and coopera-
tion policy. The working party has held sev-
eral meetings in Geneva, and has shown that 
there is growing interest in competition ques-
tions among developing countries. 
19 I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
A — Changes in the legislative 
and interpretative rules 
1. Revision of the 'cte minimis' notice 
36. To reduce the administrative constraints 
encumbering firms, particularly as regards the 
notification of agreements, the Commission 
adopted in 1970 a notice on agreements of 
minor importance (')· Such agreements have 
no significant effect either on competition or 
on intra-Community trade and, consequently, 
are not caught by Article 85(1), which prohib-
its agreements between undertakings. The in-




4). It was clear, however, 
that the arrangements did not meet firms' 
requirements: agreements of minor importance 
continued to be notified to the Commission 
and to burden the monitoring departments 
unnecessarily, to the detriment of the principle 
of sound administration. This is why a new 
notice (
5) was adopted on 15 October 1997, 
with the threefold purpose of clarifying the 
Commission's interpretation of what consti-
tutes an agreement of minor importance, eas-
ing the burden of administrative constraints 
while providing legal certainty for undertak-
ings and, hence, making monitoring more 
effective by concentrating efforts on cases 
with a definite impact on the single market. 
The notice is also part of the policy of assist-
ing small and medium-sized firms by giving 
them a number of specific advantages. Lastly, 
the instrument helps to make the Commis-
sion's practice concerning the application of 
Article 85 more transparent. 
37. The major change compared with the 
1986 and 1994 instruments concerns the level 
of the thresholds below which Article 8,5 is not 
applied. Two alterations have been made: the 
turnover criterion has been abolished, and a 
distinction has been drawn in terms of market-
share thresholds between horizontal and verti-
cal agreements. The earlier, turnover-based 
threshold of ECU 300 million has been abol-
ished. Large undertakings which easily met 
this first threshold but which had modest 
(') Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 
64, 2.6.1970. 
(
2) Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 
313,29.12.1977. 
C
3) Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 
231, 12.9.1986. 
(
4) Revised Commission notice on agreements of minor importance. 
OJ C 368. 23.12.1994. 
(') Commission notice on agreements of minor importance, OJ C 
372,9.12.1997. 
market shares on a given market were system-
atically and improperly excluded from the 
benefit of the previous notice. From now on, 
therefore, they can enjoy the advantages con-
ferred by the new notice. The market-share 
threshold, for its part, is differentiated. For 
horizontal agreements, the ceding remains 
fixed at 5 % of the total market, but for 
vertical agreements the ceiling is raised to 
10 %. This distinction between horizontal and 
vertical agreements, which involves raising 
the threshold of non-applicability for the latter, 
is based on the presumption that an anti-
competitive practice committed within verti-
cally linked companies has a less serious 
impact on markets. 
38. Below these thresholds, Article 85 will, 
however, still be applied to agreements lead-
ing to restrictions of competition that are by 
their nature incompatible with the objectives 
of the Treaty. Such restrictions are 'black-
listed' in the notice, which is an innovation. 
They comprise horizontal agreements which 
have as their object to fix prices or to limit 
production or sales, and to share markets or 
sources of supply; they also comprise vertical 
agreements designed to fix resale prices or 
containing territorial protection clauses. 
39. Below the thresholds, and taking account 
of the market shares in question, such repre-
hensible agreements will probably have a 
national rather than a Community impact. This 
is why the Commission considers that, below 
the thresholds, it is the courts and competition 
authorities of the Member States which should 
act first, either under Article 85(1) or under 
national law. The Commission will examine 
such agreements only where it believes that 
the Community interest so requires and in 
particular if they adversely affect the function-
ing of the single market. 
40. Lastly, new provisions beneficial to inde-
pendent small and medium-sized undertak-
ings, as defined in the Commission's recom-
mendation of 1996 (
6), have been inserted in 
the new instrument. Agreements entered into 
by independent SMEs whose annual turnover 
and balance-sheet total do not exceed ECU 40 
million and 27 million respectively and which 
have a maximum of 250 employees will not, 
in principle, be investigated by the Commis-
sion. The latter reserves the right to intervene, 
(
6) Commission recommendation concerning the definition of 
SMEs, OJ L 107, 30.4.1996.  21 however, where such agreements significantly 
impede competition in a substantial part of the 
relevant market or where competition is re-
stricted by the cumulative effect of parallel 
networks of similar agreements made between 
several producers or dealers. 
2. Notice on cooperation between 
Community and national competition 
authorities 
41. The Commission had already expressed 
its wish to decentralise the application of 
Community competition law when, in 1993, it 
adopted a notice intended to provide the 
ground rules for cooperation between its de-
partments and national courts ('). So as to 
strengthen the incentive to decentralise, it 
adopted, on 10 October 1997, a notice in-
tended to clarify the conditions for coopera-
tion between itself and the Member States' 
competition authorities in handling cases 
caught by Articles 85 and 86 (
2). The notice is 
the result of wide consultations with all the 
Community institutions, the Member States 
and business representatives(
3). 
42. Its purpose, mainly, is to decentralise the 
application of the Community competition 
rules so as to make them more effective. To 
this end, it provides that each competition 
authority in the Member States will handle the 
cases whose effects are basically felt on its 
territory, though without calling into question 
the Commission's exclusive power to grant 
exemptions. 
It describes the practical cooperation sought 
between the competition authorities of the 
Member States and the Commission. The 
arrangements are designed to ensure the estab-
lishment of a one-stop shop for monitoring 
cases which are covered by Community com-
petition law, so as to reduce the risk of 
contradictory decisions and to simplify, as 
much as possible, the administrative formali-
ties with which firms must comply. 
For this objective to be achieved, the Commis-
sion believes it is desirable for the national 
22 
(') Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commis-
sion in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, OJ C 39, 
13.2.1993. 
(
2) Notice on cooperation between national competition authorities 
and the Commission in handling cases falling within the scope 
of Articles 85 or 86 of the EC Treaty, OJ C 313, 15.10.1997. 
(
3) 1996 Competition Report, points 30 to 33. 
authorities themselves to apply Community 
law direct or, failing that, to reach, pursuant to 
their national law, a result similar to that of 
applying Community law. Such harmonisation 
will make it possible to prevent divergent 
solutions to common problems from arising 
and firms from being tempted to seek out 
whichever authority seems to them to be the 
most favourable to their interests. This is why 
the notice invites those Member States which 
have not already done so to acquire their own 
legislation enabling their competition author-
ity to implement Articles 85(1) and 86 effec-
tively. 
The notice lays down the guidelines for an 
appropriate allocation of tasks between the 
Commission and the national supervisory 
authorities, which most of the Member States 
now have. Generally speaking, the national 
authorities will handle cases the effects of 
which are felt in their territory and which 
appear, upon preliminary examination, un-
likely to qualify for exemption under Article 
85(3), for which the Commission has exclu-
sive competence. The Commission cannot 
therefore decentralise cases which are notified 
to it with a view to exemption under Article 
85(3). 
43. The notice is intended to facilitate coop-
eration and consequently provides for specific 
implementing arrangements. A distinction is 
drawn between cases which the Commission 
deals with first and those which go first to a 
national authority. In the former category, the 
Cornmission decentralises complaint-based 
cases only if it alone can handle the own-
initiative procedures and notifications. If the 
national authority agrees to handle the com-
plaint — rejected for lack of Community 
interest — the Commission will hand over to 
that authority the documents in its possession. 
In the latter category, the Commission recom-
mends that the Member States inform it of the 
proceedings which they initiate, in particular 
in cases of special interest for the Community. 
Cooperation between them, therefore, may 
take the form of suspension of a decision by 
the national authority or of a formal consulta-
tion of the Commission. The Commission 
emphasises that it will regard dilatory notifica-
tions, made in order primarily to obstruct 
national proceedings, as not having priority. 
The application of the notice will be reviewed 
annually. Provision is also made for the notice ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
itself to be completely reviewed by the end of 
the fourth year after its adoption. 
3. Notice on the definition 
of relevant market 
44. To improve the transparency of its com-
petition policy, both for business and the legal 
community, the Commission adopted, on 15 
October 1997, a notice on the relevant market 
for the purposes of Community competition 
law(') and, in particular, of Regulation No 
17 (
2) and Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 (
3), 
the Merger Regulation. Such clarification is 
evidence of the Commission's willingness to 
increase the predictability of its market analy-
ses for practitioners of Community competi-
tion law. The definition of the relevant market 
is a very important stage in competition analy-
sis, since it provides the context in which the 
degree of competition between firms will be 
assessed. 
The main purpose of market definition is 
systematically to identify the competitive con-
straints on the firms involved. The objective, 
as regards both the product and geographic 
dimensions, is to identify those actual com-
petitors of the firms involved that are capable 
of constraining the firms' behaviour and of 
preventing them from behaving independently 
of effective competitive pressure. Accordingly, 
the relevant market is an analytical tool which 
makes it possible, in particular, to calculate 
firms' market shares. These will provide a 
preliminary indication of their market power, 
for the purposes of assessing dominance or 
applying Article 85. 
The Commission, as a general mie, bases its 
analysis on the substitutability of demand. In 
other words, the relevant market is made up of 
those products or services which the consumer 
considers to be mutually interchangeable in a 
given geographic area, in particular as regards 
use and price. This means that the relevant 
market, defined as the products or services 
sold in a given geographic area by the firms 
involved in the proceedings, comprises the 
(') Commission notice on the definition of relevant market for the 
purposes of Community competition law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997. 
(
2) Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, OJ 13, 
21.2.1962. 
(
3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989, 
OJ L 395, 30.12.1989, corrected in OJ L 257, 21.9.1990, and 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2367/90 of 25 July 1990, OJ 
L 219, 14.8.1990, as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 3666/93 of 15 December 1993, OJ L 336, 31.12.1993. 
products or services and the marketing areas 
which are likely to affect or sufficiently limit 
the competitive behaviour of the firms in 
question. Supply-side substitutability may also 
be taken into account when defining markets 
in situations where its impact is equivalent to 
that of demand substitution in terms of effec-
tiveness and immediacy. 
The notice is intended to be as empirical as 
possible and is based on the Commission's 
previous case-law. It tries to set out in coher-
ent, readable fashion the economic principles 
on which the Commission bases its approach 
to the definition of relevant markets. Thus it 
lists the types of evidence which make defini-
tion possible. With regard to the product mar-
ket, the Commission takes account in particu-
lar of actual substitutions in the recent past, 
the results of econometric estimates, the views 
of customers and competitors, market research 
and the degree of resistance to change shown 
by users. To establish the geographic dimen-
sion of the relevant market, it uses inter alia 
the movements associated with price varia-
tions, the socio-cultural characteristics of de-
mand, customer and competitor behaviour, 
trade flows and the various barriers to entry, 
such as transport costs. The combination of all 
these factors results in the identification of the 
relevant market. 
4. Review of the policy 
on vertical restraints 
45. Last year the Commission began a re-
view of its policy on vertical restraints. This 
was given firmer shape with the publication of 
a Green Paper, adopted on 22 January 1997 (
4). 
The discussion paper triggered wide debate on 
the effects of vertical restraints and on the 
need to review the instruments and the Com-
mission's current practices in this field. The 
Community institutions, the Member States, 
business and the legal community all took part 
in the debate, which also attracted the atten-
tion of our trading partners. The Commis-
sion's paper contemplates four options: main-
taining the current system; widening the scope 
of block exemptions; limiting the scope of 
current block exemptions; and a rebuttable 




4) COM(96) 721. 
(
5) 1996 Competition Report, points 46 to 50.  23 During the consultation process, the Commis-
sion received more than two hundred contribu-
tions from the various parties involved. Hear-
ings were held with the representatives of the 
Member States and with those of business. 
These fruitful exchanges made it possible to 
identify trends, though not yet to say what the 
consensus is. The Member States appear to 
favour replacing the current framework with a 
new system of exemption or negative clear-
ance, up to a certain threshold of market 
power. Business, for its part, is willing to 
change, but stresses that any new system 
should be based on legal certainty. 
The Commission must now draw together the 
information and ideas it has gathered and put 
forward a proposal that reflects the concerns 
of business and the public authorities. It 
should be able to present a proposal in 1998. 
5. Review of the policy 
on horizontal agreements 
46. The Commission decided this year to 
begin assessing its policy on horizontal agree-
ments. It is resolved, if necessary, to revise 
and adapt the texts and its current practices, in 
particular the exemption regulations relating to 
research and development agreements and 
specialisation agreements, whose validity has 
been extended for three years (') with a view 
to possible revision. 
47. The first stage of this exercise was a 
thorough examination of the Commission's 
policy in this field. As well as carrying out an 
internal study within DG IV, the Commission 
consulted the business world. In July it sent 
150 questionnaires to a cross-section of firms 
(120) and trade associations (30) to gather 
information on the objectives, forms and pat-
terns of horizontal cooperation and to assess 
the relevance of the regulations and notices in 
force. The Commission considers itself satis-
fied with the results. It received 94 replies. 
The survey reveals a major trend towards 
more cooperation between undertakings in re-
cent years, in order in particular to respond to 
the challenges of globalisation, the rapid de-
velopment of advanced technologies and 
fiercer competition. The majority of the under-
takings replying seem to consider that the 
current instruments meet their real require-
ments only imperfectly. A need to review the 
Commission's policy on horizontal coopera-
tion has therefore emerged. 
The Commission also contacted the competi-
tion authorities of the Member States to re-
quest their assistance in carrying out a com-
parative study of the various systems of super-
vising horizontal agreements in the Member 
States. 
6. Guidelines on setting fines 
48. On 3 December the Commission took 
note of the guidelines on the method of setting 
fines imposed pursuant to Article 15(2) of 
Regulation No 17 and Article 65(5) of the 
ECSC Treaty, drawn up by DG IV and pre-
sented to the College of Commissioners by Mr 
Van Miert. The publication of the guide-
lines (
2) is intended to improve the transpar-
ency and effectiveness of the Commission's 
decision-taking practice. It is directed both at 
firms and their legal advisers and at the Com-
munities' judicial institutions. The application 
of the principles set out in the guidelines will 
also help to make the Commission's policy on 
fines more coherent and to strengthen the 
deterrence of the financial penalties. 
49. The method of calculating the fine is 
now based on the determination of a basic 
amount expressed in ecus. This is increased to 
take account of possible aggravating circum-
stances or reduced to reflect possible attenuat-
ing circumstances. The basic amount is deter-
mined according to the gravity and duration of 
the infringement. The guidelines provide an 
indicative list within the limits set by Article 
15(2) of Regulation No 17 or Article 65(5) of 
the ECSC Treaty. Aggravating circumstances 
include repeated infringement, refusal to coop-
erate or the role of leader in the infringement; 
attenuating circumstances include an exclu-
sively passive role in the infringement or 
termination of the infringement as soon as the 
Commission intervenes. Under the heading 
'General comments', the document states that, 
where possible, objective factors such as any 
economic or financial benefit derived by the 
offenders or the ability of the firms in question 
to pay should also be taken into account. 
50. The guidelines supplement the arrange-
ments provided for in the Commission notice 
of 18 July 1996 on the non-imposition or 
24 
(') OJ L306, 11.11.1997.  (
2) OJC9. 14.1.1998. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
reduction of fines where an undertaking coop­
erates effectively in the proceedings ('). The 
two instruments form a whole, which the 
Commission considers will make its policy in 
this field more effective, more coherent and 
more, clear. 
Β — Applying the competition rules 
to support market integration 
1. Exchanges of information 
51. On 26 November 1997, the Commission 
adopted, under Article 65 of the ECSC Treaty, 
a decision prohibiting an information ex­
change system, which was notified by the 
association of German steel undertakings 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl and which was 
meant to group together the main German 
producers. The agreement, which was not 
implemented, provided for the exchange of 
sensitive, recent and individualised data on 
about 40 steel products, covering all the Mem­
ber States. Such an exchange of information in 
mature and highly concentrated markets is a 
serious restriction of competition, since it 
heightens the market transparency to the point 
where any attempt at independent, pro-
competitive behaviour would be exposed to 
retaliatory measures by competitors, who can 
easily determine its origin. 
2. Action to promote the creation 
of the single market: combating 
the partitioning of markets 
52. Competition policy contributes to the 
Community objective of creating a single mar­
ket and plays a crucial role in bringing it 
about, in particular by promoting the opening-
up of markets. Articles 85 and 86 provide the 
Commission with effective means to this end. 
They apply both to horizontal agreements 
between undertakings, which are designed to 
divide up national or interregional markets, 
and to vertical relationships between manufac­
turers and distributors, which may isolate 
those markets so that integration is slowed 
down or seriously impeded. 
53. As the Green Paper on the subject indi­
cates, the Commission is particularly alert to 
(') Commission notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines 
in cartel cases, OJ C 207, 18.7.1996 and 1996 Competition 
Report, points 34 and 35. 
the effects of agreements and restrictive prac­
tices in distribution networks which impede 
intra-Community trade. Some exclusive distri­
bution agreements lead to the introduction of 
distribution systems based on national territory 
and to the foreclosure of each of the markets 
thus isolated, in particular by prohibiting each 
distributor from supplying customers estab­
lished in another contract territory. Such re­
strictions are particularly intolerable where 
there are price differences between Member 
States and where consumers in the Union 
cannot have access to the markets with the 
lowest prices. They are intolerable since they 
limit competition and prevent the convergence 
of prices within the Union. The damaging 
effects of such a situation will be even more 
striking when economic and monetary union is 
implemented. 
54. As in previous years, the Commission 
has spared no effort in combating horizontal 
agreements which result in the partitioning of 
markets. Thus it sent the United Kingdom 
association of manufacturers and distributors 
of dental equipment, the British Dental Trade 
Association (BDTA), a comfort letter regard­
ing the latter's rules and regulations on fairs 
and exhibitions, once it had ascertained that 
there was no provision or practice which 
discriminated against undertakings from third 
countries wishing to display equipment at fairs 
and exhibitions organised by the BDTA. Simi­
larly, when joint control of Costa Crociere, an 
undertaking specialising in Mediterranean 
cruises, was acquired by Carnival Corporation 
and Airtours (operating in North America and 
northern Europe respectively), the Commis­
sion considered that the agreements setting up 
the joint venture were caught by Article 85(1), 
since they limited the growth of the acquirers 
on their joint venture's markets (they were 
reserving the Mediterranean market for Costa 
Crociere). However, the Commission granted 
this agreement an exemption, given the ex­
pected improvement for the consumer in terms 
of commercial services and moderate prices. 
Lastly, in another case concerning the creation 
of a joint venture, for the production of lubri­
cants between the undertakings Hydro Texaco 
Holdings A/S (Texaco) and Preem, both active 
in the oil industry, the Commission agreed to 
exempt the agreement only after the parties 
had changed the clauses which isolated the 
Swedish market for the distribution of lubri­
cants through an exclusive distribution licence 
granted to Preem by Texaco. When the agree­
ments have been changed, the parties will be  25 free to obtain lubricants from the supplier of 
their choice wherever situated. 
55. The Commission has shown similar 
willingness with regard to vertical links. It 
has attempted in particular to check that the 
setting-up of a joint venture, often justified 
at the production stage on grounds relating 
to the cost of investment in the research and 
development of new products or to the 
achievement of economies of scale, does not 
result in anticompetitive behaviour at the 
distribution stage. Thus the Commission au-
thorised the creation of a joint venture in the 
tyre sector between Michelin and Continental 
after ascertaining that the changes to the 
agreements made by the parties had the 
effect of removing doubts about possible 
cooperation between the founders in die mar-
keting of the joint venture's products on 
their respective distribution networks. It also 
took account of the fact that a joint franchis-
ing project had been abandoned. The Com-
mission warned the parties that their market-
ing practices would continue to be super-
vised. Similarly, when a joint venture was 
set up between Sanofi and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, which was designed to develop, pro-
duce and market new active molecules 
against cardiovascular disease, the Commis-
sion took an active interest in the conditions 
for marketing the new products in the Mem-
ber States. Given the complementary nature 
of the founders' businesses and the pro-
competitive situation on the markets in ques-
tion, where generic products play an impor-
tant role, the new entity is not considered to 
restrict competition significantly. 
3. Distribution of motor vehicles 
56. The Commission's monitoring of the 
block exemption regulation relating to the 
distribution and servicing of motor vehicles(') 
continues to be of great importance in the 
automobile sector. The Commission has had to 
deal with a great number of submissions from 
consumers and individuals in this connection 
regarding various aspects of car distribution in 
the European Union. 
57. In its biannual reports on car prices (
2), 
which are made widely available to the public, 
the Commission has found that car prices 
within the Community still differ substantially, 
thus providing strong incentives for parallel 
trade. As a result of this increased price 
transparency, the Commission has continued 
to receive letters from final consumers and 
intermediaries acting on their behalf who have 
encountered obstacles in buying cars outside 
their own Member State, in particular in Fin-
land, Denmark, and the Netherlands. In these 
countries, dealers have often refused to sell to 
non-residents or requested a price supplement. 
As a result of the strength of the pound 
sterling, residents from the United Kingdom 
have increasingly been seeking to acquire 
right-hand drive cars on the continent. In 
many cases, a solution has been found follow-
ing informal intervention by the Commission. 
58. Manufacturers and/or their suppliers 
must not restrict the freedom of final consum-
ers and/or their authorised intermediaries to 
buy in the Member State of their choice, 
which is one of the fundamental achievements 
of the European Community. Although the 
consumer's right is not accompanied by an 
obligation imposed on dealers to sell, a dealer 
may not reject a consumer's offer to buy, or 
ask for a higher price, simply because the 
consumer is a resident of another Member 
State. On the other hand, a manufacturer may 
take measures against sales by its dealership to 
so-called 'non-authorised' or grey market 
dealers acting as resellers. 
59. Contractual provisions in the dealer con-
tract and/or behaviour which restrict this free-
dom are blacklisted, and their use results in 
the automatic loss of the benefit of exemption 
for the manufacturer and/or supplier. Where 
such infringements take place, consumers can 
appeal to their national authorities or courts 
which are competent to apply European com-
petition rules, particularly in cases where a 
block exemption regulation exists. 
60. Other submissions concerned the termi-
nation of dealer contracts, notably in Ger-
many. In one case, the Commission decided to 
reject the complainant's application. The 
Commission considers that matters whose ef-
fects are mainly limited to one Member State 
and which merit no Community interest can 
26 
(') Commission Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 of 28 June 1995 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements, OJ 
L 145, 29.6.1995. See also 1996 Competition Report, points 54 
to 56. 
(
2) Press release IP/97/113, 14.2.1997, and press release IP/97/640, 
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be dealt with equally well on a national level. 
This approach complies with the Automec 
judgment (')· 
61. As regards compliance with the block 
exemption regulation, the Commission dealt 
with two important notifications. These con-
cerned the standard distribution agreements 
for the Smart car and for Ford service outlets. 
In the first of the two cases, having checked 
the conformity of the latest version of the 
agreement with Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 
(in particular, the ability of dealers to market 
other makes or their freedom to seek, through 
advertising, customers outside the contract ter-
ritory), the Commission sent the parties a 
comfort letter. In the second case, it found that 
the agreement did not fall within the scope of 
Regulation (EC) No 1475/95 and recognised 
the advantages for consumers, especially with 
regard to having services near to hand. 
C — Undertakings 
position 
in a dominant 
62. Article 86 of the EC Treaty prohibits 
anticompetitive practices committed by one or 
more undertakings in a dominant position on a 
given market. Such abuses may consist in 
limiting production, charging excessive prices, 
discriminatory or predatory pricing, tied sales 
or other commercial practices not guided by 
the principle of economic efficiency. Such 
practices have a negative impact on competi-
tion and are consequently unsound, since they 
are carried out by undertakings whose market 
power enables them to isolate themselves from 
competitive pressure and eliminate their com-
petitors without significant damage to them-
selves or to block market access by new 
entrants to a significant degree. 
63. Conventional competition law censures 
such behaviour, which limits, or indeed de-
stroys, the ability of competitors or new en-
trants to affect the dynamics of the market. In 
the Commission's eyes, such practices are 
particularly damaging, since they lead to mar-
ket partitioning and delay the integration of 
the Member States' economies. This is why 
the Commission is particularly alert to the 
effects of abuses of a dominant position on 
that integration. The cases which it has had to 
examine this year show that such behaviour is 
not confined to specific sectors, even if the 
sectors where liberalisation is in progress are 
the high-risk ones. 
64. As far as proceedings are concerned, the 
Commission ultimately imposed fines in only 
one case this year. In the remainder, it was 
able, after the complaint-notification stage, to 
accept from the undertakings involved com-
mitments or changes to agreements which put 
an end to the offending practices. The attitude 
of undertakings reveals a genuine willingness 
to accept the principles of competition, but the 
approach must not be relaxed in future. This is 
why the Commission will continue to see that 
proposed commitments are honoured. 
65. The Commission censured and inflicted 
a fine of ECU 8.8 million on Irish Sugar. The 
undertaking, which is the sole sugar producer 
in Ireland and has a 90 % share of the Irish 
sugar retailing market, was found to have 
abused a dominant position not only on ac-
count of its repeated attempts to impede com-
petition from small Irish sugar-packing com-
panies but also of its ploys to limit competi-
tion from imports from France and Northern 
Ireland. For instance, the company offered 
discriminatory prices or discounts to custom-
ers of an importer of French sugar and pro-
posed discriminatory discounts to industrial 
customers exporting part of their production to 
other Member States. Such practices led to the 
erection of artificial barriers between Member 
States and to the disruption of market fluidity. 
66. Similarly, in Swedish Match Sverige/ 
Skandinavisk Tobakskompagni, the Commis-
sion expressed doubts as to the compatibility 
of the agreement signed between the two 
companies with Article 86 (
2). Swedish Match, 
the sole manufacturer and distributor of ciga-
rettes in Sweden, has held an exclusive licence 
since 1961 for the manufacture, distribution 
and sale of the Prince brand of cigarette, 
which belongs to the Danish company Skandi-
navisk Tobakskompagni and which has a 
strong position on the Swedish market. An 
exclusive licensing agreement of such a dura-
tion and scope concluded between two under-
takings in a dominant position on neighbour-
ing markets was regarded as likely to be 
caught by Article 86, in particular since Swed-
ish Match fixed the selling price of Prince 
cigarettes unilaterally. The agreement there-
fore had the effect of isolating the Swedish 
(') Case T-24/90 [19921 ECR II-2223. 
(
2) The Commission also raised the question of the compatibility of 
the agreement with Article 85 of the Treaty. 
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market, on which Swedish Match could act 
independently of any competitive constraint. 
The Commission approved the licensing 
agreement following amendments whereby 
most of the marketing of the Prince brand is 
placed under the supervision of Skandinavisk 
Tobakompagni, which will be able in particu­
lar to determine the price of the cigarettes. The 
change in the agreement resulted immediately 
in the appearance of a major competitor on the 
Swedish market. 
67. The case in which the Commission took 
action against Belgacom, following a com­
plaint from ΓΤΤ Promedia in 1995 about the 
abuse of a dominant position, was brought to a 
positive conclusion this year. ΓΓΤ Promedia, 
which is the Belgian subsidiary of the US 
telephone directory publisher, ill World Di­
rectories Company, had accused Belgacom, 
the Belgian telecommunications operator, of 
applying discriminatory and excessive prices 
for access to the data on its subscribers for 
voice telephony services. The Commission 
considered that, since directory publishers 
were dependent on telecommunications opera­
tors, access to the data should be allowed on 
non-discriminatory terms, at prices calculated 
on the basis of the operator's own costs. 
Belgacom had a price structure which took 
account, in particular, of the turnover of the 
publisher, in this case 111 Promedia. There 
was no justification for this, except the market 
power associated with Belgacom's dominant 
position. Following the Commission's inter­
vention, Belgacom agreed to abolish the 
turnover price component and adopt a method 
of calculation based on the ratio of total 
annual costs to the number of publishers, 
which is more consistent with Community 
law. Prices have fallen as a result, and the 
logic of the system introduced creates a link 
between the fall in prices and the appearance 
of new entrants. The Commission has there­
fore halted proceedings against Belgacom. 
68. On 24 March 1997, the Commission 
initiated formal proceedings against SWTFT 
(Society for Worldwide International Financial 
Telecommunications se), a cooperative owned 
by 2 000 banks which manages an interna­
tional telecommunications network specialis­
ing in the supply of data transmission and 
processing services to financial institutions 
around the world. Further to a complaint from 
La Poste, a French public undertaking which 
had been refused access to the network, the 
Commission considered, in a statement of 
objections, that SWIFT had infringed Article 
86. SWIFT holds a dominant position of a 
monopolistic nature, since it is the only opera­
tor on the international networks for transfer­
ring payment messages and the only network 
to supply connections for banking establish­
ments anywhere in the world. It therefore 
constitutes a basic infrastructure in its own 
right, since to refuse any entity access to such 
a network is tantamount to a de facto exclu­
sion from the market for international trans­
fers. Lastly, SWIFT has manifestly abused its 
dominant position by laying down unjustified 
admission criteria relating to the general con­
ditions for the exercise of the financial activi­
ties of its members and by applying these 
criteria in the case of La Poste in a discrimi­
natory manner. 
Willing to settle the matter amicably, even 
though it had challenged the Commission's 
arguments, SWIFT formally undertook to 
grant complete access to any entity which 
meets the criteria laid down by the European 
Monetary Institute for admission to domestic 
payment systems, whereas hitherto such 
access was reserved for shareholder members 
only. This commitment was published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communi­
ties^. Consequently, the Commission de­
cided to suspend the proceedings initiated 
against SWIFT and declared its intention to 
ensure that the commitment was honoured. 
69. Following complaints lodged by suppli­
ers of maintenance services in the information 
technology sector against the commercial 
practices of Digital Equipment Corporation 
(Digital) and on the basis of the investigations 
which it carried out, the Commission initiated 
proceedings against the company for infring­
ing Article 86 (
2). In its statement of objec­
tions, the Commission found that Digital had a 
dominant position on the European markets 
for Digital software maintenance services and 
other hardware services for Digital computers. 
The Commission considered that Digital had 
abused its dominant position by developing a 
commercial policy typified by discriminatory 
practices and tied sales. All these commercial 
practices revealed a clear desire to obstruct the 
ability of independent service suppliers to 
compete with Digital on the markets for main-
(') Case No IV/36.120-La Posle/SWIFT + GUF, OJ C 335, 
6.11.1997. 
(
2) The Commission also raised the question of the compatibility of 
certain Digital distribution agreements with Article 85 of the 
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tenance services and other, hardware services 
for Digital computers. Having received the 
objections and challenged them, Digital pre-
sented the Commission with proposed formal 
commitments designed to alter its commercial 
and pricing policy in the field of software 
maintenance services and other, hardware 
services. 
D — Information society 
70. In the year preceding full liberalisation 
of telecommunications services in the Euro-
pean Union, scheduled for 1 January 1998, the 
Commission stepped up its action to stimulate 
competition on information society markets; it 
took a number of measures to back up the 
liberalisation process(') and kept develop-
ments under close scrutiny to ensure that 
operators did not set in place agreements or 
structures (
2) that would reduce its impact. 
1. Alliances between operators 
71. The forthcoming full liberalisation of 
telecommunications markets (
3), which will 
trigger competition between operators across 
the full range of services, swifter technological 
progress, and growing interpénétration of 
world markets, has prompted restructuring op-
erations and alliances of all kinds in this sector 
whereby firms are endeavouring to put them-
selves in a position to take up the challenges 
inherent in these far-reaching changes. The 
Commission has repeatedly had occasion in 
recent years to comment on the compatibility 
of agreements and operations of this nature 
with the Community competition rules (
4), and 
1997 was no exception. The approach it takes 
here is to ensure that national telecommunica-
tions operators who still dominate their 
domestic markets do not use such alliances, 
which are necessary from a technical or eco-
nomic standpoint, in order to hold on to 
positions they acquired through their mon-
opoly power and restrict competition. 
72. On 29 October, the Commission gave the 
go-ahead to two international alliances be-
tween telecommunications operators, namely 
(') See Chapter II below. 
(
2) See Chapter III below. 
(
3) Liberalisation aspects which have to do with the prerogatives of 
public authority are discussed in Chapter II, which deals with 
the application of Articles 37 and 90 of the EC Treaty. 
(
4) 1995 Competition Report, points 54 to 59; 1996 Competition 
Report, points 66 to 83. 
Unisource and Uniworld(
5). Unisource groups 
together Sweden's Telia, the Dutch operator 
PTT Telecom and Switzerland's Swiss Tele-
com, the Spanish operator Telefonica having 
decided to withdraw. Uniworld is a joint ven-
ture between Unisource and AT&T. The aims 
of these groupings are twofold: to achieve 
critical mass and extensive geographical cov-
erage, which in this industry means entering 
into a transadantic partnership. The alliances 
previously established, between British Tele-
com and MCI (Concert), on the one hand, and 
France Télécom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint 
(Atlas/Global One), on the other, bear witness 
to this. The agreements creating the two alli-
ances were assessed in the light of Article 85 
of the Treaty and were approved by means of 
an individual exemption granted for a period 
of five years following amendments to the 
agreements and subject to conditions relating 
to the structure and behaviour of the parties. 
Unisource offers a range of telecommunica-
tions services: mobile telephony, satellite serv-
ices, data transmission services and corporate 
voice telephony, which are supplied to users 
via operational subsidiaries. After satisfying 
itself that the three shareholders in Unisource 
would not strengthen their pre-existing domi-
nant positions on their respective domestic 
markets, the Commission exempted the agree-
ments subject to compliance with undertakings 
designed in particular to prevent any discrimi-
nation by the parent companies in network 
operation, any transfer of confidential infor-
mation from one entity to another, any cross-
subsidisation between Unisource and its parent 
companies, or any attempt to engage in tied 
service provision. The Commission also took 
note of the undertakings given by the Dutch 
and Swiss authorities to liberalise their tele-
communications markets by 1 January 1998 
(liberalisation had already taken place in 
Sweden). 
Uniworld offers similar telecommunications 
services, with coverage extended to the United 
States. Undertakings of the same nature 
enabled the Commission to exempt the agree-
ments creating Uniworld for a period of five 
years. AT&T also proposed an additional un-
dertaking not to discriminate between Uni-
source shareholders and other European opera-
tors as regards the rates it charges for interna-
tional calls from Europe to the United States. 
(
5) 1996 Competition Report, point 68.  29 73. The Commission finalised its analysis of 
the GEN (Global European network) agree-
ment, which groups together the largest tele-
communications operators in the Union. The 
agreement provides for the creation of a high-
quality, heavy-capacity optical fibre telecom-
munications network which will enhance the 
quality of trans-European telecommunications 
network services. The Commission deemed 
certain clauses of the agreement incompatible 
with the Community competition rules, in 
particular those which provided for the joint 
setting of prices and exclusion of third parties 
from access to the network. In response to the 
Commission's observations, the notifying par-
ties amended the agreement such that each 
operator which is a signatory will negotiate 
with third parties, individually and in a non-
discriminatory manner, the terms on which it 
offers access to the network, and in particular 
prices. On that basis, the Commission allowed 
the system to be set up. This case provides a 
clear illustration of the policy pursued by the 
Community authorities: the Commission wel-
comes technological progress but makes sure 
that it is not used by operators in a dominant 
position in order to deprive competitors of the 
benefits of such progress through discrimina-
tory practices. 
2. Mobile communications 
74. The Commission noted with satisfaction 
the growth of competition in mobile telephony 
and the knock-on effects this was having on 
the telecommunications industry as a whole. 
New services, lower prices, greater network 
coverage, stronger demand, and creation of 
new jobs are the unmistakable signs of this 
dynamism, which the Commission is support-
ing through its competition policy. It will 
remain vigdant in order to facilitate access to 
the market for competitors and protect the 
interests of consumers by safeguarding their 
freedom of choice between operators and their 
services ('). 
75. The Commission gave its approval to the 
agreement between mobile telephone opera-
tors using the GSM standard, who are grouped 
together in an international association of over 
200 members. The aim of the agreement is to 
30 
(') In this connection, the Commission investigated two cases 
concerning the award of concessions for the second GSM 
operator in Spain and Italy. These are described in Chapter II, 
which discusses the application of Articles 37 and 90 of the 
Treaty. 
draw up a standard form to be used on a 
voluntary basis to facilitate bilateral negotia-
tions between operators wishing to conclude 
'roaming' agreements. Such agreements are 
necessary in order to coordinate GSM net-
works and offer subscribers maximum use of 
their mobile telephone wherever they happen 
to be at any point in time. 
Operators of GSM networks in the European 
Union have to comply with national rules, in 
particular those governing the award of oper-
ating licences, which means that their network 
cannot extend beyond national borders. For 
the 35 million subscribers in the 15 Member 
States, it is essential that these limitations 
should not undermine the advantages flowing 
from the GSM standard. Thus, when a sub-
scriber leaves the territory of the Member 
State in which he took out his subscription, he 
should be able to make and receive calls in 
another Member State; for this to be possible, 
operators in different Member States must 
coordinate their activities. 
The Commission takes the view that the exist-
ence of a standard form facilitating such coor-
dination offers a number of advantages. For 
operators, it cuts costs and negotiating times 
and also guarantees transparency, thereby re-
ducing the risks of discrimination. For con-
sumers, it offers the certainty of being able 
more rapidly to use their mobile telephone 
over a wide area. The Commission also noted 
that amendments made to the agreement had 
ruled out some potential competition prob-
lems, such as the risk of limitations being 
placed on a consumer's freedom to take out, 
under more favourable tariff conditions, a sub-
scription with an operator in a country in 
which he is not himself resident. Discussions 
are continuing with a view to finding a solu-
tion to the prices charged by operators them-
selves for roaming services, which are not 
determined on the basis of real costs. 
3. Telecommunications tariffs 
76. In cases where national telecommunica-
tions operators still enjoy dominant positions 
on their domestic markets, particularly as far 
as infrastructures are concerned, it is particu-
larly important, given the logic of liberalisa-
tion, that these operators should not misuse 
their market power to the detriment of their 
competitors. The Commission consequently 
sees to it that those competing with national — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
operators enjoy access to the latters' infra-
structures on fair and non-discriminatory 
terms, particularly as far as prices are con-
cerned. 
77. The Commission accordingly initiated 
proceedings against Deutsche Telekom AG 
(DT), the German telecommunications opera-
tor, following a complaint made in 1996 
against the conditions imposed on third parties 
for access to DT's infrastructuresO)· After DT 
had submitted a draft new contract offering 
network access to competitors, the Commis-
sion had a price survey carried out by an 
international accountancy firm which demon-
strated DT's inability to prove that its prices 
were cost-orientated and found the price level 
to be 100 % higher than on comparable com-
petitive markets. Although the Commission is 
not and does not wish to act as a price 
regulator, DT was invited to adjust the tariffs it 
charges to real economic conditions so that 
they cannot constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position. DT finally agreed to lower its net-
work access tariffs, in particular for providers 
of business services, by 38 % for access to the 
local network and 78 % for access to the 
long-distance network, and the Commission 
decided to terminate the proceedings. 
78. The Commission has also started pro-
ceedings to investigate charges for interna-
tional telephone calls paid by dominant tele-
phone operators. A large proportion of the 
price paid for these international telephone 
calls is made up by the accounting rates, 
which amount to transfer prices between op-
erators located in different countries. At 
present, as a result of technological changes 
and consequent reductions in costs, it is be-
lieved that these charges no longer reflect the 
true cost of calls. The Commission wfll there-
fore scrutinise the current accounting rate ar-
rangements with a view to furthering the goal 
of cost orientation. Requests for information 
have been sent to all dominant telecommuni-
cation operators in the EU in order to assess 
the competition aspects of the accounting rates 
arrangements. 
4. Information technology 
79. The case which pitted the US firm Santa 
Cruz Operation Inc (Santa Cruz) against Mi-
crosoft is an example of a fairly sophisticated 
(') 1996 Competition Report, point 71. 
anticompetitive practice involving the use of 
intellectual property rights in order to limit the 
ability of a competitor to innovate. 
Santa Cruz took over AT&T's activities in 
relation to the UNIX system for powerful 
microcomputers and also inherited a contract 
signed 10 years earlier between Microsoft and 
AT&T, under which Microsoft was to produce 
a single version of the UNIX system, then 
manufactured by both parties. The contract 
required the parties to design any new version 
of the UNIX system on the basis of Micro-
soft's original version and to make it compat-
ible with programs developed by Microsoft 
and AT&T prior to 1987. This forced Santa 
Cruz to use the obsolete Microsoft technology 
for any new product; however, on the market 
for UNIX systems, Santa Cruz and Microsoft 
are competitors. 
Contractual clauses of this kind have therefore 
been regarded as anticompetitive insofar as 
they restrict the ability of a competitor to 
innovate. After receiving the Commission's 
objections, Microsoft decided unilaterally and 
irrevocably to release Santa Cruz from its 
contractual obligations concerning the use of 
the original version of the UNIX system. As a 
result, Santa Cruz withdrew its complaint. 
80. The Commission also takes an interest in 
derived products such as computer games and 
their method of distribution. It thus had occa-
sion to scrutinise licensing agreements con-
cluded by Sega and Nintendo, two of the 
leading manufacturers of video games con-
soles. The two firms had set in place a licens-
ing system enabling independent firms to de-
velop and distribute games that were compat-
ible with their consoles. Under the agree-
ments, Sega and Nintendo had the right to vet 
any game developed by a licensee before it 
was marketed; licensees also had to subcon-
tract production of the games they had devel-
oped to the licensors or to a limited number of 
approved manufacturers. 
The Commission regarded the agreements as 
anticompetitive insofar as they enabled Sega 
and Nintendo to control competition in the 
markets for games that were compatible with 
their consoles; one of their effects was to limit 
the ability of licensee firms to compete with 
the licensors. The Commission therefore noti-
fied the firms concerned of its objections, 
whereupon Sega and Nintendo decided to 
amend their agreements by deleting the dis-
31 puted clauses. Finding that the new agree-
ments no longer contained any restriction of 
competition, the Commission terminated the 
proceedings. 
E — Transport 
1. Maritime transport 
1.1. Liner shipping consortia 
81. The Commission applied, on several oc-
casions, the provisions of the regulation grant-
ing a block exemption to liner shipping con-
sortia (')· The conditions and obligations at-
tached to exemption ensure that Article 85(3) 
of the Treaty is observed and that consortia 
remain subject to effective competition so as 
to enable snippers to obtain a fair share of the 
benefits resulting from these agreements. 
Articles 5 to 9 of Regulation (EC) No 870/95 
lay down the conditions in which consortia 
can qualify for block exemption. Exemption is 
granted automatically to consortia which hold 
a share of less than 30 or 35 % of the trade 
depending on whether or not they operate as 
part of a liner conference. A consortium whose 
share of the trade exceeds the 30 or 35 % limit 
but does not, however, exceed 50 % of the 
direct trade may also qualify for block exemp-
tion, once it has been notified, provided that it 
fulfils the other conditions laid down in the 
regulation. Where a consortium holds more 
than 50 % of the trade or where it does not 
fulfil the other conditions for block exemption, 
the parties must notify the agreement to the 
Commission with a view to obtaining an 
individual exemption under Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty. During the year, the Commission 
examined cases which came under each of the 
exemption categories. 
82. The Commission granted block exemp-
tions to four liner shipping consortia under a 
simplified non-opposition procedure pursuant 
to Regulation (EC) No 870/95. 
On 5 March, the Joint operational service 
agreement (JOS), signed between four ship-
ping companies (
2), and the West Coast/ 
Mediterranean agreement (WC/Med), con-
cluded between three of the above four com-
panies (
3), were exempted. On 6 October, 
block exemptions were granted to two ship-
ping consortia, New Caribbean Services and 
Eurosal DJ. The Commission's analyses of 
these agreements were similar. Having estab-
lished that the market shares of the consortia 
amounted to between 40 and 50 %, that re-
maining competition was still effective on the 
lines in question, and having secured certain 
amendments in the case of the latter agree-
ment, the Commission concluded that the con-
ditions for exemption as laid down in Regula-
tion No 870/95 were fulfilled. 
83. Three consortium agreements which did 
not fall within the scope of Regulation (EC) 
No 870/95 were nevertheless granted indi-
vidual exemptions under Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty (
4). 
84. On 3 September, the Commission 
granted an individual exemption under Article 
85(3) of the Treaty to consortium agreements 
concluded between four transatlantic shipping 
companies(
5). The Vessel sharing agreements 
(VSA) consortium, set up in 1988 by Sea-
Land, P&O and Nedlloyd to organise the joint 
operation of shipping lines between northern 
Europe and the United States, on the one 
hand, and between the Mediterranean and the 
United States, on the other, entered into agree-
ments with OOCL and Maersk on the swap-
ping of slots. Since the parties' shares of the 
relevant trades exceeded the 30 % threshold 
and certain clauses of the agreements failed to 
satisfy one or more of the exemption condi-
tions laid down in Regulation (EC) No 870/95, 
the agreements fell outside its scope. Under 
the opposition procedure, the Commission 
published a notice (
6) seeking the views of 
interested third parties. 
The Commission's analysis found that the first 
three conditions laid down in Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty were met, among other things be-
cause the agreements resulted in major invest-
ments and in capacity reductions. It also found 
that the fourth condition was satisfied because, 
32 
(') Commission Regulation (EC) No 870795 of 20 April 1995 on 
the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain catego-
ries of agreements, decisions and concerted practices between 
liner shipping companies (consortia) pursuant to Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 479/92, OJ L 89, 21.4.1995. See also 1995 
Competition Report, points 68 to 70, and 1996 Competition 
Report, points 84 to 87. 
(
2) Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd, Iscont Lines Ltd, KNSM Kroon-
burgh BV and Zim Israeli Navigation Ltd. 
(
3) Andrew Weir Shipping Ltd, KNSM Kroonburgh BV and Zim 
Israeli Navigation Ltd. 
(
4) 1996 Competition Report, point 87. 
(
5) Sea-Land, P&O Nedlloyd, Maersk and OOCL. 
f
6) OJ C 185, 18.6.1997. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
with total market shares of less than 40 %, the 
parties were not in a position to eliminate 
competition. The Commission nevertheless 
pointed out that certain clauses of the agree-
ments could not qualify for an individual 
exemption, and the parties undertook to re-
frain from applying them in geographical 
areas covered by the EC Treaty. On the basis 
of those undertakings, the Commission con-
sidered that it could grant an individual ex-
emption to those restrictive clauses. The ex-
emption is for six years in the case of activi-
ties covered by Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 
and three years in the case of those covered by 
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68. 
1.2. P&O Stena Line 
85. On 31 October 1996, the shipping com-
panies P&O and Stena notified the setting-up 
of a joint venture, P&O Stena Line, in which 
they intended to pool their cross-Channel ferry 
business. Since the operation did not consti-
tute a concentration within the meaning of the 
Merger Regulation, it had to be examined in 
the light of Article 85 of the Treaty. The same 
operation was, however, regarded by the 
French and United Kingdom authorities as a 
merger under their respective national laws 
and was notified to the competent authorities 
of each country. Three sets of proceedings 
were therefore initiated in parallel. The Com-
mission's concern here was to cooperate fully 
and frankly with the national authorities and to 
prevent conflicting decisions being adopted. 
On 10 June 1997, after receiving comments 
from interested third parties concerning the 
planned joint venture, the Commission sent 
P&O and Stena a letter expressing serious 
doubts as to the compatibility of the Operation 
with the Community competition rules. The 
Commission's main misgiving was that the 
last criterion laid down in Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty might not be fulfilled insofar as there 
was a risk of an oligopolistic dominant posi-
tion being created on the cross-Channel pas-
senger transport market between the new joint 
venture and its main competitor, Eurotunnel. 
After investigating the case and discussing it 
with the national authorities concerned, and 
subject to completion of the procedure in 
hand, the Commission announced its intention 
of granting P&O Stena Line an individual 
exemption for a limited period. The validity of 
the exemption will be limited as the Commis-
sion wishes to reserve the right to reconsider 
its position before long given the great diffi-
culty of assessing all the parameters involved 
on this specific market, in particular the im-
pact which the abolition, in mid-1999, of 
duty-free sales will have on competition. 
2. Air transport 
2.1. Application of the competition rules 
to routes between the Community 
and non-member countries 
86. The globalisation of air transport mar-
kets is being reflected in the proliferation of 
alliances between airlines on routes linking the 
Community to non-member countries. In order 
to adjust its competition policy instruments to 
this situation, which is set to continue, the 
Commission adopted on 16 May a memoran-
dum accompanied by two proposals for Coun-
cil regulations on the application of the com-
petition rules to air transport, and in particular 
routes between the Community and non-
member countries (')· One of the proposals 
would extend the scope of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3975/87 (
2), which currently covers 
only air transport between airports in the 
Community, so as to include all routes be-
tween Community airports and airports in 
non-member countries. The other proposal 
would supplement the anangements by em-
powering the Commission to grant block ex-
emptions for certain categories of agreement 
restricting competition on those routes. 
87. The Commission currently has powers, 
under Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87, to apply 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty directly to 
intra-Community routes only. It can therefore 
take action against restrictive practices on 
extra-Community routes only under Article 89 
of the Treaty, which allows it to introduce 
monitoring provisions in the absence of any 
specific implementing regulation. These ar-
rangements, which were intended to be transi-
tional, do not enable the Commission to act 
with all the necessary effectiveness. The Mem-
ber States are furthermore entitled to initiate 
parallel proceedings under Article 88. If the 
Commission is to be seen as a credible partner 
in international negotiations, it must have at its 
disposal adequate legal instruments for guar-
(') COM(97) 218 final; OJ C 165, 31.5.1997. 
(
2) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87. OJ L 374, 31.12.1987, 
as amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2410/92, OJ L 240, 
24.8.1992.  33 anteeing the application of its competition 
rules both within the Community and in rela-
tions with non-member countries. These are 
the reasons which prompted the Commission 
to propose that its powers be extended to 
cover air transport routes between the Com-
munity and non-member countries. This desire 
for harmonisation is not new: it already sent 
the Council an unsuccessful proposal for a 
similar extension of its powers in 1989(')· 
88. The Commission's new proposals take 
account of the changes that have taken place 
in the industry since 1989 and reflect the 
present configuration of the air transport mar-
ket. The key features of the new situation are 
the full liberalisation of air transport services 
within the Union, which has been effective 
since 1 January 1997, and the development of 
alliances between airlines on routes between 
the Community and non-member countries, 
particularly transatlantic routes. 
89. The disappearance of regulatory con-
straints within the European Economic Area is 
also increasing competition between market 
players and the risks of anticompetitive behav-
iour on routes between the EEA and third 
countries. That liberalisation is furthermore 
insufficient in a context of rapid globalisation. 
The Commission therefore obtained negotiat-
ing briefs from the Council enabling it to 
conclude agreements on the gradual liberalisa-
tion of air transport services with certain 
non-member countries, e.g. Switzerland, the 
CEECs and the United States (
2). These agree-
ments should deal with competition issues and 
ensure that there is no discrimination between 
Community airlines in terms of access to the 
relevant routes. 
90. The proliferation of a new generation of 
alliances between air carriers, on transadantic 
routes in particular, which are having a major 
impact on competitive conditions in the Com-
munity market likewise militates in favour of 
the early adoption of a new legal framework 
that would avoid recourse to Articles 88 and 
89 of the EC Treaty. Rebanee on those two 
articles makes for procedural unwieldiness and 
legal uncertainty. For example, the Cornmis-
sion initiated Article 89 proceedings in six 
cases in 1996, while two Member States de-
cided to open parallel proceedings under 
Article 88 in respect of two of the six alliances 
concerned. In those two cases, the companies 
which were parties to the agreements had to 
contend with problems caused by the concur-
rent examination of the same agreement by 
different authorities: multiple procedures, ex-
tra costs, risk of contradictory decisions. 
91. It is therefore in the interests of making 
enforcement more efficient, increasing legal 
certainty and reducing the administrative bur-
den on businesses that the Commission has 
put forward its proposals designed to safe-
guard more effectively the operation of a 
single market which is fully open to interna-
tional competition. 
2.2. Transatlantic air agreements 
92. The Commission continued to investi-
gate in parallel a number of alliance agree-
ments that were concluded between European 
airlines and US airlines (
3), namely between 
British Airways and American Airlines, 
Lufthansa and United Airlines, SAS and 
United Airlines, Swissair/Sabena/Austrian Air-
lines and Delta Air Lines, and KLM and 
Northwest(
4). 
A hearing took place on 3 and 4 February in 
British Airways/American Airlines, during 
which the parties to the agreement and a 
number of third parties elaborated on points 
addressed in connection with the case. In view 
of the complexity of the case and the Commis-
sion's obligation to cooperate with the Mem-
ber States under Article 89 of the Treaty, it 
was decided to hold an informal exchange of 
information on 17 July between national ex-
perts on agreements and dominant positions in 
air transport and the Commission. This infor-
mation exchange was followed by several 
meetings between British Airways/American 
Airlines and Commission officials in order to 
discuss the competition issues arising from the 
alliance agreement. 
The agreements between Lufthansa and 
United Airlines, SAS and United Airlines, 
Swissair/Sabena/Austrian Airlines and Delta 
Air Lines, and KLM and Northwest continued 
to be investigated in parallel. 
34 
(') C0M(89) 417; OJ C 248, 29.9.1989. 
(
2) The negotiating brief concerning the United Slates at present 
covers only certain issues. 
(
3) 1996 Competition Report, points 99 to 101. 
(
4) OJC 117, 15.4.1997. I — ANTITRUST: ARTICLES 85 AND 86 
The Commission intends to adopt a proposal 
on the basis of Article 89(1) of the Treaty in 
the course of the first half of 1998 for at least 
three of these alliances. 
F — Energy 
93. In the electricity sector, the Corrimission 
kept a watchful eye to ensure that the aim of 
the liberalisation directive was being fulfilled 
by preventing undertakings, and especially 
former monopolists, which still enjoy a domi-
nant position on their domestic market from 
abusing that position in order to foreclose the 
market. In its action, the Commission was 
careful to adopt a measured and responsible 
attitude so that the necessary security of sup-
ply remained guaranteed. 
94. In the case in which the Commission 
investigated Electrabel, a private producer 
holding more than a 90 % market share of 
electricity production in Belgium, and Inter-
mixt, the representative of the communes hav-
ing an interest in semi-public corporations 
which distribute electricity to users in Bel-
gium, the new 'statutes' linking Electrabel to 
these corporations would have foreclosed the 
Belgian market. The new 'statutes' estab-
lished, in particular, a partnership lasting be-
tween 20 and 30 years and granted Electrabel 
an exclusive right to supply primary electricity 
to the communes for the same period. These 
provisions would therefore have delayed any 
evolution of the Belgian electricity market for 
an extremely long time; under these circum-
stances, users would not have been able to 
benefit from the advantages of the sector being 
opened up to competition. 
The Commission accordingly envisaged initi-
ating proceedings under Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty, which would have led to the new 
statutes being banned. After consultations with 
the parties concerned the Commission de-
cided, in the light of proposals to amend the 
statutes, to suspend its investigation of the 
case. Under the new statutes, the exclusive 
supply clause in favour of Electrabel was to 
lapse from the year 2011, and from the year 
2006 onwards the exclusivity was to concern 
no more than 75 % of the requirements of 
each grouping of municipalities. In addition, 
in order to facilitate a change of supplier, the 
new statutes provide that from 2011 onwards, 
Electrabel will not oppose the dissolution of 
such a corporation, provided that it receives 
fair compensation. 
G — Financial services (
1) 
95. The Commission is determined to ensure 
that monetary union takes place in accordance 
with Treaty principles regarding competition. 
It therefore set out its preliminary views on 
the applicability of Article 85 of the Treaty to 
the Target payments system created by the 
European Monetary Institute and Member 
States' central banks. This payments system, 
which is to come into operation at the begin-
ning of the third stage of economic and mon-
etary union and will be run by the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB), should con-
cern three categories of payments: payments 
directly related to monetary policy and involv-
ing the ESCB; interbank payments (arbitrage 
transactions); and payments involving bank 
customers, whether private individuals or 
firms. 
The Commission took the view that Article 
85(1) did not apply to payments in the first 
category as the parties involved were not 
businesses, but did apply to the second and 
third categories since the parties involved in 
the transactions were economic operators, and 
other privately operated payments systems 
were also present on the market. The Commis-
sion had two reservations about the scheme: 
the first concerned the plan to charge all 
parties involved in a given transaction a stand-
ard rate for payments effected through the 
Target system; here the Commission acknowl-
edged that the system will help to create an 
effective tool for managing cross-border arbi-
trage transactions which is likely to bolster the 
reliability of the money market within the euro 
zone. The second reservation focused on the 
level of the standard charge: the Commission 
reminded the European Monetary Institute that 
the rates charged had to cover all costs, in-
cluding operating costs. The EMI undertook to 
inform the Commission of any further devel-
opments. 
( ) The reader is referred to the section on undertakings in a 
dominant position, in which the SWIFT case is discussed.  35 H — Statistics 
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(') Commission staff have introduced a new method for registering 
cases opened under Articles 85 and 86 which produces statistics 
that reflect more faithfully the different stages in the procedure. 
Cases are now registered on the date when the request or the 
notification takes effect. Statistics for previous years have been 
revised on the basis of the new method, which explains why 

































Π Formal decisions 
El Informal procedure 
37 Figure 3: 
End-of-year stock of cases over time 
1400 τ 
1200 ■■ 
















1993 1994 1995 1996 
Input of cases r^^i Output of eases —♦— End-of-year stock of cases 
Η» 1 262 
499  517 
1997 
38 Il — STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
A — The Treaty of Amsterdam 
96. The Treaty of Amsterdam contains pro­
visions directly concerning Community com­
petition policy. These are a new Article 7d on 
services of general economic interest, together 
with a declaration on that subject, a protocol 
on the system of public broadcasting in the 
Member States, a declaration on public credit 
institutions in Germany and a new Article 
227(2) on the outermost regions. 
97. The new Article 7d lays down that 'with­
out prejudice to Articles 77, 90 and 92, and 
given the place occupied by services of gen­
eral economic interest in the shared values of 
the Union as well as their role in promoting 
social and territorial cohesion, the Community 
and the Member States, each within their 
respective powers and within the scope of 
application of this Treaty, shall take care that 
such services operate on the basis of principles 
and conditions which enable them to fulfil 
their missions'. The Treaty of Amsterdam thus 
upholds the Community's attachment to objec­
tives of general economic interest while em­
phasising the place occupied by these services 
in the Union's shared values and their role in 
promoting social and territorial cohesion. 
The new Treaty, while retaining the provisions 
of Article 90, thus reinforces the principle 
whereby a balance must be struck between the 
competition rules and the fulfilment of public 
services' missions. 
This new provision is in accordance with the 
policy proposed by the Commission in its com­
munication of 11 September 1996 on services of 
general interest in Europe, i.e. that of introduc­
ing into Article 3 of the Treaty of Rome a 
paragraph which would confirm the Communi­
ty's role in contributing to the promotion of 
services of general interest while not calling into 
question the allocation of powers between the 
Commission and the Member States. 
98. The European Parliament, in its resolution 
of 17 December on the Commission communi­
cation, which emphasises the importance of 
public services for economic and social cohe­
sion, welcomed the introduction of the new 
Article 7d into the Treaty. 
99. Several other texts dealing with public 
services issues have also been adopted: a proto­
col on the system of public broadcasting in the 
Member States, which emphasises the specific 
nature of this system in view of its cultural and 
political dimension; a declaration on public 
credit institutions in Germany, which links the 
advantages granted to these institutions to the 
discharge of a mission in the general interest and 
to compliance with the principle of proportion­
ality as regards the impairment of competitive 
conditions and the safeguarding of the Commu­
nity interest. 
100. Regarding competition policy, a new 
legitimacy has thus been conferred on the main 
institutional and legal balances in the Treaty of 
Rome by the provisions contained in the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, particularly those of the new 
Article 7d. 
Β — Telecommunications 
101. The directive of 13 March 1996 on the 
implementation of full competition in telecom­
munications markets fixed 1 January 1998 as 
the date for the introduction of competition in 
voice telephony and the provision of infra­
structures. This liberalisation obligation has 
been reinforced by the WTO agreement on 
basic telecommunications services. In order to 
ensure that liberalisation is fully successful the 
Commission has adopted a number of strin­
gent and balanced measures. 
Moreover, the Parliament and the Council 
adopted three new harmonising directives in 
1997: Directive 97/13/EC of 10 April on a 
common framework for general authorisations 
and individual licences in the field of telecom­
munications services^), Directive 97/33/EC 
of 30 June concerning interconnection and the 
financing of universal services (
2), and Direc­
tive 97/51/EC of 6 October amending Direc­
tive 90/387/EEC (ONP framework) and 
92/44/EEC (leased lines) for the purpose of 
adapting them to a competitive environment in 
the telecommunications sector (
3). Member 
States had to transpose the directives by 31 
December 1997 at the latest. 
1. Monitoring the implementation 
of the directives 
102. The Commission wished first of all to 
verify that Member States were meeting their 
obligations under Community law in relation to 
liberalisation so that the regulatory framework 
could be in place by 1 January 1998. In order to 
carry out a coordinated control of specific com­
petition directives and harmonisation directives 
(') OJL 117,7.5.1997. 
(
2) OJL 199,26.7.1997. 
(
3) OJL 295, 29.10.1997.  39 40 
and, where necessary, speed up the initiation of 
infringement proceedings against Member 
States failing to comply with the timetable 
which has been fixed, the Commission has de-
cided to set up a joint team with the task of 
implementing the Community telecommunica-
tions legislation, the '1998 Joint Team', bring-
ing together officials drawn from the directo-
rates-general for competition and telecommuni-
cations, and with the collaboration of the Com-
mission's Legal Service. The team prepared a 
progress report for the Council on the transposi-
tion of the directives, which was adopted by the 
Commission on 29 May and updated on 8 Octo-
ber, on the basis of information provided in 
bilateral meetings with Member States. 
103. The 29 May report established that some 
Member States were behind in their transposi-
tion of the directives and that considerable work 
remained outstanding. The 8 October report 
showed that progress had been made but estab-
lished that some Member States were still not 
keeping to the timetable for the liberalisation of 
telecommunications laid down in Commission 
Directive 90/388/EEC. 
104. On 5 November, the Commission de-
cided to initiate infringement proceedings 
under Article 169 of the Treaty against seven 
Member States (Denmark, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and Belgium). As 
at 1 July, Denmark had failed to ensure that its 
public operator, TeleDanmark, had published 
its standard procedures and conditions for in-
terconnection. Publication of this information 
is crucial to enable new entrants to conduct 
swift negotiations, on the basis of standard 
conditions, for the interconnection of their new 
network with the network already in place. 
Greece had not yet permitted the two private 
Greek GSM operators to interconnect their 
networks directly with foreign networks with-
out passing through the public operator. Nor 
had it, as at 1 October, liberalised the establish-
ment of a new infrastructure for the supply of 
liberalised services (i.e. all services other than 
voice telephony). Italy had not yet liberalised 
its infrastructure or specified the contribution of 
new entrants to the net cost incurred by Tele-
com Italia for the universal service. As at 1 
July, Luxembourg had not liberalised the estab-
lishment of new infrastructures to supply liber-
alised services. Germany had not ensured that 
Deutsche Telekom publish an interconnection 
catalogue specifying the prices of services of-
fered. As at 1 July, Portugal had failed to 
liberalise the establishment of new infrastruc-
tures for the supply of liberalised services. 
Belgium had only liberalised the use of existing 
infrastructures, not the establishment of new 
infrastructures, for the supply of liberalised 
services and had failed to enact legislation 
fixing new entrants' financial contribution to 
the net cost of the universal service. 
A series of meetings with Member States was 
programmed for the beginning of 1998 to 
reassess the situation in each country. 
2. Communications by telephony 
on the Internet 
105. On 2 May, the Commission published 
for comment a notice on the application of 
Directive 90/388/EEC to telephony services 
on the Internet. The Commission's position is 
that the services in question cannot for the 
moment be considered voice telephony be-
cause a number of criteria have not yet been 
met. In view of technical developments those 
criteria may shortly be met and the Commis-
sion may accordingly alter its position. The 
Commission intends to issue a final version of 
the notice in early 1998, which will take 
account of the numerous comments which 
have been received. 
3. The grant of additional periods 
for the liberalisation of 
telecommunications 
706. Mindful that networks in the Union are 
at different stages of development and wishing 
to pursue a balanced liberalisation policy, the 
Commission recognised the need to grant 
some Member States additional periods for 
implementing liberalisation, having regard to 
the conditions and size of their networks. 
Acting under the appropriate provisions in 
Commission Directives 96/2/EC liberalising 
mobile communications and 96/19/EC on the 
implementation of full competition, it decided 
to grant additional implementation periods on 
the following dates: 12 February 1997 for 
Portugal ('), 7 May for Luxembourg (
2), 10 
June for Spain (
3) and 18 June for Greece (
4). 
None of the extensions granted falls after 
2000. The table set out below shows the 
position for each Member State (
5). 
(') OJ L 133.24.5.1997. 
(
2) OJ L 234, 26.8.1977. 
(
3) OJL 243. 5.9.1997. 
(") OJL 245. 9.9.1997. 
(') On 27 November 1996. the Commission also granted Ireland a 
supplementary transitional period for liberalisation of telecom-
munications, 1996 Competition Report, points 121 and 122. Il — STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
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Member State Obligation under the directive  Date in the 
directive 
Asked for Granted 
Greece 
Spain 
Liberalisation of voice telephony and public 1.1.1998 1.1.2003 
telecommunications networks 
Abolition of restrictions on the offer of alterna- 1.7.1996 1.7.2001 
tive infrastructures 
Liberalisation of voice telephony and public 
telecommunications networks 






Liberalisation of voice telephony and public 1.1.1998 1.1.2000 31.3.1998 
telecommunications networks 
Abolition of restrictions on the offer of alterna- 1.7.1996 1.7.1998 1.7.1997 
tive infrastructures 
Liberalisation of voice telephony and public 1.1.1998 1.1. 2000 1.1.2000 
telecommunications networks 
Abolition of restrictions on the offer of alterna- 1.7.1996 1.1.1999 1.7.1997 
tive infrastructures 
Authorisation of infrastructures for own mobile 2.1996 1.1.1998 Refused 
networks 
Authorisation of international interconnection 2.1996 1.1.1999 1.1.1999 
of mobile networks 
4. Application of the Commission 
decision concerning discrimination 
in the grant of GSM concessions 
in Spain (') 
107. On 18 December 1996, the Commis-
sion adopted a decision requiring Spain to 
terminate the distortion of competition created 
by requiring the second GSM operator, Airtel 
Móvil, to make an initial payment of ESP 85 
billion while the first operator, Telefónica, was 
granted its licence without an initial fee. On 
30 April the Commission approved a 'package 
of corrective measures proposed by the Span-
ish Government to terminate the distortion. 
The principal elements in the package are the 
second operator's right to interconnect to Tele-
fonica's fixed network free of charge up to an 
amount of ESP 15 billion, the extension of 
Airtel Móvil's licence from 15 to 25 years, 
early provision of frequencies, the allocation 
to Airtel Móvil of an additional 4.5 MHz in 
the 900 MHz frequency band and the exten-
sion of Airtel Móvil's licence without an 
additional payment, allowing it to operate 
mobile services in the DCS-1800 frequency 
band as well. 
5. Termination of infringement 
proceedings initiated against Italy 
concerning conditions for granting 
the GSM licence 
108. In 1994, the Commission decided to 
initiate infringement proceedings against 
Italy concerning the conditions for granting 
the second GSM licence. Those conditions 
were more burdensome than those imposed 
on me first operator, the State enterprise SIP 
(now Telecom Italia Mobile), thereby 
strengthening the latter's dominant position 
in the new market for mobile cellular digital 
communications. On 4 October 1995, it 
adopted a decision requesting the Italian 
Government to correct the situation (
2). In 
January 1996, the Italian Government under-
took to put together a package of remedial 
measures. In the course of 1997, it notified 
all of these measures to the Commission, 
which decided, on 10 December, to terminate 
the infringement proceedings. However, on 
determining that certain remedial measures 
agreed with the Italian Government had not 
been implemented, it decided to initiate a 
new procedure. 
(') 1996 Competition Report, point 120.  (
2) 1995 Competition Report, point 109.  41 42 
6. Draft directive under Article 90(3) 
concerning the legal separation 
of cable and telecommunications 
activities 
109. On 16 December, the Commission ap­
proved a draft directive under Article 90(3) 
aimed at preventing former telecommunica­
tions monopolies from delaying the emergence 
of new, more advanced telecommunications 
services over the cable network, thereby ham­
pering technical progress at the expense of 
consumers. Under the draft directive Member 
States must ensure that cable operators and 
telecommunications enterprises are legally 
separated by requiring each of the two types 
of network to be run by separate enterprises. It 
also empowers the Commission to require a 
telecommunications enterprise to give up its 
activities in the cable sector if this is necessary 
for the limitation of the anticompetitive effects 
of the position of a former monopoly-holder 
on the market. 
110. The aim is to allow new entrants to 
have access to the local part of networks after 
liberalisation of the telecommunications sector 
on 1 January 1998. At the basis of liberalisa­
tion is an overview of developments on the 
market following the adoption of two direc­
tives in 1995 and 1996. The Commission is 
concerned that, if telecommunications infra­
structures and cable television networks are 
provided by the same enterprise, competition 
may be impaired because new entrants will 
only have access to the local loop through the 
operator holding a dominant position. In that 
situation the former monopoly-holder does not 
have an incentive to improve cable networks 
so that multimedia services can be offered; the 
accounting separation required under the exist­
ing directive on cable networks is insufficient 
to encourage competition. 
111. The new directive will amend the exist­
ing directive on cable television networks and 
will be adopted by the Commission under 
Article 90(3) after the consultations on the 
draft have been concluded. 
C — Media 
112. On 26 June, the Commission adopted a 
decision in the VTM case, declaring incompat­
ible with the Treaty the exclusive right to 
broadcast television advertising granted by the 
Flemish Government to the private television 
company, VTM. 
113. In its decision the Commission consid­
ers that the grant to VTM of the exclusive 
right to broadcast television advertising from 
Flanders to the Flemish Community infringes 
Article 90, read in conjunction with Article 52 
of the Treaty since the exclusive right amounts 
to excluding any operator from another Mem­
ber State wishing to set up in Belgium with a 
view to broadcasting televised advertising to 
the Flemish public via the Belgian cable net­
work. The fact that these measures apply 
without distinction both to Belgian operators 
other than VTM and to enterprises from other 
Member States cannot prevent VTM's prefer­
ential treatment being caught by Article 52 of 
the Treaty since it constitutes a form of dis­
crimination whose effects are protectionist. 
114. The Commission considers that in this 
case there are no compelling reasons of gen­
eral interest within the meaning of the case-
law of the Court of Justice which could justify 
VTM's monopoly. Although the Commission 
concedes that cultural policy and the mainte­
nance of pluralism can constitute overriding 
objectives in the public interest, in this case 
there is no necessary relationship between the 
purported cultural policy objective of preserv­
ing pluralism in the Flemish press and the 
grant in Flanders of a private commercial 
television monopoly to VTM. 
D — Energy 
1. Judgments of the Court of Justice 
concerning exclusive rights to import 
and export electricity and natural gas 
775. On 23 October, the Court of Justice 
delivered judgment in the actions brought by 
the Commission in 1994 for failure of the 
Netherlands, Spain, France and Italy(') to 
fulfil their obligations concerning the exclu­
sive rights to import and export natural gas 
and electricity. Regarding Article 37 of the 
Treaty, the Court ruled that exclusive rights 
give rise to discrimination against operators 
established in other Member States, contrary 
(') Case C-157/94 Commission ν Netherlands, Case C-158/94 
Commission ν Italy, Case C-159/94, Commission ν France and 
Case C-160/94 Commission ν Spain. In the last-mentioned case 
the Court considered that there were no exclusive rights 
involved. STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
ARTICLES 37 AND 90 
to that article('). The Court did not pronounce 
on the issue of whether the derogation in 
Article 90(2), which was invoked on by the 
Member States, justified the maintenance of 
the exclusive rights in those particular cases. 
Pointing to the basic principle that the burden 
of proof rests primarily on those seeking to 
rely on the derogation, it considered that the 
Commission had failed to adduce persuasive 
evidence, in particular of an economic nature, 
which might have enabled it to pronounce on 
the pleas put forward by the Member States. 
776. The Commission will naturally take ac­
count of the Court's remarks in its future 
activity. More specifically, as regards the ex­
clusive rights at issue in those cases, court 
proceedings no longer seem necessary in view 
of recent legislative developments in the 
energy field. 
2. Transposition of Directive 96/92/EC 
concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity 
777. At the end of last year, the Council 
adopted the directive proposed by the Com­
mission concerning common rules for the in­
ternal market in electricity. The main idea 
behind the directive is to provide third party 
access to the market so as to allow electricity 
consumers to benefit from price competition 
between producers. From an operational 
standpoint the directive makes available the 
following alternatives: either direct access for 
third parties to infrastructures or access to the 
market through the network operator, in which 
the operator becomes the sole buyer and seller 
of electricity. 
118. The directive must be transposed by the 
Member States not later than 19 February 
1999 except for Belgium, Greece and Ireland, 
which have been granted an extra period for 
transposition. The Member States' transposi­
tion measures are to be monitored by the 
Commission. Projects giving priority to re­
newable sources of energy, district heating 
systems and indigenous energy sources will be 
scrutinised to ensure that they are compatible 
with the Treaty's competition rules. The Com­
mission will also make sure that the proce­
dures adopted for access to the network and 
(') Commission ν France, cited above, paragraphs 33, 39 and 40; 
Commission ν Italy, cited above, paragraphs 23 and 32; Com­
mission ν Netherlands, cited above, paragraphs 15 and 17. 
the arrangements for, and level of, tariffs do 
not entail a de facto limitation on the trade in 
electricity envisaged by the application of the 
directive. 
3. Proposal for a directive on common 
rules for the internal market in gas 
779. The Council meeting on energy held on 
8 December resulted in agreement to the 
proposal for a directive on the Community 
market in natural gas. The Commission wel­
comes the agreement. The directive establishes 
common rules for the transmission, distribu­
tion, supply and storage of natural gas; it lays 
down mies on access to the market, the use of 
networks, and the criteria and procedures ap­
plicable to the granting of authorisations for 
the transmission, distribution, supply and stor­
age of natural gas. Although distribution of 
gas is covered by the directive, Member States 
are allowed, subject to certain conditions, to 
refrain from applying certain provisions con­
cerning distribution if the fulfilment of obliga­
tions imposed in the general economic interest 
would be jeopardised. The directive lays down 
that, where Member States rely on the prin­
ciple of general economic interest, the Com­
mission must appraise the relevant cases 
individually. 
720. As a Community average, the actual 
liberalisation of national markets will repre­
sent about 30 % of annual gas consumption on 
the entry into force of the directive, with 20 % 
being the minimum. The minimum percentage 
will be increased to 28 % after five years and 
33 % after 10 years. Likewise, the category of 
eligible customers (consumers of natural gas 
authorised to negotiate their supply contracts 
independently with suppliers other than their 
usual supplier) is to be gradually extended: 
when the directive comes into force it will 
extend to all customers consuming more than 
25 million cubic metres of gas annually on a 
consumption site basis, dropping to an annual 
consumption of 15 million cubic metres after 
five years and to 5 million cubic metres after 
10 years. Gas-fired electric power stations are 
to be treated as eligible customers irrespective 
of their level of consumption. Member States 
may also decide to apply a maximum limit for 
liberalisation of the market, which has been 
set at 30, 38 or 43 % respectively. 
727. Regarding the organisation of access to 
the system, Member States may choose be- 43 tween two procedures: negotiated access or 
regulated access. Both systems must operate 
in accordance with objective, transparent and 
non-discriminatory criteria. Upstream pipeline 
networks must in principle also be open, but in 
accordance with criteria to be fixed by the 
Member States. 
722. The Commission can grant derogations 
where operators who have entered into take-
or-pay contracts are encountering difficulties 
caused by liberalisation. The directive also 
creates a derogation for Member States not 
directly connected to the gas network of any 
other Member States and having only one 
main external supplier. Provision is also made 
for derogations in respect of emerging markets 
and regions in Greece and Portugal. 
725. When the common position of the 
Council has been formally approved it will be 
presented to the European Parliament for a 
second reading. It is envisaged that the final 
text of the directive will be adopted by the 
Council during the first half of 1998. It should 
be implemented and applied by about the 
middle of 2000. 
E — Postal services 
1. European Parliament and Council 
directive on common rules for the 
development of the internal market in 
Community postal services and the 
improvement of quality of service 
124. On 15 December, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council adopted, on the basis of 
a proposal made by the Commission in 1995 
and subsequently amended, a harmonisation 
directive for the postal sector ('). The directive 
aims to introduce common rules for develop-
ing the postal sector and improving the quality 
of service, as well as gradually opening up 
markets in a controlled way. 
It imposes on Member States a minimum 
harmonised standard of universal service, in-
cluding a high-quality service countrywide 
with regular guaranteed deliveries at prices 
everyone can afford. This involves the collec-
tion, transport, sorting and delivery of letters 
as well as books, catalogues, newspapers, 
periodicals and parcels within certain price 
and weight limits. It also covers registered and 
insured items and applies to both domestic and 
cross-border deliveries. Due regard is given to 
considerations of continuity, confidentiality, 
impartiality and equal treatment as well as 
adaptability. The directive harmonises the 
maximum scope of the sector that, if neces-
sary, may be reserved by Member States so as 
to guarantee the funding of the universal 
service. 
2. Notice on the application 
of the competition rules 
to the postal sector (
2) 
725. On 17 December, the Commission 
adopted a notice aimed at clarifying the appli-
cation of the competition rules to postal serv-
ices. The Commission had wanted to wait 
until the postal directive was definitively 
adopted before adopting the notice, so that the 
latter would take full account of all the direc-
tive's provisions. The notice provides postal 
operators and the Member States with guide-
lines setting out the principles according to 
which the Commission will apply the compe-
tition rules to individual cases in the sector. 
The Commission points out, in particular, that 
it will ensure that the monopoly power granted 
to national post offices in order to guarantee 
universal service is not exploited in a way 
which will extend their dominant position to 
activities that are open to competition. It will 
likewise ensure that there is no unwarranted 
discrimination in favour of large customers at 
the expense of small users and that the mo-
nopolies granted for cross-border services are 
not used as a means of engaging in unlawful 
restrictive pricing agreements. 
F — Transport 
1. Decision on Italian dock labour 
legislation 
726. On 21 October, the Commission 
adopted, pursuant to Article 90(3) of the 
Treaty, a formal decision on Italian dock 
labour legislation (
3). The decision asks Italy to 
put an end to the port companies' monopoly 
of temporary labour. It follows the Court of 
Justice's judgment(
4) to the effect that certain 
44 
(') OJL 15,21.1.1998. 
(
2) OJ C 39, 6.2.1998. 
(
3) Decision 97/744/EC, OJ L 301, 5.11.1997. 
(
4) Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova [1991] 
ECR 1-5889. STATE MONOPOLIES AND MONOPOLY RIGHTS: 
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provisions of the Italian dock labour regula-
tions were incompatible with Community law. 
At the time, port operations were subject in 
every Italian port to a twofold monopoly: (a) 
that concerning the organisation of port opera-
tions, held indirectly by the port management 
body, and (b) that concerning the labour for 
carrying out those operations, held by the 
dockers' companies. 
727. Following an initial warning from the 
Commission, Italy had reformed its port leg-
islation in two stages (laws of 1994 and 
1996). The reform led to partial liberalisa-
tion, the main features of which were the 
deregulation of port operations, the freedom 
of port firms to hire their own employees, 
the creation of port authorities, the compul-
sory removal of port managers from port 
operations, and the abolition of discrimina-
tion based on nationality. 
72S. The port reform laws introduced, how-
ever, major new distortions of competition 
benefiting the old dockers' companies. The 
main one is that the old port companies, 
which were converted into firms for the 
performance of port operations, have also 
been given a monopoly in two very eco-
nomically important markets: the market for 
temporary labour and the market for subcon-
tracting labour-intensive services. The Com-
mission considered that the latter measure 
infringed Article 90(1), read in conjunction 
with Article 86, since it leads the old port 
companies to abuse their dominant position. 
The companies become de facto the exclu-
sive suppliers of their competitors (i.e. the 
exclusive suppliers of temporary labour and 
of subcontracted labour-intensive services to 
their competitors in the port operations mar-
ket), thereby giving rise to a conflict of 
interest. Moreover, the new Italian port leg-
islation grants the said monopoly to the same 
undertakings which, in the Court's view, had 
abused their dominant position. 
2. Decision on piloting tariffs 
in the port of Genoa 
729. On 21 October, the Commission 
adopted another decision under Article 
90(3) ('). this time with regard to the system of 
rebates in piloting tariffs introduced in the port 
of Genoa by a circular from the Italian Minis-
try of Transport (
2), Tourship (ex Corsica Fer-
ries) had complained about the system, which 
granted a 65 % reduction on the basic piloting 
tariff to shipping companies whose passenger 
vessels made at least four calls a week on a 
scheduled route and according to a regular 
timetable and frequency. Tourship argued that 
mere was no justification for this type of 
reduction, since the service supplied by the 
pilots was the same regardless of the owner of 
the vessel. 
130. Having examined the complaint, the 
Commission considered that neither the exist-
ence of economies of scale of this order of 
magnitude nor the protection of the seabed 
could objectively justify the level of the reduc-
tion. It did recognise, though, that economies 
of scale could result from planning pilot serv-
ices around the scheduled activities of ship-
ping companies as opposed to their unsched-
uled activities. However, since the current 
system was not based on this criterion, the 
Commission considered that the measure was 
incompatible with Article 90(1), read in con-
junction with Article 86, its effect being to 
apply unequal conditions to different shipping 
companies for equivalent services, thereby in-
troducing distortions of competition. The 
Commission called on the Italian Government 
to put an end to the infringement within two 
months. 
3. Groundhandling services 
at Athens Airport 
131. The Commission terminated proceed-
ings under Articles 90 and 86 which it had 
initiated following complaints from various 
airlines about the groundhandling services 
supplied on a monopoly basis by Olympic 
Airways at Athens Airport. The poor quality of 
these services (registration, baggage handling, 
cleaning and catering, etc.) and the lack of 
transparency in the charges were the result of 
an abuse of a dominant position. 
732. Following this decision, the Greek 
authorities began work on improving the east 
terminal at Athens Airport, which caters for 
foreign airlines. Major works are being, or 
will shortly be, carried out at the other Greek 
tourist airports. The law on temporary work, 
which prevented Olympic Airways from easily 
(') OJ L301, 5.11.1997. 
(
2) The tariff was prompted by the judgment of the Court of Justice 
in Case C-18/93 Corsica Ferries Italia [1994] ECR 1-1783 and 
was twice modified after the complaint was lodged, on 5 
October 1994 and 4 September 1996.  45 hiring seasonal staff to meet traffic peaks 
during the tourist season, has been amended. 
133. The monopoly held by Olympic Air-
ways in the supply of groundhandling services 
will be abolished from 1 January 1998, the 
date on which a new operator, selected by 
tender, will start to compete. From 1 January 
1999 (the date laid down by the Council 
directive on access to the groundhandling mar-
ket 0), a second supplier of ramp services will 
start operating. 
134. Olympic Airways has also introduced a 
system of quality control and minimum stand-
ards which it undertakes to observe at Athens, 
Heraklion, Chania, Rhodes, Corfu and Thessa-
loniki airports. Statistics on compliance with 
these standards will be transmitted to the 
airlines at the end of each season. Olympic 
Airways has also drawn up a new pricing 
structure, which is closer to the actual cost of 
supply. From now on, these tariffs will be 
published and any change will be announced 
and substantiated. 
4. Systems of discounts 
on landing fees 
135. Back in 1995, the Commission 
adopted a decision based on Article 90(3) (
2) 
calling on the Belgian authorities to bring to 
an end the system of discounts on landing 
fees charged at Zaventem Airport. The deci-
sion had concluded that the system consti-
tuted a State measure within the meaning of 
Article 90(1) which had the effect of apply-
ing to airlines unequal conditions for equiva-
lent services (associated with landing and 
take-off), thereby placing some of them at a 
competitive disadvantage. The system there-
fore infringed Article 90(1), read in conjunc-
tion with Article 86. Belgium did not comply 
with the decision, but instead appealed to the 
Court of Justice requesting the decision's 
annulment. Under Article 185 of the Treaty, 
however, the appeal, which has not yet been 
mied on, is not amenable to suspensive 
effect. In 1996, the Commission accordingly 
initiated the Article 169 procedure for failure 
to comply with the decision. Having received 
no reply to the reasoned opinion, or notifi-
cation of the measures taken, the Commis-
sion decided on 19 March to refer the matter 
to the Court of Justice under Article 169. 
756. Other proceedings were initiated with 
regard to similar systems in three other 
Member States. In May, letters of formal 
notice were sent out concerning systems of 
volume discounts and concerning the differ-
entiation of landing fees in accordance with 
the domestic or international origin of flights. 
G — Other State monopolies 
of a commercial character 
757. The Commission continued its efforts 
to secure compliance with Article 37 of the 
EC Treaty. The adjustment of national mon-
opolies of a commercial nature in the new 
Member States received particular attention. 
1. Swedish and Finnish alcohol 
monopolies 
1.1. Judgment of the Court of Justice 
concerning the Swedish alcohol monopoly 
138. On 23 October, the Court of Justice 
gave a preliminary ruling concerning the com-
patibility of the Swedish alcohol retail mon-
opoly with Articles 37 and 30 of the EC 
Treaty(
3). The Court took the opportunity to 
clarify the scope of the two provisions: mies 
relating to the operation of national monopo-
lies of a commercial character must be as-
sessed in the light of Article 37, while rules 
which are separable from the operation of the 
monopoly are subject to Article 30. The Court 
confirmed the Commission's opinion that the 
existence of the monopoly's exclusive right to 
retail alcoholic beverages is compatible with 
the Treaty, but reaffirmed that such an exclu-
sive right must not lead to discrimination. The 
system of wholesale import and distribution 
licences, on the other hand, was regarded as 
incompatible with Article 30 of the Treaty. 
759. The Commission is monitoring the ac-
tivities of the Swedish and Finnish retail mon-
opolies on the basis of the reports submitted 
to it by the Swedish Competition Authority 
and the Finnish Product Control Agency and 
reserves the right to initiate formal proceed-
ings if non-discrimination is not being secured 
effectively. 
46 
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(
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1.2. Norwegian alcohol monopoly 
140. On 3 December, the EFTA Court issued 
an advisory opinion(') on the compatibility of 
certain national provisions on the retail sale of 
alcoholic beverages with various articles of 
the EEA Agreement, and in particular with 
Article 16, whose terms correspond to those of 
Article 37 of the EC Treaty. 
141. The Court came to the conclusion that 
Article 16 of the EEA Agreement does not 
preclude the application of national provisions 
according to which certain alcoholic bever-
ages, i.e. red wine, white wine and rosé wine 
containing more than 4.75 % alcohol by vol-
ume, may only be sold at the retail level 
through a State alcohol retail monopoly, 
whereas beer with an alcoholic content of less 
than 4.75 % alcohol by volume (medium-
strength beer) may be sold outside the State 
alcohol retail monopoly by parties who obtain 
a municipal licence. 
142. The Court stated, however, that the 
system of maintaining two dividing lines 
under which wine or wine products with an 
alcoholic content of between 2.5 and 4.75 % 
alcohol by volume may only be sold through 
the State alcohol retail monopoly, while beer 
with the same alcoholic content may be sold 
outside the State retail monopoly, may lead to 
discrimination contrary to the said Article 16. 
(') Case E-l/97 Fridtjof Frank Gundersen and Oslo kommune. 
143. By declaring, in this case, that provi-
sions which define the scope of the exclusive 
right are to be considered in the light of 
Article 16 of the EEA Agreement, the Court 
followed the approach taken by the Court of 
Justice in Franzén. 
2. Austrian tobacco monopoly 
144. Austria did not comply within the pre-
scribed time limit with the reasoned opinion 
sent by the Commission in May for failure to 
fulfil the obligation to adjust its manufactured 
tobacco monopoly in accordance with Article 
71 of the Act of Accession and Article 37 of 
the Treaty. The principal objection levelled at 
Austria is that it has maintained in respect of 
any new operator trying to set up a wholesale 
distribution network in competition with the 
monopoly a general obligation to supply all 
retailers established on the national territory. 
Such an obligation is not only contrary to the 
applicable rules, whereby wholesalers must be 
free to choose their commercial partners oper-
ating at the retailing level, but would make it 
virtually impossible for new wholesalers to 
gain access to the relevant market. 
In December, the Commission, in the light of 
the Court's recent judgment in Franzén (see 
previous point), concluded that the provisions 
of Austrian national law which it had ob-
jected to under Article 71 of the Act of 
Accession and Article 37 of the Treaty are 
separable from the operation of the mon-
opoly, although they have an influence on the 
latter and must therefore be examined in the 
light of Article 30. 
47 Ill — MERGER CONTROL 
A — Introduction 
145. Since 1993, the number of mergers 
handled by the Commission has increased 
each year. A significant upturn in activity took 
place in 1997 (particularly during the second 
half of the year), with the Commission receiv-
ing 172 notifications (excluding the ECSC) as 
against 131 in 1996. This represents a growth 
rate of about 30 % and brings the total number 
of notifications received since the Merger 
Regulation was adopted seven years ago to 
more than 700. The number and variety of 
mergers with a Community dimension, but 
above all the substantial increase in cross-
border mergers (up 36 % on 1996) concerning 
European companies from more than one 
Member State, reflect an increased momentum 
towards economic integration within the Euro-
pean Union this year. Among the wide range 
of markets concerned, certain business sectors 
proved particularly dynamic, such as financial 
services (15 notifications), the chemical indus-
try (21 notifications), telecommunications (17 
notifications) and retailing (11 notifications). 
The wide variety of operations notified in 
1997 is evident from their breakdown by type 
of concentration: 77 notifications concerned 
the establishment of a joint venture or acquisi-
tion of joint control and 74 concerned acquisi-
tion of sole control or of a majority holding. 
Seven mergers and 14 takeovers were also 
notified. 
146. Control of notified mergers, which re-
sulted in the adoption of 188 decisions, includ-
ing 136 final decisions (excluding the ECSC) in 
1997, gave rise to the highest number of in-
depth investigations recorded since 1990. The 
Commission decided to initiate proceedings in 
cases which raised serious concerns as to com-
patibility with the common market (as against 
six in 1996). But only one operation was actu-
ally declared incompatible (Blokker/Toys 'R' 
Us), as against three the previous year. Follow-
ing in-depth investigations, the Commission 
also gave the go-ahead in eight cases (as against 
four in 1996), seven of which were made sub-
ject to conditions (Anglo American/Lonrho, 
BT/MCI, Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, Coca-
Cola/Carlsberg, Guinness/Grand Metropoli-
tan, Siemens/Elektrowatt, Veba/Degussa). The 
unconditional authorisation concerned the 
Coca-Cola Entreprises/Amalgated Beverages 
GB case. Seven other cases (as against three in 
1996) were referred to the competent competi-
tion authorities of Member States; of those, six 
concerned only part of the operation. 
147. Lastly, with regard to the coal and steel 
industries, 10 decisions were taken under Article 
66 of the ECSC Treaty as against seven in 1996: 
this trend has been relatively stable since 1992. 
Three of those decisions gave the go-ahead to 
major restructuring operations in the steel indus-
try. Hoogovens, the Dutch integrated producer, 
acquired control of Usines Gustave Boël in 
Belgium. The German producers Thyssen and 
Krupp set up a joint venture, Thyssen Krupp 
Stahl, in which they combined their flat products 
activities. As part of the privatisation of the 
Spanish nationalised company Aceralia, the 
largest producer in Spain, Arbed acquired a 
stake of 35 % and took over the company. 
148. The substantial upturn in Commission 
merger control activity reflects the key role 
played by the Community rules. The year also 
saw the end of a wide-ranging legal review 
which was launched in 1995 and centred 
on amendments to Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 ('). Apart from amendments extending 
the scope of the regulation to cover a new 
category of mergers with cross-border effects, 
the review of all rules and procedures also 
enabled a number of new texts and amendments 
to be adopted (mostly applicable as from 2 
March 1998). The result should be further 
improvements in the efficiency of the regula-
tion, which has now been adapted to economic 
developments. 
Β — Merger review 
1. Adoption of amendments 
to Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 
Stages and objectives 
149. The year 1996 saw the official presenta-
tion by the Commission of proposed amend-
ments to Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4064/89 on the control of concentrations be-
tween undertakings. This followed wide-
ranging consultations of Member States, the 
competent competition authorities and the 
business community and took account of reac-
tions received after the publication of a Green 
Paper on the subject in January 1996. Follow-
ing the adoption of Parliament and Economic 
and Social Committee reports welcoming the 
Commission proposal, work continued in the 
(') Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on 
the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ L 395, 
30.12.1989, as amended by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1310/97 of 30 June 1997, OJ L 180, 9.7.1997.  49 first half of 1997 within the Council working 
party. 
750. This preparatory work culminated on 
24 April 1997 in a Council agreement on 
amendments to the Merger Regulation. The 
agreement was made official on 30 June 1997, 
at the end of the Dutch Presidency, with the 
adoption of Council Regulation (EEC) No 
1310/97 ('), which is scheduled to enter into 
force on 1 March 1998. In the interests of 
transparency and accessibility, the Commis-
sion has posted a consolidated version includ-
ing the amendments on its Internet server. 
757. The changes to the original 1989 text 
are in line with the Commission's objective of 
resolving the problems encountered since the 
regulation entered into force. A number of 
mergers with significant cross-border effects 
fall below the thresholds triggering Commu-
nity control. Instead of being examined within 
the framework of a 'one-stop shop' system at 
Community level, such mergers are generally 
subject to multiple national controls of differ-
ent types. Other amendments approved by the 
Council reflect the Commission's concern to 
improve control procedures in order to reduce 
administrative burdens on companies and to 
simplify the mies. 
Substance of the main amendments 
152. It was decided not to change the thresh-
olds stipulated in the 1989 regulation but to 
add a new category of merger transaction. The 
Community will now be responsible for merg-
ers meeting the following four conditions: (i) 
the combined worldwide turnover of all the 
companies concerned must be more than ECU 
2.5 billion and (ii) the combined turnover of 
all the companies concerned must be more 
than ECU 100 million in each of at least three 
Member States. In addition, so as to ensure 
that mergers with cross-border effects are also 
included, (iii) the turnover of each of at least 
two of the companies concerned must be more 
than ECU 25 million in each of those same 
three Member States and (iv) the Community-
wide turnover of each of at least two of the 
companies concerned must be more than ECU 
100 million. 
755. These measures will enable economic 
realities to be reflected more accurately and 
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will provide companies with greater legal cer-
tainty and increase administrative efficiency 
by extending the 'one-stop shop'. 
754. The procedures and time limits laid 
down in the Merger Regulation will now 
apply to all operations resulting in a lasting 
change in the structure of the enterprises 
concerned, and, accordingly, to all full-
function joint ventures in particular. In other 
words, all full-function joint ventures will 
henceforth be covered by the Merger Regula-
tion, even those which hitherto were examined 
under the procedures of Regulation No 17. 
This amendment will have a significant impact 
which reflects concerns often raised in profes-
sional and legal circles regarding the need to 
harmonise and simplify the way full-function 
joint ventures are handled. However, the Com-
mission will retain the option of assessing, 
within the framework of the Merger Regula-
tion, the cooperative aspects of a full-function 
joint venture in the light of Article 85 to the 
extent that the merger results in the coordina-
tion of the competitive behaviour of the parent 
companies. It will therefore be able to initiate 
second-stage proceedings in the event of seri-
ous concerns arising not just as regards the 
risk of a dominant position being created or 
strengthened, but also as regards the risk of 
the competitive behaviour of the parent com-
panies being coordinated in a way which is 
incompatible with the common market. 
755. Specific provision is also made for 
companies to propose commitments during the 
first stage of proceedings with a view to 
clearing up any serious concerns which could 
constitute grounds for the Commission to ini-
tiate second-stage proceedings. For that pur-
pose, arrangements have been laid down to 
extend the time limit for the first stage of 
proceedings so as to allow the Commission to 
study the commitments and to consult the 
Member States before, as appropriate, accept-
ing them and authorising the merger. 
756. Among the other main changes, the 
new regulation clarifies the circumstances in 
which the Commission can refer a case to the 
competent authorities of a Member State fol-
lowing a request from that State setting out the 
grounds on which it is based. In particular, the 
Commission will refer all or part of a case 
where a merger affects competition on a dis-
tinct national market that does not constitute a 
substantial part of the common market. II —MERGER CONTROL 
757. Lastly, mention should also be made of 
two amendments concerning the period within 
which a merger cannot be effected and the 
basis for calculating the turnover of credit 
institutions and other financial institutions. To 
ensure effective control, the Council took the 
view that mergers should not be effected until 
a final decision has been adopted. As regards 
the calculation of turnover of financial institu-
tions to determine whether a merger has a 
Community dimension, calculation will be 
based on the income items as defined in 
Council Directive 86/635/EEC and no longer 
on one-tenth of total assets. 
2. Changes and improvements to the 
other provisions and notices relating 
to merger control 
Implementing regulation and interpretative 
notices 
158. Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
3384/94 on notifications, time limits and hear-
ings and the Form CO attached to it have been 
revised with three objectives in mind: namely 
to make the changes that had become neces-
sary as a result of amendments to Regulation 
(EEC) No 4064/89; to introduce the improve-
ments deemed desirable in the light of merger 
control experience; and to clarify a number of 
purely formal and linguistic points. Profes-
sional and legal circles were consulted on the 
changes, which were also submitted to the 
Member States for an opinion at two advisory 
committee meetings held at the year-end. For 
the same reasons, an in-depth review was also 
carried out of four interpretative notices on the 
concept of concentration, undertakings con-
cerned, joint ventures and the calculation of 
turnover. 
legislation easier to interpret and to update 
references to decisions actually taken. 
Commission notice on the alignment of 
procedures for processing mergers under 
the ECSC and EC Treaties 
160. In the interest of greater transparency, 
closer compliance with the rights of the de-
fence and faster decision-making, the Com-
mission notice helps to simplify merger con-
trol by aligning certain rules pursuant to 
Article 66 of the ECSC Treaty with those of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. In this 
way, the Commission hopes to meet the ex-
pectations of companies involved in merger 
operations covered by both sets of rules. It 
should be possible for ECSC companies to 
familiarise themselves with the procedures of 
ordinary merger law with a view to the forth-
coming expiry of the ECSC Treaty. 
161. The main changes as regards transpar-
ency concern the publication, in compliance 
with the requirements of business secrecy, of 
the fact of notification and the final decisions 
adopted. The protection of the rights of the 
defence, which is a general principle of Com-
munity law, will be reinforced by the sending 
of a statement of objections prior to the condi-
tional authorisation or prohibition of a merger. 
Interested parties will be able to access the file 
and make observations at the hearing when a 
statement of objections has been sent. Lastly, 
the Commission will endeavour to apply the 
same time limits to the various processing 
stages of ECSC files as those laid down in the 
Merger Regulation. These new arrangements, 
which are harmonised with the amendments to 
the Merger Regulation, are scheduled to enter 
into force on 1 March 1998. 
759. As regards the implementing regulation 
and the Form CO, the changes resulting from 
amendments to the Merger Regulation mainly 
concern rationalisation of the methods used to 
calculate the various time limits governing 
proceedings and implementation of the provi-
sions on the suspension of notification and the 
completion of an operation (suspended pend-
ing a final decision). The changes made in the 
light of experience are designed to facilitate 
the processing of notifications, particularly by 
ensuring that correct and complete information 
is provided, and to improve hearing proce-
dures. The redrafting of the notices was basi-
cally designed to make the changes to the 
C — New developments 
1. Product markets and geographic 
markets 
Daily consumer goods 
162. In the daily consumer goods sector, 
numerous criteria are used to define product 
markets, particularly where food products are 
concerned. For example, final consumers' 
tastes and preferences are often decisive fac-
tors in assessing whether products are substi-
tutable from a demand viewpoint. Consumer 
habits result not just from products' physical  51 52 
properties and generic characteristics but also 
from the impact of brand image and reputa-
tion, on which a company's competitive 
strength may rest. In three cases the Commis-
sion had to determine distinct markets for 
alcoholic or non-alcoholic beverages by ana-
lysing a set of factors affecting the substitut-
ability of different product groups in the light 
of demand on the relevant market. 
765. Accordingly, in the non-alcoholic bev-
erages sector, the Commission drew a distinc-
tion between sparkling drinks and non-
sparkling drinks such as fruit juice. Since this 
initial distinction proved sufficient to assess 
the effects of a merger in The Coca-Cola 
Company/Carlsberg case, the Commission 
was not obliged to determine whether finer 
distinctions were needed. This distinction, 
however, proved insufficient in another case, 
Coca-Cola Enterprises/Amalgated Beverages 
GB, for the purposes of which the Commis-
sion drew a finer distinction between colas and 
other flavoured sparkling drinks. In the case in 
point, the Commission concluded that there 
was a specific market for colas in the United 
Kingdom. With regard to alcoholic drinks, in 
the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan case, the 
Commission also had to establish a more 
detailed breakdown of the spirits market, 
which in the European Economic Area con-
sists largely of national markets, to take ac-
count of the specific conditions prevailing on 
one or another of those markets, and in par-
ticular to take account of variations in con-
sumption patterns from one country to an-
other. 
764. Price is also an important criterion in 
determining a product market, as was shown 
by the Coca-Cola Enterprises/Amalgated Bev-
erages GB case. The Commission's finding 
that colas constituted a separate product mar-
ket in the United Kingdom was based not just 
on consumers' taste and preferences or on the 
product's image and brand, but also on ele-
ments drawn from its price investigations. 
When asked whether consumers would switch 
to drinks other than colas if prices were raised 
by between 5 and 10 %, most competitors and 
distributors replied that any such switch would 
be limited or that substitution would not take 
place. The Commission also concluded from 
commercial documents and professional mar-
ket surveys that the vast majority of market 
traders took account of the specific competi-
tive environment of colas when determining 
commercial strategy and drawing up pricing 
studies and policies. In the Guinness/Grand 
Metropolitan case, the Commission, taking 
price as well as other factors into account, 
similarly concluded that genever was not the 
same product market as gin in Belgium given 
the differences recorded in retail prices for 
those beverages over more than two years. 
Public service Infrastructure 
165. With regard to sectors undergoing liber-
alisation, the Siemens/Elektrowatt case al-
lowed the Commission to analyse recent com-
petition trends on several capital goods mar-
kets situated upstream from general-interest 
service markets, such as energy supplies or the 
public telephone network. On the question of 
payphones, features specific to the universal 
service network prompted the Commission to 
identify a separate market for 'public' pay-
phones, which are tougher and integrate so-
phisticated monitoring equipment given that 
they are located in public places out of doors 
and are accessible at all times. These pay-
phones are run (not purely on the basis of 
profitability considerations) by operators 
which form a specific demand category: na-
tional telecommunications companies still 
within the public sector, or private operators 
of the public telecommunications network 
which have been granted authorisation as part 
of moves to liberalise the industry. Even after 
liberalisation of the telecommunications indus-
try has been completed, the obligation to 
provide a public service means that it will still 
be necessary to maintain a network of 'public' 
payphones, which will continue to influence 
the conditions of competition on a market on 
which only a minority of payphone manufac-
turers are present. 
766. Unlike 'private' payphones run by pri-
vate operators, as in cafés, hotels and restau-
rants, which constitute a market with a Euro-
pean dimension, 'public' payphone markets 
are still heavily national, given the specifica-
tions and technical standards (particularly as 
regards safety) laid down by the national 
operators, which has resulted in an individual 
payphone model being developed, at least in 
each of the large Member States. 
2. Dominance assessment 
2.1. Dominance at world level 
167. Within the context of the globalisation 
process, an increasing number of mergers in-Ill —MERGER CONTROL 
volving very large companies which are active 
on world markets are likely to have a signifi-
cant effect in the common market. Since some 
of these mergers are taking place on global 
markets characterised by a small number of 
competitors and high entry barriers, there is a 
substantial risk of dominant positions being 
created or strengthened. 
76S. The application of the Merger Regula-
tion to operations of this type may involve 
extraterritorial elements, particularly where 
the companies are based outside the common 
borders of the European Union and the opera-
tion (full merger, acquisition or creation of a 
joint venture) also takes place outside the 
Union. Apart from triggering the notification 
requirement when the turnover thresholds laid 
down in the regulation are reached, the critical 
element on which competence to act is based 
is the operational scope of the transaction 
within the common market. The matter of 
competence is hardly in doubt in cases where 
the relevant geographic market is defined as 
global, since the European Union forms a 
substantial part of that market. Accordingly, 
competence is then based on the impact of the 
operation on the conditions of competition in 
the common market. However, even where the 
relevant market has not been defined as global, 
the Commission's competence to examine a 
merger between companies which do not have 
a registered office, subsidiaries or branches on 
Community territory may be based on the 
operation's effect on the conditions of compe-
tition in the common market. 
769. In that context, the Boeing/McDonnell 
Douglas case, which led to the creation of the 
largest aerospace company in the world, gave 
rise to an in-depth investigation in view of its 
impact on competition. The company resulting 
from the merger held a market share of more 
than 60 % of the world market for commercial 
jet aircraft with more than 100 seats. A market 
which is extremely concentrated since, follow-
ing the operation, only one competitor, Airbus, 
remains. Boeing already dominated the mar-
ket, and its position was strengthened by 
various factors, such as the immediate in-
crease in its market share and order book. 
Other essential elements helped to strengthen 
its dominant position. The main ones identi-
fied by the Commission include the leverage 
effect with users of McDonnell Douglas 
(MDD) aircraft, the enhanced opportunity to 
enter into long-term exclusive supply deals 
with airlines, the merger of patent portfolios 
and the technological 'spill-over' benefits to 
the company's defence and space activities 
resulting from public funding of R & D pro-
grammes. 
770. In view of the lack of potential entrants 
(no other aircraft manufacturer was interested 
in acquiring the activities concerned), Boeing 
offered commitments which basically con-
cerned the cessation of exclusive supply deals, 
the 'ring-fencing' of MDD's commercial air-
craft activities and the licensing of patents to 
third parties. An annual report is also to be 
submitted to the Commission on R & D 
projects benefiting from public funding. Since 
this package of measures was deemed ad-
equate to resolve the resulting competition 
problems, the Commission decided to give the 
merger a conditional go-ahead. 
777. The case, which was examined simulta-
neously on both sides of the Atlantic, proved 
particularly sensitive because of the important 
interests involved, both in civil and military 
terms and because of its economic repercus-
sions on competition. Throughout the Com-
mission proceedings, the case received consid-
erable attention from the media which focused 
on the State interests at stake. The Commis-
sion reached its decision after carrying out an 
analysis based on the European Union's 
merger control rules and in accordance with its 
own practice and the case-law of the European 
Court. Numerous contacts and consultations 
took place, particularly between the Member 
of the Commission with special responsibility 
for competition and the Federal Trade Com-
mission within the framework of the bilateral 
agreement on cooperation in competition mat-
ters between the European Union and the US 
Government. During its in-depth investigation, 
the Commission notified the US authorities of 
its initial conclusions and concerns and called 
on the Federal Trade Commission to take 
account of the European Union's important 
interest in safeguarding competition on the 
large commercial jet aircraft market. After the 
Federal Trade Commission decided not to 
oppose the merger, the US Government in-
formed the Commission of its cdncerns re-
garding a possible decision to prohibit the 
proposed merger, which could undermine the 
United States' defence interests. The Commis-
sion took its concerns into consideration to the 
extent consistent with EU law, and limited the 
scope of its action to the civil side of the 
operation, including the effects of the merger 
on the commercial jet aircraft market resulting  53 54 
from the combining of Boeing and MDD's 
defence interests. In spite of the difficulties 
inherent to this case, the conditional authorisa-
tion given by the Commission on completion 
of its investigation was therefore a satisfactory 
and appropriate solution which maintained 
effective competition on the large commercial 
jet aircraft market. 
772. In the Anglo American Corporation 
(AAC)ZLonrho case, the Commission also es-
tablished that there was a risk of a dominant 
position being created on the world platinum 
market. This risk arose when AAC acquired a 
shareholding in Lonrho through a series of 
purchases. The dominant position resulted 
from the substantial combined market share of 
the parties and from the strong probability that 
it would increase further in the short term, 
given the very limited actual or potential 
competition. A sell-off was ruled out as a 
possible solution given that the only likely 
buyer would have been Gencor, the third-
largest South African operator, which had 
itself been involved in a previous putative 
merger which the Commission had opposed in 
1996 (Gencor/Lonrho case). Anglo American 
therefore agreed to the Commission's require-
ment that it reduce its shareholding in Lonrho 
to below a threshold giving it overall control 
of that company. This was the first time since 
the regulation entered into force that a com-
mitment along those lines, consisting in the 
reduction of a shareholding in a company 
listed on a financial market, had been pro-
posed, thus avoiding the risk of a dominant 
position being created. The decision also con-
firmed the Commission's consistent approach, 
which holds that acquisition of control may 
result from a qualified minority holding. 
2.2. Market foreclosure effects 
173. In the BT/MC1 case, the merger be-
tween British Telecommunications and MCI 
Communications Corporation, the Commis-
sion's investigations showed that the operation 
might create or strengthen a dominant position 
in the market for international voice telephony 
services between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. This risk was linked to the 
relative capacity shortage in transmission 
facilities on transatlantic submarine cables be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United 
States which might lead to a bottleneck on the 
cable link, currently facing rapidly expanding 
demand. 
774. The Commission took the view here 
that cable and satellite were not substitutable 
in the supply of telecommunications services 
for transatlantic links. BT and MCI already 
had significant cable capacity and their 
strength would have been further reinforced if 
their end-to-end international traffic capacities 
had been increased. As a result, the parties 
would have benefited from specific advantages 
(particularly in terms of international pay-
ments). No other competitor on the UK-US 
link would have enjoyed such advantages. 
Moreover, the new enterprise would have been 
in a position to oppose competition from other 
operators. In reply to the Commission's objec-
tions, the parties offered commitments consist-
ing essentially of making transatlantic cable 
capacity available and selling matched half 
circuits to other operators at their request. 
These commitments were deemed sufficient to 
address the concerns raised since they facili-
tated access by competitors to a position simi-
lar to reciprocal correspondents. Shortly after 
the case was wound up, a surprise develop-
ment occurred with the notification of a new 
proposed merger between MCI and a new 
telecommunications operator (WorldCom). A 
decision is to be taken in 1998 on the new 
project, which, if completed, could make the 
merger between BT and MCI as authorised by 
the Commission obsolete. 
775. In the Siemens/Elektrowatt case, the 
Commission concluded that the merger would 
lead to foreclosure of the German market for 
'public' payphones in view of the long-term 
contractual link between the only purchaser, 
Deutsche Telekom, and the sole remaining 
manufacturer, Siemens. This link resulted 
from the joint development of a new genera-
tion of payphones, for which Siemens pro-
vided the technology. Until that point, even 
though the parties were the only competitors 
capable of supplying the new payphones, the 
fact that competition existed meant that the 
telecommunications company could choose 
between two sources of supply. Following the 
merger, the option of changing supplier, and 
the resulting negotiating leverage, would have 
disappeared. Furthermore, there would have 
been no possibility of potential competitors 
bringing real pressure to bear because market 
entry would have entailed significant invest-
ments which would not have been feasible in 
view of the limited sales potential. The com-
mitment proposed by Siemens, namely to sell 
off Elektrowart/Landis & Gyr's payphone pro-
duction activities to a third party, which would Ill —MERGER CONTROL 
also enjoy fair access to the technology in 
question, avoided the risk of the market being 
effectively foreclosed as a result of the domi-
nant position. 
2.3. Range effects 
176. The question of the potential impact of 
range effects on competition, which is particu-
larly important with regard to daily consumer 
goods, such as drinks, arises in connection 
with the additional benefits that may accrue to 
the owners of dominant brand names. These 
advantages may be reflected in greater pricing 
flexibility and in a wide range of commercial 
strategy options. In the Coca-ColoJCarlsberg 
and Guinness/Grand Metropolitan cases, the 
Commission considered the inclusion in a 
range of drinks of strong brands belonging to 
separate markets. It concluded that the impact 
of such inclusion could give each of the 
brands in the portfolio greater strength on the 
market than if they were sold individually, and 
strengthen the competitive position of the 
portfolio's owner on several markets. 
777. In the second case, the consequences 
for potential competitors of owning a portfolio 
of high-profile brand names were also exam-
ined. The negotiating leverage resulting from 
ownership of dominant brands, which could, 
for instance, enable exclusive deals to be 
imposed, was deemed likely to raise additional 
obstacles to the market entry of new products. 
77S. Other range-related effects can also be 
noted in the industrial sector. For example, in 
the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas case, leaving 
aside the previously existing monopoly in the 
wide-body jet aircraft segment (Boeing 747), 
the merger resulted in an additional monopoly 
in the smaller narrow-body aircraft segment, 
thus making Boeing the only aircraft manufac-
turer offering a complete range of large com-
mercial aircraft. This position could not be 
contested by new potential entrants, given the 
extremely high entry barriers on the market, 
which was highly capital-intensive. 
ing the request by the Federal Cartels Office 
(Bundeskartellamt) in which it pointed out that 
the participation in the merger of the other 
energy supplier, PreussenElektra, could lead to 
a strengthening of a dominant position in the 
supply of electricity in Berlin and its sur-
rounding area. In the new Länder, Preussen 
Elektra controls certain regional electricity 
supply companies whose markets surround 
BEWAG's supply area. Those separate mar-
kets do not constitute a substantial part of the 
common market and the Commission decided 
to refer the matter to the Federal Cartels 
Office. However, in line with the directive on 
the liberalisation of the electricity sector, the 
Commission took the view that the market 
entry of a new competitor, in the form of the 
presence among the buyers of the strong US 
company Southern, had a positive impact on 
competition on a market which has tradition-
ally been partitioned. 
180. Part of the Rheinmetall/British 
Aerospace/STN Atlas case was referred to the 
Federal Cartels Office. This concerned a lim-
ited aspect of the operation involving various 
branches of industry, such as marine technol-
ogy, systems engineering and defence systems. 
The relevant market concerned equipment for 
armoured vehicles which was only marginally 
open to foreign competition. 
181. The takeover bid launched by the retail 
group Promodès for its competitor Casino 
affected a number of local retail markets, 
including Paris and the Paris area. The Com-
mission's decision to refer part of the opera-
tion was based on a belief that an examination 
by the French competition authorities would 
enable separate geographic markets on which 
the position of the group's stores entailed a 
risk of creating or strengthening a dominant 
position to be determined accurately. How-
ever, in view of the structure of the market and 
the position of the two groups, the Commis-
sion decided to approve the operation as re-
gards the part for which it retained compe-
tence. 
3. Referrals to the Member States 
779. The SEHB/VIAG/PE-BEWAG case, in-
volving the privatisation of the Berlin-based 
electricity company BEWAG, is the only case 
where an operation notified to the Commission 
in 1997 was referred in its entirety to a 
Member State. The decision was taken follow-
182. The diversified Preussag conglomerate 
acquired control of Hapag-Lloyd and Touristik 
Union International, both of which are active 
in tourism and travel services in Germany, in 
two separate transactions. The Federal Cartels 
Office took the view that the combination of 
those two operations and another merger, 
which took place at the same time in the same 
industry and had a national dimension, re- 55 56 
sulted in the creation of a duopolistic structure 
given the mutual links between the two lead-
ing groups on the air travel, sea cruises and 
charter flights markets. In view of the circum-
stances of the case, the Commission referred 
the parts of Preussag's acquisitions concerning 
those markets so as to ensure that they were 
examined on the same basis and that their 
effects on competition were assessed in a 
consistent way. However, it decided that the 
other aspects of the notified mergers, which 
concerned several markets in the fields of 
transport and travel agencies, were compatible 
with the common market. 
785. The acquisition of joint control of 
Compagnie Industrielle Maritime by a subsidi-
ary of Elf and Compagnie Nationale de Navi-
gation meant the takeover of a major oil 
storage company which had hitherto been 
independent of the large oil companies that 
made up its customer base, and threatened to 
create or reinforce dominant positions on cer-
tain separate oil storage markets. Accordingly, 
the Commission decided to refer that part of 
the case to the French authorities. Other spe-
cific aspects, such as the storage of crude oil 
traded on the international spot market, did not 
raise serious competition concerns, and were 
therefore approved. 
184. The takeover bid for Redland launched 
by Lafarge provided a first opportunity, for 
two Member States to cooperate simultane-
ously with the Commission in handung certain 
aspects of the operation concerning aggregates 
and ready-mixed concrete. The French and 
UK authorities had informed the Commission 
that the proposed operation would entail a risk 
of creating or strengthening dominant posi-
tions in a number of distinct geographic mar-
kets. The French request identified 17 affected 
areas; in the request from the United Kingdom 
(where Lafarge's presence is much smaller) 
two such areas were identified. The Commis-
sion considered that the competent national 
authorities were best placed to examine the 
issues raised, given that the markets identified 
in the requests were local or regional in scope. 
By a third decision taken the same day, the 
Commission authorised the bulk of the opera-
tion on the basis that it would not create or 
strengthen dominant positions in any other 
markets than those which were the subject of 
the requests for referral. 
4. Full-function joint ventures 
185. With the entry into force of the amend-
ments to the regulation, the distinction for 
merger control purposes between concentra-
tive and cooperative joint ventures no longer 
applies, and the 'full-function' nature of a 
joint venture has become the sole criterion 
governing application of the Merger Regula-
tion to operations of that type. Since the 
criterion is based on a joint venture's long-
term performance of all the functions of an 
autonomous economic unit, it is all the more 
important that about half of notified operations 
concern joint ventures presented as being con-
centrative. Specific arrangements apply to a 
large number of such operations, particularly 
with regard to the trade links remaining be-
tween the parent companies and the joint 
venture, which must be looked at carefully 
when determining whether the entity is genu-
inely full-function. 
186. Whether a joint venture is full-function 
or not is essentially contingent on its having 
all the necessary resources in terms of fund-
ing, staff and tangible and intangible assets. It 
was on that basis that Fuel Logistic, a nuclear 
forwarding joint venture between RSB Logis-
tic Projektspedition and AO Techsnabexport in 
Germany (RSB/Tenex/Fuel Logistic case) was 
deemed not to be a concentration because it 
lacked the necessary assets such as special 
transportation equipment, specialised staff and 
appropriate premises which would enable it to 
provide those services on the market. Further-
more, Fuel Logistic was to supply its services 
mainly to one of its two parent companies and 
to act as an auxiliary company of RSB. By the 
same token, the joint venture created between 
Preussag Stahl AG and Voest-Alpine Stahl 
Linz GmbH for the production of laser welded 
steel sheet (Preussag/Voest-Alpine case) was 
not regarded as constituting a concentration. 
The Commission took the view that the joint 
venture would not perform all the functions 
normally carried out by companies operating 
on the same market since it would rely en-
tirely on its parent companies for the procure-
ment of virtually all of the pre-material it 
would need and would not be able freely to 
negotiate the price of those supplies. 
187. In other operations the Commission had 
to determine where the dividing line lies be-
tween a full-function joint venture and a joint 
venture which is not full-function because of 
the nature of the relationship with its parent Ill —MERGER CONTROL 
companies. The fact that the joint venture set 
up by Philips and Hewlett Packard to manu-
facture components for lighting products will 
sell to its parent companies during its start-up 
phase does not alter the fact that it will operate 
on the market on a lasting basis 
(Philips/Hewlett-Packard case). Similarly, in 
the operation between the Swedish telecom-
munications companies Telia and Ericsson, 
whereby joint control is acquired of AU-
System Group (software development and dis-
tribution of telecommunications equipment), 
the joint venture was to retain Telia as a major 
customer. However, the Commission also took 
into account that there were other major cus-
tomers and that commercial relations con-
cerned only one field of AU-System's activi-
ties and concluded that the company would 
play an active role on the market irrespective 
of its sales to one of its parent companies 
(Telia/Ericsson case). 
7 SS. The minor economic importance — in 
comparison with the operation as a whole — 
of the contractual links between a joint ven-
ture and one or both of its parent companies 
was also deemed relevant in the BASF/Shell 
case. The joint venture in which the polyethyl-
ene production and sales activities of BASF 
and Shell are combined is continuing to source 
raw materials from its parent companies. It 
also produces other substances on their behalf 
and operates facilities on the industrial sites of 
BASF and Shell. In spite of those links, the 
joint venture, which has its own plants and 
constitutes an upstream integrated company, 
was deemed to be autonomous and full-
function, mainly on the basis that its polyethyl-
ene activities made up the bulk of its turnover 
(70 %). However, the Cornmission also took a 
careful look at the risk that the operation 
might lead to a larger coordination of the 
parent companies' activities in view of their 
strong positions on another polyolefins market 
and given the existence of numerous, complex 
links with the joint venture. 
7S9. The period for which a joint venture is 
to operate is also taken into account: in the 
aforementioned case, the minimum period of 
14 years laid down in the contract was deemed 
to constitute a lasting operational basis. Like-
wise, a duration of seven years does not call 
into question the lasting nature of a joint 
venture (Go-AheaaWIA/Thameslink case). In-
deed, although the new joint venture Merial, 
which was set up by Merck and Rhône-
Poulenc in the field of animal health, notably 
antiparasitics, will be the exclusive distributor, 
for a specified period, of some of Merck's 
finished products and sources certain basic 
chemical ingredients from its parent compa-
nies (Merck/Rhône-Poulenc/Merial case), its 
full-function nature was not called into ques-
tion. The Commission took account of the fact 
that Merial would perform all the functions of 
an autonomous company on a lasting basis, 
would carry out its own R&D activities, 
which were of vital importance to the field in 
question, and would maintain its own produc-
tion units and sales force. Merial would also 
have the power to determine the quantities and 
resale prices of the finished products acquired 
from Merck. Lastly, Merial would bring sig-
nificant added value to the finished products 
and the basic ingredients provided by one or 
other of its parent companies. 
5. Implementation of rules 
and procedures 
790. In view of its objective, merger control 
should be implemented in such a way as to 
ensure optimum effectiveness while also safe-
guarding the rights of the parties and third 
parties. Various rules and procedures set out in 
the regulation and implementing legislation 
allow these two principles to be reconciled. 
797. Regarding the right of third parties to 
be heard, for instance, the Court's judgment of 
27 November 1997 (
]), which rejected the 
application to have the Commission decision 
in the Procter & Gamble/VP Schickedanz de-
clared null and void, clarified a number of 
points relating to those rights and to the time 
limits for consulting third parties and the 
advisory committee of experts from the Mem-
ber States. In particular, the Court drew a 
distinction between the rights, backed by guar-
antees, of parties to the merger to have their 
right of defence respected throughout the pro-
ceedings, and the right of third parties to make 
known their point of view on merger plans 
which may have a detrimental impact on them. 
However, the Court also recalled the principle 
that these rights of third parties had to be 
reconciled with the main aim of the regulation, 
which is to ensure efficient controls and legal 
certainty for the companies subject to its 
implementation. In the case in point, the im-
plementation of those principles led the Court 
to take the view that the period of two days 
(') Case T-290/94 Kaysersberg SA ν Commission.  57 within which the third party applicant had to 
make its observations on the amendments to 
the plan proposed by the buyer was not such 
as to show that the Commission had failed to 
have regard for its right to be heard. The Court 
pointed out that, although the legitimate inter-
est of third parties to be heard may require 
them to be allowed a sufficient period for that 
purpose, such a requirement must, neverthe-
less, be adapted to the need for speed which 
characterises the general scheme of the regula-
tion and which requires the Commission to 
comply with strict time limits for the adoption 
of the final decision. Accordingly, the judg-
ment sets out the need to acknowledge the 
usefulness of the Commission's flexibility in 
respect of Community merger control and in 
reconciling respect for the rights of defence 
and efficiency. 
792. The processing of a case, which must 
normally take place within the strict time 
limits laid down in the regulation, may on 
occasion be delayed by problems such as a 
lack of information required to assess the 
operation notified. As a result of omissions or 
inaccuracies in the information given on the 
Form CO or in its annexes, the Commission 
declared notifications incomplete in 16 cases, 
thus extending the time limits for assessment 
so as to ensure that control remained efficient. 
Omissions, inaccuracies or contradictions of 
that type were noted, for example, in respect 
of the indirect presence of the parties on a 
significantly affected market (Veba/Degussa), 
of estimated market shares (Nestlé/San Pel-
legrino), or of the identification of the main 
customers or competitors likely to be con-
tacted (Swedish Match/KAV). 
193. In addition, so as not to prejudge the 
results of merger control or to prevent the 
adoption of remedies where appropriate, op-
erations must be notified rapidly and may not 
be carried out before a certain date (extended 
until the final decision by the new rules). In 
two cases (Samsung/AST and Maersk 
Data/Nantec) the Commission reserved the 
right to make use of its powers to fine parties 
for late notification. Lastly, in the 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere case, the Com-
mission was obliged to insist that the firms 
call an immediate halt to the marketing of 
decoders for digitally broadcast channels, 
which constituted partial implementation of 
the operation, whereas it was still subject to a 
legal suspension. However, in order to take 
account of important factors such as the major 
financial risks which can be associated with 
this obligation, firms can apply for a deroga-
tion, of which five were granted in 1997. 
794. However, the effectiveness of merger 
control is basically contingent on its ability to 
maintain or re-establish real competition. With 
that aim in view, the Commission made use, 
on two occasions, of its power to demand 
asset separation measures or any other appro-
priate action where a merger operation has 
already taken place. In the first case, which 
concerned Finnish companies (Kesko/Tuko), 
and was declared incompatible at the end of 
1996, the Commission took a separate deci-
sion pursuant to Article 8(4) of the regulation 
early in 1997 when it ordered the companies 
concerned to carry out their proposed divest-
ment with a view to restoring effective compe-
tition. The Blokker/Toys 'R' Us merger in the 
Netherlands was declared incompatible with 
the common market but, by means of the 
simultaneous application of Article 8(4) of the 
regulation, the Commission also took appro-
priate measures designed to ensure that the 
buyer, Blokker, sold off its controlling stake in 
the target company. These two merger opera-
tions were carried out without the companies 
concerned being obliged to notify the Com-
mission because they did not have a Commu-
nity dimension. Nevertheless, the Commission 
examined them and took the necessary meas-
ures following requests by the Finnish and 
Dutch authorities respectively pursuant to Ar-
ticle 22 of the regulation, which provides for 
the Commission to examine a concentration 
with no Community dimension at a Member 
State's request. 
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D — Statistical overview 
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59 IV — STATE AID 
A — General policy 
795. A number of important objectives which 
the Commission had set itself for the reform of 
its general policy on State aid were achieved in 
1997. It adopted a proposal for a regulation 
empowering it to exempt certain categories of 
aid from the notification requirement, which 
was agreed by the Council on 13 November. It 
also adopted new regional aid guidelines and a 
multisectoral framework on regional aid for 
large investment projects. At the same time as it 
adopted fliese guidelines, the Commission fixed 
the regional aid coverage ceiling at 42.7 % of 
the Union's population for the period 2000-06, 
a 4 percentage points reduction on the present 
coverage. As regards the processing of aid 
cases, the complexity and number of those 
cases again put an enormous strain on the 
Commission's resources. 
796. In April, the Commission published its 
fifth survey on State aid in the Union(') cover-
ing the period 1992-94. The downward trend 
compared with the period 1981-91 marks for 
the first time a point of inflection highlighting a 
stabilisation of the overall volume of aid. Ac-
cording to a widely held view(
2), this level is 
still too high, and if Europe is to be competitive 
at world level it must be reduced. The volume 
of aid to industry in the Twelve over the period 
1992-94 came, on average, to approximately 
ECU 43 billion a year, or 4 % of value added 
and ECU 1 400 per job in the sectors con-
cerned. The most noteworthy development 
highlighted by the survey is the increase from 7 
to 36 % between 1990 and 1994 in the share in 
volume terms accounted for by individual aid 
payments to manufacturing industry. 
797. As well as being a major source of 
distortion of competition, this high level of 
State aid risks endangering the efficient func-
tioning of the single market. Furthermore, the 
survey shows a growing disparity in the level 
of aid between the cohesion countries and the 
richer central regions. This is clearly contrary 
to the objective of economic and social co-
hesion. The importance of strict monitoring 
of State aid is further strengthened in the 
context of the completion of the single mar-
ket and the preparations for economic and 
monetary union. 
198. The new instruments adopted by the 
Commission or being prepared by its depart-
ments pursue the following objectives: 
• simplifying and clarifying the procedural 
rules; 
• concentrating the departments' resources 
on monitoring more closely the most im-
portant cases; 
• reducing the overall volume of aid granted 
in the Community; and 
• improving the openness and transparency 
of aid monitoring (
3). 
799. In 1997 the Commission thus adopted: 
• a proposal for an enabling regulation based 
on Article 94 of the Treaty (
4); 
• regional aid guidelines (
5); 
• guidelines on State aid to maritime trans-
porti
6); 
• a new framework for State aid to the motor 
vehicle industry (
7); 
• a 'multisectoral' framework on regional aid 
for large investment projects; 
• guidelines on State aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty, aimed spe-
cifically at the agriculture and fisheries 
sector (
8); 
• a notice on the method for setting the 
reference and discount rates; (
9) and 
• a notice on the application of Articles 92 
and 93 of the Treaty to short-term export 
credit insurance (
10). 
200. The following instruments, which were 
still being drawn up at the end of the report 
period, were discussed during that period at 
multilateral meetings between the Commis-
(') COM(97) 170 final. 
(
2) See point 6.4 of the opinion of the Economic and Social 
Committee on the 1994 Competition Report. OJ C 39, 
12.2.1996. 
(
3) See in this connection the wish expressed by Parliament in point 
7 of its resolution on the 1994 Competition Report, OJ C 65, 
4.3.1996. 
(
4) OJ C 262, 28.8.1997. 
(
5) Not yet published in the OJ. 
(
6) OJ C 205, 5.7.1997. 
(
7) OJ C 279, 15.9.1997. 
(
8) OJC283, 19.9.1997. 
(') OJC 273,9.9.1997. 
(
,0) OJ C 281, 17.9.1997.  61 sion's departments and Member States' ex-
perts: 
• a draft proposal for a procedural regulation 
based on Article 94; 
• a draft review of the Community guide-
lines on State aid for rescuing and restruc-
turing firms in difficulty; 
• a draft framework on training aid; and 
• a draft new directive on the transparency 
of financial relations between Member 
States and public undertakings. 
207. The key instruments from the point of 
view of reducing the level of aid in the 
Union are the regional aid guidelines, the 
multisectoral framework on regional aid for 
large investment projects and the future Com-
munity guidelines on aid for rescuing and 
restructuring firms in difficulty. The draft 
procedural regulation, the draft new directive 
on transparency and the notice on reference 
rates will, for their part, make above all for 
greater transparency. As for the future exemp-
tion regulations that will be adopted on the 
basis of the enabling regulation, these should 
simplify procedures by relieving the Commis-
sion of the burden of having to investigate 
numerous aid cases where there is no major 
risk of competition being distorted. The Com-
mission should thus be able to devote a 
larger part of its resources to the individual 
scrutiny of the most important regional aid 
cases, such cases having to be systematically 
notified to it under the new multisectoral 
framework. 
proposal for an enabling regulation to the 
Council. 
203. The purpose of the proposal for an en-
abling regulation is to make it possible, under 
certain conditions, to exempt from the notifica-
tion requirement certain types of horizontal aid 
measures which can be presumed from experi-
ence to be compatible with the common market 
provided they fulfil certain specific, pre-
established criteria. This should ultimately re-
sult in the Commission being relieved of a 
heavy, low value-added administrative work-
load, allowing it to concentrate on those cases 
most deserving of attention. The Commission 
does not intend, however, to waive any rights or 
avoid any obligations when monitoring aid 
measures thus exempted from the notification 
requirement. Member States will have to main-
tain a register and inform die Commission in 
their yearly reports of any exempted aid 
awards. The Commission will, of course, inves-
tigate complaints with all due diligence and 
national courts may also be called upon to deal 
with any breaches of the rules. 
204. In practice, the regulation will empower 
the Commission to adopt, after consulting an 
advisory committee, specific regulations 
exempting from the notification requirement, 
under certain conditions, aid measures falling, 
in particular, within the following categories: 
• horizontal aid for SMEs, R&D, environ-
mental protection, employment and training; 
• regional schemes in keeping with national 
maps approved beforehand by the Commis-
sion. 
1. Regulations based on Article 94 
of the Treaty 
202. The most important area of legislative 
activity is, by far, that relating to the drawing-
up of Council regulations pursuant to Article 94 
of the Treaty. The Commission received clear 
encouragement to carry out work on such 
regulations at the Council meeting on 14 No-
vember 1996, when it was invited to present 
proposals aimed at increasing the legal cer-
tainty, predictability and consistency of its de-
cisions(')- In July, the Commission presented a 
In addition, the regulation will provide a legal 
basis for the de minimis rule(
2). On 13 Novem-
ber, the Council gave its agreement to the 
proposal for a regulation presented by the 
Commission. The regulation ought therefore to 
be formally adopted in 1998 once the Council 
has received the European Parliament's 
opinion. 
205. The procedural regulation that is being 
drawn up will codify, within a single Council 
regulation, the various mies of procedure which 
currently exist in the State aid field and will 
thus improve transparency and legal certainty. 
It will provide a firmer legal basis for current 
62 
(') Parliament has also urged the Commission to take similar 
action: see point 26 of its resolution on the 1994 Competition 
Repon. OJ C 65, 4.3.1996. 
(
2) See Commission notice on the de minimis rule for State aid, OJ 
C 68, 6.3.1996. IV —STATE AID 
practices, most of which stem from the case-
law of the Court of Justice or from the prag-
matic rules which the Commission has itself 
developed. 
A preliminary draft proposal for a procedural 
regulation prepared by the Commission's de-
partments was submitted to the Member States' 
experts at a multilateral meeting on 3 and 4 
November. The Commission proposal should 
be ready for transmission to the Council early 
in 1998. 
2. New regional aid guidelines 
206. On 16 December, the Commission 
adopted new regional aid guidelines(·) unify-
ing the criteria used to assess regional aid and 
replacing with a single text all the existing 
provisions, which involve different time 
frames and the nature of which is to some 
extent heterogeneous. The guidelines accord-
ingly contain, firstly, those elements of the 
earlier instalments which are still operational 
and, secondly, new elements based on changes 
in Commission practice to reflect the socio-
economic situation and the speeding-up of the 
process of the integration of the Union's 
economies. The Commission thus intends to 
meet the need for more effective control of 
State aid in the European Union by concen-
trating the effort to reduce regional disparities 
more on the less-favoured regions. The guide-
fines should also make it possible to introduce, 
as from 1 January 2000, a regional aid system 
which is both transparent and the same for all 
Member States, being based on full compli-
ance with the Treaty provisions. Successive 
drafts of the guidelines were presented to 
Member States' experts at multilateral meet-
ings on 15 May 1996 and 23 May and 1 July 
1997. 
207. Of the new elements introduced by the 
guidelines, the reduction in permissible aid 
intensities for large firms is of particular im-
portance. The reduction in intensities meets 
the concern to lessen the distortions of compe-
tition caused by aid while maintaining the 
necessary consistency. It seeks, moreover, to 
reduce the potential for regional aid to act as 
an incentive to firms to relocate. In addition to 
the overall reduction in intensities, the Com-
mission has introduced specific mies on tailor-
ing maximum aid intensities to the seriousness 
and scale of regional problems. 
New rules on investment-linked employment 
aid have also been introduced to enable Mem-
ber States to provide more support for labour-
intensive investments and thus to contribute to 
the objective of stimulating employment. In 
view of the increasing pace of technical 
progress, certain categories of intangible in-
vestment which did not previously qualify for 
investment aid can now be financed within 
certain limits. 
In the interests of softening the negative im-
pact of any company relocations supported by 
regional aid, the guidelines stipulate that the 
aided investments and jobs must remain in the 
region concerned for at least five years (
2). 
208. As in the past, regions having a per 
capita gross domestic product of less than 
75 % of the Community average will qualify 
for exemption under Article 92(3)(a). The 
guidelines contain an amendment, however, to 
the method for choosing regions coming under 
Article 92(3)(c), which will henceforth consist 
of two stages: 
• the fixing by the Commission of a ceiling 
on the population covered by the exemp-
tions in Article 92(3)(a) and (c) of the 
Treaty at Union level and its distribution 
among Member States; 
• notification by Member States of the methods 
and indicators they wish to use in choosing 
the eligible regions and of the list of regions 
they propose for exemption under Article 
92(3)(c). 
In laying down this method, the Commission 
took account of the need both to ensure stricter 
monitoring of aid and to leave Member States 
sufficient scope in determining their regional 
policy. Against this background, the guidelines 
should help to increase further the mutual con-
sistency with the Structural Funds, eligibility 
for fund assistance being henceforth an addi-
tional criterion for determining eligibility for 
national aid. The timetables for national aid 
maps (consisting, for each Member State, 
(') Not yet published in the OJ. 
(
2) In its resolution of 13 November 1996 on industrial restruc-
turing and relocation in the European Union (OJ C 362, 
2.12.1996). Parliament underscored, in connection with the 
Structural Funds, 'the need for regional and local authorities to 
demand from incoming investment added value and self-
sustaining linkages to the existing economy ensuring relocation 
is less vulnerable to easy delocation in future.'  63 of a ceiling on coverage in terms of percent-
age of population, die regions eligible for 
regional aid and the maximum intensities 
of investment or employment aid for each 
eligible region) and that for the Structural 
Funds are also to be aligned. The strengthen-
ing of the mutual consistency between na-
tional maps of regions eligible for aid and the 
maps of future regional assistance from the 
Structural Funds formed the subject matter of 
a specific communication to Member 
States (')-
Ceiling on the coverage of regional aid 
in terms of population concerned 
209. At the same time as it adopted the 
guidelines, the Commission fixed the ceiling 
of coverage of regional aid at 42.7 % of the 
population of the Union for the period 
2000-06, a 4 percentage points reduction on 
the current coverage. This Community ceiling 
was apportioned between Article 92(3)(a) and 
(c) regions and between the various Member 
States in the light of regional disparities in 
terms of per capita income and unemployment 
in both the national and the Community con-
text. The different national ceilings, which 
constitute the upper limit to the amount of 
regional aid that may be granted by Member 
States during the period 2000-06, may be 
revised before the end of 1998 in the light of 
the latest available statistics. 
3. Multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects 
270. On 16 December, the Commission 
adopted a multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects (
2). The 
framework will be applicable from 1 Septem-
ber 1998 for a period of three years, at the end 
of which the Commission will decide either to 
prolong, amend or abolish it. The framework 
is intended to limit the — often excessive — 
amounts of regional aid for large investment 
projects. It fits into the Commission's broader 
objective of ultimately putting an end to the 
various existing sectoral mies on State aid 
with a view to adopting a single approach to 
major awards under regional aid schemes re-
gardless of the sector involved, except in the 
case of coal and steel, which will remain 
subject to the ECSC Treaty until July 2002. 
The new framework generalises, in all sectors 
not covered by sectoral rules on State aid, the 
obligation to notify individually any aid 
planned for large-scale projects under regional 
aid schemes where one of the following two 
criteria is met: 
(i) the total project cost comes to more than 
ECU 50 million (
3) and the aid intensity is 
more than 50 % of the relevant allowable 
ceiling and the aid per job created or 
safeguarded exceeds ECU 40 000 (
4); 
(ii) the aid amount exceeds ECU 50 million. 
For large-scale projects thus defined, the 
framework lays down rules aimed at reducing 
any competition-distorting effects by lowering 
the aid ceiling compared with the maximum 
ceiling of intensity authorised in the region 
concerned, and this on the basis of three 
criteria: 
• the capital-labour ratio; 
• the degree of competition in the relevant 
market; and 
• the impact on regional development. 
277. These three criteria are each translated 
into a coefficient the value of which varies 
with the project's characteristics. To obtain the 
theoretical ceiling of permissible aid for a 
large-scale project, the maximum intensity 
authorised in the region concerned must be 
multiplied by the three coefficients obtained, 
provided the product of these coefficients is 
less than one. Most of the time this is likely to 
be the case, especially where capital-intensive 
projects are concerned. Here, the intensity of 
the aid authorised for large-scale projects will 
therefore be well below the allowable ceiling 
for the region in question, which remains 
applicable, however, to all projects not fulfill-
ing criteria (i) and (ii) mentioned above. 
272. A discussion paper on the draft multi-
sectoral framework was the subject of an 
exchange of views between Commission offi-
cials and Member States' experts at a multilat-
eral meeting on 15 January, and the instrument 
64 
(') SEC(97) 2293 final: communication of 16 December 1997 on 
the links between regional and competition policy: reinforcing 
concentration and mutual consistency (not yet published in the 
OJ). 
(
2) Not yet published in the OJ. 
(
3) Reduced to ECU IS million for projects in the textile and 
clothing industry. 
(") Reduced to ECU 30 000 for projects in the textile and clothing 
industry. IV —STATE AID 
was finalised in the course of numerous bilat-
eral meetings. 
4. Directive on transparency 
273. At a multilateral meeting on 1 July the 
Commission's departments presented a draft 
new directive amending the directive on the 
transparency of financial relations between 
Member States and public undertakings (')· 
The planned amendments are due essentially 
to the need to draw up separate accounts for 
operations connected with a service of general 
economic interest within the meaning of 
Article 90(2) or benefiting from exclusive 
rights and for those within the commercial 
sector. The aim is to highlight the existence of 
any cross-subsidisation between the two types 
of activity. The directive should be adopted by 
the Commission in 1998. 
Β — Concept of aid 
274. The way aid is defined is of fundamen-
tal importance when it comes to applying the 
State aid rules, as only measures constituting 
aid within the meaning of Article 92(1) must 
be notified to the Commission. To create legal 
certainty for aid recipients Member States 
should also notify measures which might con-
stitute aid. The concept of State aid under 
Article 92(1) is conveniently divided into four 
separate criteria which must all be fulfilled for 
State aid to exist and which are described 
below. Commission decisions and Court of 
Justice judgments have helped clarify these 
criteria. Developments in 1997 are described 
below. 
1. Advantage to a firm or firms 
275. It has consistently been held by the 
Court and the Commission that advantages 
granted by public authorities which lighten the 
charges normally included in an undertaking's 
budget constitute State aid(
2). In its La Poste 
(French Post Office) judgment (
3) the Court of 
First Instance upheld the Commission decision 
but found, contrary to the Commission deci-
sion, that tax concessions to the French public-
law undertaking La Poste did constitute State 
aid which could benefit from exemption under 
Article 90(2) as the tax concessions were not 
greater than was necessary to ensure the per-
formance of the public-interest tasks assigned 
to La Poste. Moreover, the Court of First 
Instance confirmed that the Commission has a 
wide discretion in evaluating under Article 
90(2) the additional public service costs, this 
discretion being comparable to that exercised 
by the Commission when applying Article 
92(3) of the Treaty. 
276. In 1997, the market investor principle 
was applied on several occasions by the Com-
mission. This instrument makes it possible for 
the Commission to detennine whether the 
transfer of public funds to public or private 
undertakings partially owned by the State con-
stitutes State aid. This is the case if a private 
investor operating under normal market condi-
tions would provide the funds on less favour-
able terms or would not provide them at all. 
27 7. The purchase by the State from an 
undertaking of some of its shareholdings at 
more than the market price thus constitutes 
aid. This point was illustrated by the negative 
decision on the purchase by the French Gov-
ernment of Crédit Lyonnais preference shares 
held by Thomson SA (
4). In this connection the 
Commission would welcome greater transpar-
ency on the part of Member States in transac-
tions involving the capital of undertakings 
which they own. 
27& The 'Technolease' case(
5) illustrates 
just how complex the measures supporting 
certain firms can be. In the case in point, 
Philips leased know-how through one of its 
subsidiaries to Rabobank. This enabled Philips 
to make a profit of NLG 600 million and 
Rabobank in all likelihood to amortise its 
purchase more quickly than Philips could have 
done, amortisation periods varying from one 
sector to another. In authorising this book 
transfer, the Dutch tax authorities appear to 
have allowed Philips and Rabobank to pay 
less tax. As no further information was forth-
coming from the Dutch authorities, in April 
the Commission initiated Article 93(2) pro-
ceedings in respect of the measure. 
(') Commission Directive 93/84/EEC of 30 September 1993 amend-
ing Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of financial 
relations between Member States and public undertakings, OJ L 
254, 12.10.1993. 
(
2) See Case C-241/94 France ν Commission [1996] ECR 1-4551. 
(
3) Case T-106/95 Federation Française des Sociétés d'Assurances 
and Others ν Commission [1997] ECR 11-229. 
(
4) Case C 62/96, aid for Thomson SA-Thomson Multimédia, not yet 
published in the OJ. 
(') Case C 28/97, ex NN 38/97, Technolease Philips-Rabobank, OJ 
C 338. 8.11.1997.  65 279. The advantage conferred on a firm may 
take the form of a guarantee given by the 
public authorities to cover part of its liabilities. 
A system of guarantees set up by the State but 
financed entirely by premiums paid by the 
beneficiaries does not, however, constitute 
State aid as it does not consume any State 
resources. The Commission accordingly termi-
nated the proceedings it had initiated in re-
spect of the Regeling Bijzondere Financiering 
(special financing scheme) ('). which was open 
to any financially sound business, on the 
ground that no aid was involved inasmuch as 
the Dutch authorities had undertaken to adjust 
the premiums should the scheme fall into 
deficit in future. Similarly, it concluded that 
there was no aid element in a scheme of 
guarantees for small and medium-sized enter-
prises which encouraged the provision of risk 
capital in Finland (
2). On the other hand, State 
guarantee schemes which are not financed by 
premiums paid by beneficiaries have been 
considered by the Commission to contain aid 
elements. 
Reference rates 
220. Calculating the financial advantage to 
be gained from an aid measure in the case of 
staggered payments or the granting of soft 
loans calls for the setting of a reference rate in 
order to update the value of the financial flows 
involved. In July, the Commission laid down 
the rules it will henceforth apply in determin-
ing the reference rate for each country when it 
calculates the financial benefit flowing from a 
soft loan or a grant disbursed in several instal-
ments (
3). 
227. The reference rates are used to measure 
the grant equivalent of aid so disbursed and to 
calculate the aid element resulting from inter-
est subsidy schemes for loans. They are thus 
useful in determining whether an aid measure 
is covered by the de minimis rule (
4), and they 
establish the interest rates applicable to the 
repayment of illegal aid(
5). The rates are 
supposed to reflect the average level of inter-
est rates charged, in the various Member 
States, on medium and long-term loans (five to 
10 years) backed by normal security. 
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(') Case C 49/91. OJ C 202, 2.7.1997. 
(
2) Case N 124/97, OJ C 250, 15.8.1997. 
(
3) Notice on the method for setting the reference and discount 
rates, OJ C 273. 9.9.1997. 
(
4) See the Commission notice on the de minimis rule for Slate aid, 
OJ C 68, 6.3.1996. 
(
3) SeeOJC 156,22.6.1995. 
In the past, the rates were set on the basis of 
definitions agreed bilaterally with each Mem-
ber State. This method resulted in the Com-
mission adopting heterogeneous definitions for 
the rates. What is more, the rates were com-
municated to the Commission spasmodically, 
which made it difficult to update them. Against 
this background, the Commission had an inde-
pendent study carried out of the method for 
setting the reference rates applicable to the 
various aid schemes for businesses in the 
Union. The study was effected on the basis of 
a survey of over 70 banks in the 15 Member 
States. In the light of the study, the Commis-
sion decided to align the reference rate defini-
tions and to automate the system of gathering 
and updating the rates. 
2. Origin of resources 
222. Only aid 'granted by a Member State or 
through State resources in any form whatso-
ever' can constitute State aid under Article 
92(1). In many cases it is obvious that State 
resources are being used. This is the case, for 
example, with grants, capital injections, soft 
loans and tax exemptions (
6). In other cases the 
State resources element may be less clear. 
223. One typical situation where the State 
resources criterion is closely investigated is 
when a Member State gives certain undertak-
ings advantages directly through legislation. 
This issue arose in the PMU case, where a 
formal investigation was opened with regard 
to aid allegedly granted by France to race-
course undertakings (
7). Part of the alleged aid 
was not considered State aid by the Commis-
sion. The advantage resulted from legislation 
providing for an upward adjustment of the 
income share of the racecourse undertakings. 
Changing the distribution of the income from 
bets between betters and racecourse undertak-
ings in favour of the latter did not involve any 
allocation of State resources. Hence no State 
aid was involved here. 
224. A related situation arises where a Mem-
ber State refrains from enforcing legislation on 
undertakings. The Commission decided that a 
failure by the Spanish authorities to enforce 
environmental regulations did not in itself 
constitute State aid within the meaning of 
(
6) For non-recovery of taxes and contributions owed, see Case C 
7/97, OJ C 192,24.6.1997. 
(') Case C 4/97, OJ C 163, 30.5.1997. IV — STATE AID 
Artide 92(1) since it did not involve any 
transfer of State resources (')· Consequently, 
the complainants' allegation that State aid was 
involved because the Spanish State would 
have to cover costs for environmental damage 
due to the undertaking's non-compliance was 
rejected. 
225. The State resources criterion is often 
highlighted when an undertaking controlled by 
a Member State grants aid. This was the case 
in Riedel-de Haèn AG, where the Commission 
decided to launch a formal investigation into 
aid granted by a German incorporated founda-
tion (
2). The legal objective of the foundation, 
which was established by a Federal law, was 
to offer aid for environmental projects. Its 
resources derived from the privatisation of a 
former State-owned company. The German 
Government appointed each member of the 
management board and the foundation was 
audited by the Federal Court of Auditors. 
Consequently, the Commission considered the 
foundation to be a State body and its resources 
to be State resources. Aid granted by the 
foundation thus constituted State aid. 
226. Cross-subsidies between the reserved 
activities and the competitive activities within 
an undertaking can involve a transfer of public 
resources. In the La Poste case, the Court of 
First Instance held the possibility of such 
cross-subsidies between the reserved postal 
activities and the insurance activities of La 
Poste to be excluded to the extent that the aid 
remained lower than the additional costs gen-
erated by the performance of the particular 
tasks of general public interest referred to in 
Article 90(2) and assigned to La Poste (
3). 
3. Specificity criterion 
227. The specificity criterion is often the 
most difficult one to establish. It helps to 
distinguish general measures, which are a 
matter for harmonisation, from specific meas-
ures, which may come within the scope of 
Articles 92 to 94 of the Treaty. 
228. The specificity criterion is met, for ex-
ample, where tax measures or measures relat-
ing to social security contributions introduce a 
difference of treatment in favour of one or 
more sectors of industry without that differ-
ence being justified by the nature or purpose 
of the levy system. The Commission thus 
launched a formal investigation into section 
52.8 of the German 1996 income tax act(
4), 
which provides for reductions in taxable in-
come for natural or legal persons investing in 
companies in the eastern Länder or west Ber-
lin. Being justified neither by the nature nor by 
the purpose of taxation in Germany, the meas-
ure was considered by the Commission to 
constitute State aid. 
229. In Maribel quater the Commission de-
cided that a Belgian scheme providing for a 
reduction in social security contributions for 
all firms employing manual workers consti-
tuted a general measure (
5). The scheme was of 
a general nature, applied automatically and did 
not appear prima facie to discriminate be-
tween sectors. The Maribel quater scheme 
replaced the Maribel bis/ter scheme (
6), which 
was not considered a general measure since an 
additional reduction in social security contri-
butions was granted to firms operating in those 
industries most involved in international com-
petition. 
4. Distortion of competition and effect 
on intra-Community trade 
230. An aid measure which has no effect on 
trade between Member States is not subject to 
the principle of incompatibility with the com-
mon market. The concept of effect on trade 
must be interpreted, however, in the light of 
the well-established case-law of the Court of 
Justice. For the condition to be met, it is 
enough, say, for the aided firm to carry on, 
even partially, an activity involving significant 
trade between Member States. 
In particular, the Commission considers that 
measures to help firms expand in non-
Community countries affect trade between 
Member States because Community firms are 
in competition with one another when it 
comes to doing more business outside the 
common market. Aid for direct investment 
abroad is thus deemed to be caught by Article 
92 (
7). Where such measures help to promote 
the international growth of small and medium-
sized enterprises which would not have ex-
(') Case NN 118/97. aid for SNIACE SA, not yet published in the 
OJ. 
(
2) Case C 63/97. ex NN 104/97, OJ C 385. 12.12.1997. 
(
3) Case T-106/95, referred to abo-ve. 
(
4) Case C 16/97, ex NN 9/96. 
(
5) Case N 132/97, OJ C 201, 1.7.1997. 
(") Case C 14/96, OJ L95, 10.4.1997. 
(
7) 1996 Competition Report, point 224.  67 panded unaided, they may be considered com­
patible with the common market. On the other 
hand, the Commission takes a stricter view of 
aid for international expansion by large enter­
prises as these should normally themselves 
bear the cost and risk of their international 
development. It thus decided to open a formal 
investigation into such aid for the Austrian 
firm LiftgmbH(') on the ground that the latter 
was already well established in several parts 
of the world where its competitors did not 
receive any aid to help them expand interna­
tionally. 
tuting one of its day-to-day activities, cannot 
be regarded as investment aid but must be 
treated as operating aid, which is in general 
considered incompatible with the common 
market. It is authorised only exceptionally: 
• where it is intended to offset additional 
transport costs in the outermost regions or 
in regions qualifying for exemption under 
Article 92(3)(c) with low population densi­
ties and, exceptionally and temporarily, Ar­
ticle 92(3) (a) regions suffering from particu­
lar handicaps (
6); 
C — Assessing the compatibility 
of aid with the common market 
231. In 1997, the Commission maintained a 
strict approach to determining whether State 
aid is compatible with the common market 
and endeavoured to strike a balance between 
compliance with a system of undistorted com­
petition and the contribution made by some 
aid to other Community policy objectives. 
Certain aid, especially operating aid provided 
through the tax system, may lead to consider­
able distortions of competition without signifi­
cantly contributing to such Community objec­
tives. The Commission undertook, in parallel 
with the adoption on 1 December by the 
Council (Economic Affairs and Finance)(
2) of 
a code of conduct on direct taxation, to adopt 
in 1998 guidelines for this type of aid and to 
review the tax arrangements in force in the 
Member States. 
As regards excise duties on mineral oils, the 
Commission may, at the request of the Mem­
ber States, ask the Council to adopt deroga­
tions from the tax harmonisation measures in 
this area(
3). Following a recent Council deci­
sioni
4), the Commission has undertaken to 
review the derogations posing problems and, 
in particular, to ensure that the latter comply 
with the competition rules on State aid. 
232. In Siemens (
5), the Court was able to 
further define the concept of operating aid. It 
upheld the Commission's argument, confirmed 
by the Court of First Instance, that aid for use 
in the marketing of a firm's products, consti-
• where it compensates for the extra costs of 
environmental protection in the fields of 
waste management and relief from environ­
mental taxes (
7); 
• in certain sectors such as shipbuilding 
where it meets very specific rules or 
thresholds. 
1. Sectoral aid 
1.1. Sectors subject to specific rules 
1.1.1. Shipbuilding 
233. The Commission continued its close 
monitoring of aid to shipbuilding under the 
seventh Council directive, which has remained 
in force since the OECD agreements. The 
United States had still not ratified these, so 
they were not yet applicable. In December, on 
the basis of a Commission proposal, the Coun­
cil decided to extend the seventh directive to 
31 December 1998, unless the OECD agree­
ment was ratified and implemented in the 
meantime. At the same time, the Commission 
also put forward a proposal to replace the 
existing directive in the event of the agree­
ment being finally ratified. 
234. The most important cases examined 
concerned the aid intended for completion of 
the privatisation of the nationalised shipyards 
in Spain and the former East German ship­
yards MTW and Volkswerft. Part of the aid 
necessitated a derogation from the rules in 




(') Case C-77/97, ex N 99/97, direct investment abroad by 
LiflgmbH, not yet published in the OJ. 
(
2) Council resolution of 1 December 1997, OJ C 2/2, 6.1.1998. 
(
3) Directive 92/81/EEC 
(
4) Council Decision 97/425/EC, OJ L 182. 10.7.1997. 
(') Case C-278/95 Ρ Siemens SA ν Commission [1997] ECR 1-2507. 
("ι See points 4.16 to 4.18 of the guidelines on national regional 
aid. 
(
7) See paragraph 3.4 of the Community guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection. OJ C 72, 10.3.1994. 
(
8) Council Regulation No 1013/97. IV —STATE AID 
235. The aid recipients are subjected to rig-
orous scrutiny by the Commission. In particu-
lar, they undergo regular on-site inspections 
and are required to provide the Commission 
with quarterly reports on the status of the 
restructuring plan. The Cornmission noted that 
MTW's output in 1996 slightly exceeded the 
limit set at 100 000 tonnes. Thus when the 
Commission approved the first tranche of re-
structuring aid in July 1997 ('), it required a 
compensatory reduction in output for 1997 
and a cut of DEM 720 000 in operating aid. 
1.1.2. Steel 
236. The sixth steel aid code(
2) entered into 
force on 1 January and is to run until the 
expiry of the ECSC Treaty on 22 July 2002. 
Under the new code, State aid is allowed only 
for research and development and environ-
mental protection, under basically the same 
rales as those applicable to other industry 
sectors, and for closures. A new feature of the 
sixth code is that it allows aid for partial 
closures, with strict rules to prevent any spill-
over of aid to the remaining activities of the 
enterprise in question, and gives the Commis-
sion more effective powers to combat illegal 
unnotified aid. The year saw the adoption of 
two decisions by the Commission in which it 
initiated proceedings to suspend aid granted 
without prior approval to MCR Gesellschaft 
für metallurgisches Recycling (
3) and ESF Fe-
ralpi GmbH(
4). The Commission did not raise 
any objection in respect of the acquisition by 
the Walloon region of a 25 % minority share-
holding in Clabecq since the region had 
behaved like a private investor. 
The Commission continued its monitoring of 
the eight ECSC cases which were approved 
under Article 95 of the ECSC Treaty. 
1.1.3. Coal 
237. Decision No 3632/93/ECSC(
5) of 28 
December 1993 establishes the Community 
rules for State aid to the coal industry cover-
ing the period from 1994 to 2002. 
(') Cases N 31/97 and C 90/97, OJ C 344, 14.11.1997. 
(
2) Commission Decision 2496/96/ECSC establishing Community 
rules for Slate aid to the steel industry, OJ L 338, 28.12.1996. 
(
3) Case C 85/97, ex N 301/97, environmental aid for MCR 
Gesellschaft für metallurgisches Recycling, not yet published. 
(
4) Case C 75/97. ex NN 108/97, aid for ESF Feralpi GmbH, not 
yet published. 
(') OJL 329, 30.12.1993. 
238. On 18 December 1996, the Commis-
sion authorised (
6) the United Kingdom to 
grant financial assistance for the 1997/98 
financial year totalling ECU 500.7 million 
(GBP 347 million) and an additional amount 
of ECU 29.5 million (GBP 24 million) for the 
1996/97 financial year to cover inherited 
liabilities. 
239. On 30 April, the Commission author-
ised (
7) the United Kingdom to grant financial 
assistance, by way of budgetary provisions for 
the financial year 1998/99 to be disbursed over 
the period until the expiry of the ECSC Treaty 
in July 2002, totalling ECU 1 285.6 million 
(GBP 891 million), to cover inherited 
liabilities. 
240. On 3 May, the Commission published 
in the Official Journal of the European Com-
munities^) a letter of formal notice to Spain 
concerning the provision of insufficient infor-
mation with respect to a notification concern-
ing supplementary aid proposed for 1994, 
1995 and 1996. 
247. On 23 August, the Cornrnission pub-
lished in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities^) a letter of formal notice to 
Germany concerning the alleged irregular use 
of State aid following a complaint lodged 
at the end of 1996 by a British anthracite 
producer. 
1.1.4. Motor vehicle industry 
(a) Motor vehicle framework 
242. The Cornrnission adopted a new Com-
munity framework for State aid to the motor 
vehicle industry for the period 1998-2000. It 
follows the series of motor vehicle frame-
works that have been adopted since 1989 and 
has been adjusted to take account of the 
consequences of the main economic and in-
dustrial trends in the industry. In 1996, the 
Commission carried out a detailed study, with 
the help of independent consultants, into the 
current motor vehicle framework. The conclu-
sions pointed to the overall efficacy of the 
framework and recommended several adjust-
ments, notably as regards the definition of 
the motor vehicle sector, the notification 
(
6) Decision 97/376/ECSC, OJ L 158, 17.6.1997. 
(
7) Decision 97/577/ECSC, OJ L 237, 28.8.1997. 
(
8) Notice 97/C137/06. OJ C 137, 3.5.1997. 
(') Notice 97/C258/02, OJ C 258, 23.8.1997.  69 70 
thresholds and certain components of the cost-
benefit analysis. 
243. The new framework broadens the defi­
nition of the industry to include first-tier com­
ponent suppliers producing modules or sub­
systems where these are produced in the car 
manufacturer's plant or on one or more indus­
trial sites in the vicinity. The new framework 
also stipulates that specific cases must be 
notified where project costs exceed ECU 50 
million (compared with ECU 17 million be­
fore) or where the amount of aid envisaged 
exceeds ECU 5 million (no threshold in the 
preceding framework). As regards cost-benefit 
analysis, the emphasis is placed on proving 
that there is a clear need for the aid; also, the 
comparator plant for assessing the extra cost 
of locating in an assisted area can, from now 
on, be located in the EEA, in the central and 
east European countries (CEECs), and, in 
some cases, on another continent. Lastly, ex­
cess capacity in the industry has led to the 
introduction of a mechanism which gradually 
adjusts the eligible aid intensity. 
244. All the Member States eventually in­
formed the Commission of their approval of 
the new framework, proposed as an appropri­
ate measure. It enters into force on 1 January 
1998. 
(b) Court judgment on action brought 
by Spain 
245. On 1 September 1995, Spain applied to 
the Court for an annulment of the Commission 
decision backdating for one year to 1 January 
1995 the framework for State aid to the motor 
vehicle industry. In its judgment of 15 April 
1997, the Court found that the Commission 
had not sought the approval of the Member 
States before adopting the contested decision 
and that, although this omission was due to 
exceptional circumstances, it meant that the 
decision was null and void. 
The validity of the framework for the period 
1996-97 is not affected. 
(c) Assessment of cases 
246. In 1997, the Commission took deci­
sions in 19 specific cases in the motor vehicle 
industry involving total aid of ECU 276 mil­
lion. 
247. The Volks^vagen (VW) Sachsen case 
reached a positive outcome in 1997. In July 
1996, in breach of a Commission decision of 
26 June 1996, the authorities of the Land of 
Saxony granted VW some DEM 90 million 
more than had been approved by the Commis­
sion for investment in the Mosel II and Chem­
nitz Π sites. 
248. At the Commission's request, Germany 
undertook on 4 September 1996 to freeze the 
payment to VW of a sum equal to the amount 
paid unlawfully by Saxony so as to neutralise 
the effects, especially the economic effects, of 
the transaction. On the same day, the Commis­
sion brought an action challenging the aid 
measure before the Court of Justice, but de­
cided not to ask the Court for an interim ruling 
as long as Bonn continued to fulfil its under­
taking. 
249. In a letter dated 3 November, the Ger­
man Government stated that it had taken all 
the steps to comply fully with the Commission 
decision of 26 June 1996. In essence, the 
German authorities certified that the amount 
granted unlawfully had been repaid by VW 
and had been placed in a trust account (An­
derkonto) to which only the German authori­
ties had access. Furthermore, the sum would 
not under any circumstances be used to fi­
nance VW investments in Saxony. 
250. The favourable outcome prompted the 
Commission to withdraw its action for in­
fringement against Germany brought before 
the Court of Justice for failure to comply with 
the decision of 26 June 1996. The proceedings 
instituted by Saxony and VW (to which an 
action by Germany is joined) against the 
Commission are still being examined by the 
Court of First Instance. 
Lastly, from a more technical standpoint, after 
carrying out on-site inspections at the VW 
plants in Saxony, the Commission obtained an 
assurance that VW would comply with the 
capacities imposed in the Commission deci­
sion of June 1996. 
257. The Commission approved a number 
of low-intensity aid measures in the motor 
vehicle industry without carrying out a cost-
benefit analysis. It does not believe such an 
analysis is necessary when the aid intensity is 
below 10 % of the admissible regional ceiling, 
plus a top-up if needed. Thus no analysis was 
required in the cases concerning aid to IV —STATE AID 
Sovab(') in France, a Renault subsidiary, and 
to Mitsubishi Motors in the Netherlands (
2). 
1.1.5. Synthetic fibres industry 
252. Since 1977, the conditions under which 
aid may be awarded to this industry have been 
laid down in a code whose terms and scope 
have been revised periodically. The current 
code came into force on 1 April 1996 with a 
period of validity of three years (
3). 
253. It requires the notification of any pro­
posal to award aid, in whatever form, irrespec­
tive of whether the Commission has author­
ised the scheme concerned, (except where the 
aid would satisfy the de minimis mie) to 
synthetic fibres producers by way of direct 
support for: 
• extrusion/texturisation of all generic types 
of fibre and yarn based on polyester, polya­
mide, acrylic or polypropylene, irrespective 
of their end-uses; or 
• polymerisation (including polycondensa-
tion) where it is integrated with extrasion in 
terms of the machinery used; or 
• any ancillary process finked to the contem­
poraneous installation of extrusion/ 
texturization capacity by the prospective 
beneficiary or by another company in the 
group to which it belongs and which, in the 
specific business activity concerned, is nor­
mally integrated with such capacity in terms 
of the machinery used. 
254. The only exceptions to the notification 
requirement relate to aid for vocational train­
ing or retraining awarded under schemes that 
have been authorised by the Cornrnission or 
aid awarded under schemes that have been 
authorised by the Cornrnission and fall within 
the scope of either the Community guidelines 
on State aid for environmental protection or 
the Community framework for State aid for 
research and development. 
255. In 1997, the Cornrnission continued to 
be vigilant in applying the code and in ac­
tively following up enquiries brought to its 
attention regarding possible breaches. 
256. The Commission limited the intensity 
of the aid to the German polyester yarn pro­
ducer Ernst Michalke GmbH (a Hoechst sub­
sidiary) to 50 % of the aid ceiling, as required 
by the current code. The aid was also ap­
proved on the basis that the investment would 
take place in parallel with a significant reduc­
tion in capacity at group level. 
257. The Commission decided to initiate Ar­
ticle 93(2) proceedings against proposed aid to 
the Portuguese cord and rope producer Cordex 
SA. While the company used its entire output 
of polypropylene filament yam in-house to 
produce the final products which it places on 
the market, the Commission takes the view 
that by contributing inter alia to an increase in 
capacity, and irrespective of the market oppor­
tunities for the company's end product, the 
investment would be to the detriment of other 
producers of polypropylene filament yarn 
which had responded to a surge in demand by 
increasing their capacity without the benefit of 
aid. 
1.1.6. Textiles and clothing 
258. The industry was previously covered by 
guidelines adopted in 1971 and modified in 
1977. The Commission considers, following a 
1995 Court judgment (
4), that the guidelines 
are no longer legally valid as the obligation on 
the Commission, in cooperation with the 
Member States, to examine existing schemes 
has not been complied with in the present case 
in the textile and clothing industry. 
259. Nevertheless, in view of the specific 
nature of the industry, the threshold from 
which aid grants must be notified as soon as 
the multisectoral framework enters into force 
is ECU 15 million instead of the ECU 50 
million for other sectors, where the intensity 
exceeds 50 % of the eligible ceiling in the 
region in question and the ratio per job created 
or maintained exceeds ECU 30 000 (
5). 
1.1.7. Transport 
260. In 1997, the Commission took 31 deci­
sions on transport aid. The number of cases 
ending in a Commission decision thus fell to 
1994 levels, i.e. a reduction of almost 40 % 
(') Case N 683/97, not yet published in the OJ. 
(
2) Case N 149/97, not yet published in the OJ. 
(
3) Code on aid to the synthetic fibres industry, OJ C 94, 30.3.1996. 
(
4) Case C-135/93 Spain ν Commission [1995] ECR 1-1673. 
(
5) See paragraph IV-A-2 of this report concerning the multisectoral 
framework.  71 72 
compared with the peaks recorded in 1995 and 
1996. Within these figures, however, are vari-
ations according to mode of transport: in sea 
transport, for example, the number of cases 
has increased. The Commission took two 
negative decisions imposing the recovery of 
unlawful aid. 
267. In the field of air transport, the Com-
mission continued to examine the implementa-
tion of the plans to restructure national air-
lines, verifying compliance with all the condi-
tions laid down in the decisions authorising 
aid for the restructuring of the airlines, in 
particular: 
• on 16 April, the Commission raised no 
objections in respect of the incorporation 
into Air France's equity of FRF 1 billion, 
representing the balance of the third and last 
instalment of the FRF 20 billion aid to the 
Erench national airline. The Commission 
took the view that this sum, placed in a 
blocked account in accordance with the 
decision of 24 July 1996, could now be 
freed in view of compliance with the condi-
tions of the decision of 27 July 1994 and the 
undertakings given by the French authori-
ties concerning, in particular, the company's 
tariffs within the EEA, the measures taken 
in agreement with the Commission concern-
ing the airports of Orly Sud and Orly Ouest 
and the terms of the merger between Air 
France and Air France Europe; 
• on the same day, the Commission author-
ised the payment to the Portuguese national 
airline TAP of the fourth and last instalment 
of the capital increase of PTE 180 billion, 
initially authorised by decision of 6 July 
1994. The Commission made certain first 
that the conditions laid down in the decision 
had been complied with and that the firm's 
restructuring plan was, on the whole, fol-
lowing the timetable fixed. The Commission 
pointed out, however, that it was necessary 
to pursue the effort to ensure the long-term 
viability of the firm, in particular through 
agreements with the two sides of industry 
and by increasing revenue; 
• on 15 July, the Commission authorised the 
payment to Alitalia, subject to certain condi-
tions, of aid totalling ITL 2 750 billion in 
the form of a capital grant, payable in three 
instalments; the first instalment of ITL 
2 000 billion would be granted immediately. 
The aid accompanies a restructuring plan 
aimed at restoring the competitiveness and 
viability of the airline in the new liberalised 
Community market. The Commission took 
the view, in the light of the restructuring 
plan and the undertakings given by the 
Italian authorities, that the aid would facili-
tate the development of the air transport 
sector without affecting trade to an extent 
contrary to the common interest. The Com-
mission's authorisation was subject to com-
pliance with a number of conditions, includ-
ing full implementation of the restructuring 
plan, management of the airline in accord-
ance with commercial principles, a guaran-
tee not to discriminate in favour of Alitalia, 
a limitation on seat capacity, the absence of 
'price leadership', the divesting of certain 
Alitalia holdings in other firms, and trans-
parent aid that can be monitored. In Novem-
ber, Alitalia brought an action before the 
Court of First Instance for a declaration that 
the Commission decision is void. 
262. In the field of maritime transport, the 
Commission was in favour of the new Com-
munity guidelines on State aid for maritime 
transport becoming applicable to existing aid 
schemes within a reasonable period(')· That is 
why it proposed appropriate measures under 
Article 93(1) to all Member States in order to 
bring existing schemes into line with the new 
guidelines by 5 January 1999 at the latest. 
The new guidelines comprise a certain number 
of changes and clarifications in relation to 
those adopted by the Commission on 3 August 
1989(
2). Thus: 
• reductions are possible in the social and tax 
contributions relating to seafarers providing 
they are Community seafarers sailing on 
vessels registered in a Member State. No 
other form of operating aid is authorised. 
The Commission therefore decided, on 17 
December, to initiate proceedings in respect 
of an Irish aid scheme since the reduction in 
wage costs was not limited only to vessels 
flying the flag of a Member State; 
• the new guidelines take the same restrictive 
approach adopted in the other modes of 
transport as regards aid to fleet renewal. No 
aid is authorised solely to acquire new or 
second-hand vessels. In accordance with 
(') OJC 205.5.7.1997. 
(
2) 'Financial and fiscal measures concerning shipping operations 
with ships registered in the Community', SEC(89) 921 final. IV —STATE AID 
this approach, the Commission decided on 
21 October to initiate proceedings against a 
Sardinian scheme of aid for the purchase of 
vessels. However, investment aid intended 
to bring Community vessels into line with 
stricter standards than the mandatory safety 
and environmental standards may be author-
ised, provided it does not exceed the 
amount strictly necessary to cover addi-
tional costs; 
• grants which are intended to compensate for 
public service obligations and which com-
ply with the criteria of the new Community 
guidelines on State aid for maritime trans-
port are not regarded as aid and do not 
therefore have to be notified. The obligation 
to notify, however, is still applicable to 
grants which do not comply with the new 
guidelines. 
On 21 October, again in the field of sea 
transport, the Commission adopted a negative 
final decision on aid granted by the Sardinian 
Region from 1988 to 1996 for the acquisition, 
conversion and repair of ships intended for 
passenger and goods transport and required 
Italy to recover the aid granted unlawfully. 
263. In its Green Paper on seaports and 
maritime infrastructure ('), adopted on 10 De-
cember, the Commission notes that certain 
arrangements relating to the financing of ports 
and fixing of port fees create increasing distor-
tions of competition. The Commission's cur-
rent policy is to consider that the public 
financing of infrastructure, in principle, consti-
tutes a general economic policy measure not 
covered by the rales on State aid, provided 
that access to the infrastructure is open to all 
potential users in a non-discriminatory man-
ner. The Commission will review this matter 
in a communication it intends to prepare in 
1998 on financing and charging for the infra-
structure. 
264. In the rail transport sector, the Commis-
sion authorised, on 19 November, under Arti-
cle 92(3)(c), aid granted by the UK authorities 
for the sale and restructuring of Railfreight 
Distribution. The Commission took the view 
that the restructuring plan should eventually 
allow the firm to regain viability and took 
account of the fact that to a large extent the 
aid was intended to offset the infrastructure 
utilisation charges due to Eurotunnel. 
(') C0M(97) 678 final. 
265. As regards road transport, the Commis-
sion adopted on 30 July a partially negative 
decision concerning unnotified aid in the 
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia region, and ordered Italy 
to abolish and recover the unlawful aid. The 
decision is currently the subject of an action 
for annulment brought by the Italian Govern-
ment, the region concerned and 117 road 
hauliers. At the same time, the Commission 
brought an action against Italy for failure to 
comply with the negative final decision 
adopted in 1993 concerning tax arrangements 
for the purchase of road fuel. 
266. With regard to combined transport, the 
Commission decided on 20 January to initiate 
proceedings under Article 93(2) against a 
Dutch aid scheme aimed at covering the losses 
incurred through the introduction of intermo-
dal shuttle links to and from the Netherlands 
in view of its doubts concerning the eligibility 
of the measures under Article 92(3)(c). 
On the other hand, on 22 October it authorised 
an extension for the period 1997-2001 of the 
Dutch aid scheme for combined transport fa-
cilities, on the ground that the measures made 
a significant contribution to transferring a part 
of road traffic to other less-polluting modes of 
transport. In view of the expiry on 31 Decem-
ber 1997 of the exemption relating to certain 
combined transport aid measures provided for 
in Article 3(l)(e) of Regulation (EEC) 
No 1107/70, as amended by Regulation (EC) 
No 543/97, the Commission based its 
positive decision, for the period 1998-2001, on 
Article 77 of the Treaty. 
267. With regard to inland waterways, the 
Commission authorised the measures adopted 
by Germany and France granting aid to small 
waterway firms and extending existing aid 
schemes to the end of 1999. The measures are 
intended to support the restructuring of the 
sector pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1101/89, as amended by Regulation (EC) 
No 2254/96. 
The Commission also authorised aid granted 
by the Luxembourg authorities to Luxport 
for the acquisition of equipment to handle 
containers for waterway transport. This is the 
first case under Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2255/96 which, under certain conditions, 
authorises until 1999 aid for investment in 
waterway terminal infrastructures or in the 
fixed and mobile equipment needed to transfer 
goods to and from the waterway.  73 1.1.8. Agriculture 
268. In July, the Commission adopted a new 
version of the Community guidelines for res-
cue and restructuring aid to agricultural under-
takings. The new rules entered into force on 1 
January 1998 for new aid. 
The new guidelines involve a substantive 
change of policy. Until now, the Commission 
has considered compatible with the common 
market, rescue and restructuring aid fulfilling 
the following specific criteria: financial diffi-
culties should result from past investment; 
difficulties should be caused by external fac-
tors and total investment aid must remain 
below certain ceilings. In the past, Member 
States had been entided, as an alternative, to 
use the Community guidelines applicable to 
all sectors (')· 
agricultural sector. The amendment was due to 
the fact that the framework did not make any 
provision for aid for R & D work, in accord-
ance with Article 92(1) of the Treaty, to 
exceed 75 %. This 75 % limitation constituted 
a more restrictive approach than had previ-
ously been applied in agriculture. After the 
entry into force of the amendment on 1 Febru-
ary 1998 die framework will, in specific cir-
cumstances, allow aid of up to 100 % in the 
agricultural sector. Four conditions are im-
posed: the research must be of general interest 
to the sector concerned, it must be published, 
its results must be made available for exploi-
tation by interested parties on a equal basis 
and it must fulfil the conditions in Annex 2 to 
the GATT agreement on agriculture. Cases 
which do not satisfy these conditions will be 
examined under the other rales of the frame-
work. 
The specific criteria for the agricultural sector 
have now been replaced by criteria similar to 
those contained in the guidelines applicable to 
all sectors, i.e. a quid pro quo for the aid is 
needed in the surplus sectors in the form of an 
irreversible reduction or closure of capacity (5 
to 16 %). In order to take account of the 
special features of the agricultural sector, for 
small agricultural enterprises (defined as op-
erators having no more than 10 annual work 
units) the requirement of irreversibly reducing 
or closing capacity may be considered to be 
achieved at the relevant market level rather 
than that of the enterprise concerned. 
In recognition of the practical problems asso-
ciated with capacity reduction, the Commis-
sion will waive the capacity reduction require-
ment where the aid concerns only a minimum 
amount of output such that trade distortion is 
at most only very minor. This derogation can 
be applied when the production concerned by 
the aid in a given year does not exceed 3 % (if 
the measures are focused on certain products 
or producers) or 1.5 % (if die measures are 
general) of the total annual value of products 
concerned in a given Member State. 
269. After publication at the beginning of 
1996 of a new framework for research and 
development concerning all sectors, including 
agriculture (
2), the Commission adopted an 
amendment to that document which clarifies 
and redefines its policy on such aid in the 
270. In 1995, the Commission adopted 
guidelines regarding State aid policy in the 
form of short-term reduced interest loans in 
agriculture ('operating loans')(
3). The main 
objective of the guidelines was to strengthen 
Commission policy concerning such types of 
operating aid. In the guidelines, the Commis-
sion recognises that specificities in the agricul-
tural sector may result in disadvantages in the 
form of higher interest rates on short-term 
loans than in other sectors of the economy. 
Member States are thus allowed to compen-
sate for that difference between sectors, on 
condition they notify the calculation method 
they intend to apply and demonstrate that 
there is no overcompensation. 
During 1997, several Member States (Italy, 
Portugal, Spain) submitted their proposals for 
the methods of calculating the disadvantage. 
Detailed examination of their proposals re-
vealed a number of practical problems in the 
application of the guidelines. Solving those 
problems would have required, firstly, the 
suspension of the application of the guidelines 
in order to allow the Commission to carry out 
a thorough examination of all the implications 
of the problems and, secondly, the adoption of 
a new communication (
4) clarifying the inter-
pretation to be given to point C of the guide-
lines. The criteria provided for in the guide-
lines (to be interpreted according to the princi-
ples set out in the new communication) will 
enter into force on 30 June 1998. 
74  (') OJC 368, 23.12.1994. 
(
2) OJC 45, 17.2.1996. 
(
3) OJC 44, 16.2,1996. 
(
4) Commission Decision of 3.12.1997. IV —STATE AID 
1.1.9. Fisheries 
277. The guidelines for the examination of 
State aid to fisheries and aquaculture form the 
basis which allowed the Commission to assess 
both aid proposals and aid measures in force 
since 1985. The guidelines were based to a 
large extent on the structural rules, currently 
Council Regulation (EC) No 3699/93 of 21 
December 1993 laying down the criteria and 
arrangements regarding Community structural 
assistance in the fisheries and aquaculture 
sector and the processing and marketing of its 
products. 
272. The Commission approved the most 
recent amendment to the guidelines in 1997. It 
had proved necessary to bring them into line 
with the spirit of the abovementioned initial 
regulation, amended on several occasions, and 
with other Community guidelines for State aid 
in the fisheries sector which had themselves 
been amended or freshly implemented. The 
most significant changes to the guidelines in 
1997 are as follows: introduction of a provi-
sion specifying that the building of fisheries 
vessels for the Community fleet qualify for aid 
only under the structural rules and prohibiting 
aid to shipyards for the building of fishing 
vessels; clarification of the provision concern-
ing aid financed from parafiscal charges; intro-
duction of a provision regulating aid for the 
early retirement of fishermen and the granting 
of individual flat-rate premiums. 
273. The Commission was also strict in its 
application of the principle of banning aid for 
the temporary cessation of fishing activities 
granted repeatedly and when the events under-
lying temporary cessation are not exceptional. 
It carried out a review of all approved aid for 
temporary cessation and initiated proceedings 
under Article 93(2) in respect of one aid 
measure of this type notified in 1997. 
1.2. Specific sectors not subject 
to special rules 
1.2.1. Financial sector 
274. At the Amsterdam summit in June the 
Heads of State or Government adopted a 
declaration on public law credit institutions in 
Germany. The declaration notes the Commis-
sion's opinion 'that the Community's existing 
competition rales allow services of general 
economic interest provided by public credit 
institutions existing in Germany and the facili-
ties granted to them to compensate for the 
costs connected with such services to be taken 
into account in full'. 
275. No declaration can grant exemption 
from the rales of the Treaty. The text therefore 
also clearly states that such public services 
must be provided within the framework of 
Community law. That means in particular that 
the State aid rales and the rules about possible 
exceptions for 'services of general economic 
interest' under Article 90(2) must be complied 
with. 
276. In a supplementary text, the Heads of 
State or Government asked the Commission to 
carry out a study into possible services of 
general economic interest in the banking sec-
tor and to inform the Council (Economic 
Affairs and Finance) of the findings. The 
Commission accordingly sent letters to all 
Member States requesting appropriate infor-
mation. It has to be determined to what extent 
public tasks actually exist in the field of 
financial services and how their provision is 
secured by individual Member States. On the 
basis of the results of this exercise, the Com-
mission will have to decide how best to ensure 
fair and equal conditions for all credit institu-
tions within the Community, which is even 
more important in the lead-up to monetary 
union. 
277. A large number of cases under exami-
nation have been in the financial sector. This 
fact reflects the process of restructuring in the 
banking sector underway in certain Member 
States. The Commission has continued to ap-
ply the general rales concerning State aid to 
the financial sector ('), taking account of its 
specificities (
2). Thus, in the cases covered by 
the guidelines on aid for rescuing and restruc-
turing firms in difficulty, the Commission 
sought to achieve a fair balance regarding the 
scale of the concessions required to offset the 
effects of distortion. In its final decision on 
GAN(
3) following a review of the case, the 
Commission approved the aid already granted 
or proposed on condition that the French State 
sell the banking subsidiary CIC and the insur-
ance branch of the group and reduce the 
turnover of GAN's international insurance 
business by 50 %. In the Crédit Lyonnais case, 
which had been the subject of general pro-
(') 1996 Competition Report, points 210 and 211. 
(
2) 1995 Competition Report, point 197. 
(
3) Cases C 19/97 and 20/97, restructuring of the financial firm 
GAN, not yet published.  75 ceedings initiated when rescue aid was ap-
proved in 1996, die Commission is currently 
carrying out an in-depth examination of the 
new aid proposal and the restructuring plan 
submitted in July by the French authorities ('). 
278. The Commission also kept a close 
watch on indirect State support for certain 
banks. In particular, it decided to initiate pro-
ceedings under Article 93(2) against the 
French 'Dépôt des notaires' and 'Livret bleu' 
schemes, the former likely to favour Crédit 
Agricole and the latter to favour Crédit 
Mutuel. Following a complaint, the Commis-
sion also initiated proceedings under Article 
93(2) in respect of the transfer of the Woh-
nungsbauförderungsanstalt (WfA), a welfare 
housing body, to Westdeutsche Landesbank 
(West LB) (
2). It would seem, according to the 
information supplied by the complainant, that 
the Land of North Rhine-Westphalia, which 
owns WfA, did not require any compensatory 
benefit from West LB in the form of shares or 
appropriate remuneration for the transfer of 
ownership of the real estate portfolio and that 
the operation is essentially intended to restore 
the solvency ratio of West LB. 
1.2.2. The audiovisual sector 
279. The audiovisual sector was an impor-
tant topic for discussion at preparations for the 
Amsterdam summit meeting. The summit pro-
vided an opportunity for emphasising in a 
specific protocol the importance of public 
audiovisual services in the EU, as the end of 
this decade is seeing a booming market for 
television, due in part to the digital revolution. 
The financing of public television channels 
has been the focus of complaints from private 
operators. 
280. In principle, the Amsterdam summit 
recognised the importance of public broadcast-
ing to the democratic and social needs of the 
Union and the right of Member States to 
define the scope and financing of public 
broadcasting services. However, the rights of 
Member States must be exercised, according 
to the protocol, in full compliance with the 
Community rules, in particular with the pro-
portionality principle as far as the financing of 
the public broadcasters is concerned. 
281. In accordance with the guidelines, the 
Cornrnission started to define its general 
policy with regard to the broadcasting sector, 
taking into account the need to safeguard 
general interest objectives, such as pluralism, 
and to provide a 'level playing field' where 
both public and private operators can fully 
exploit the possibilities offered by the new 
technologies. 
282. In the Société Française de Production 
case(
3), the Commission applied the guide-
lines for rescue and restructuring aid for firms 
in difficulty and, in February, did not hesitate 
in the absence of sufficiënt information to 
initiate proceedings under Article 93(2) in 
respect of restructuring aid of FRF 2 500 
million. 
283. With regard to the promotion of culture, 
the Commission used Article 92(3)(d), intro-
duced by the Maastricht Treaty, as the ground 
for authorising an aid scheme to promote the 
Irish film industry (
4). 
1.2.3. Postal sector 
284. As stated above (
5), the notice on postal 
services adopted by the Commission on 16 
December reaffirms the applicability of Arti-
cles 92 and 93 to such services, without 
prejudice to Article 90(2), and reiterates that 
competition must not be distorted by cross-
subsidisation between postal activities that are 
reserved and those that are open to competi-
tion. 
The Commission therefore decided that the 
commercial and logistic assistance provided 
by La Poste to its subsidiary Chronopost and 
the other financial transactions between the 
two did not constitute aid under Article 92 as 
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3) Case C 13/97 (ex NN 12/97), aid to the acquisition of SFP, OJ C 
126, 23.4.1997. 
(
4) Case N 32/97, Film Board production loans scheme funded 
under the operational programme for industrial development, 
not yet published in the OJ. 
(
5) See Part II — State monopolies and monopoly rights: Articles 
37 and 90. 
(
6) See also paragraph IV-B-1 of this report on the aid content of 
compensation granted by public authorities for the operation of 
services of general economic interest. IV —STATE AID 
1.2.4. Energy sector 
285. The Commission is dealing with an 
increasing number of cases in the energy 
sector. They now generally concern the devel-
opment of renewable energy sources, the cost 
of which is still sufficiently high to require 
support from the public authorities. In the year 
under review, the Commission first approved 
aid to the Tyrol to promote the use of the 
biomass as a source of heat or electricity. It 
approved a similar scheme set up by Bavaria, 
and did not raise any objections to a scheme in 
Lower Saxony intended for both individuals 
and companies and consisting in subsidised 
loans for the installation of solar panels and 
combined heat and power units using the 
biomass. It also approved investment aid to 
Baden-Württemberg, for which both public 
and private bodies are eligible, for heat pro-
duction plants using wood shavings. As re-
gards energy research, the Commission de-
cided not to object to the fourth energy re-
search programme in Germany aimed at even-
tually reducing the climatic and environmental 
problems caused by the utilisation of energy. 
The largest investment aid scheme approved 
by the Commission was set up by the Swedish 
Government following the closure of the 
'Barsebäck' nuclear power plant. The budget 
amounts to ECU 105 million over five years to 
compensate for the loss of electricity produc-
tion using renewable energies. The Commis-
sion approved it after checking that the inten-
sities and eligible expenditure complied with 
the Community guidelines on environmental 
aid(i). 
286. An obligation imposed on a distributor 
to purchase at minimum prices electricity pro-
duced with renewable energy resources consti-
tutes State aid. Even if a State does not make 
direct use of its budget to assist producers 
using renewable energy, the purchase obliga-" 
tion is tantamount to a compulsory levy on 
distributors' incomes. The levy is paid directly 
to producers using renewable forms of en-
ergy (
2). The Commission had taken the view 
in a decision of 1990 on the Stromeinspeis-
ungsgesetz case(
3) that obligations to purchase 
at a predetermined price imposed on distribu-
tors could constitute State aid. It reaffirmed 
this position in its decision on the obligation 
imposed by Denmark on public distribution 
companies to buy electricity produced by co-
generation at a price based on the cost of 
producing it(
4). 
2. Horizontal aid 
2.1. Research and development 
287. The Commission pursued its rigorous 
implementation of the Community framework 
for State aid for research and development (
s). 
In 1996, it had initiated Article 93(2) proceed-
ings in respect of several R&D projects 
concerning the development of a medicine for 
obesity (Hoffmann-La Roche), portable micro-
computers (Olivetti), power semiconductors 
(SGS-Thomson), semiconductors for multime-
dia applications (Philips Semiconductors) and 
digital photocopiers (Oce) (
6). 
288. The Commission had had doubts in all 
those cases concerning the pre-competitive 
nature of the subsidised development and 
whether the aid acted as an incentive. In the 
Hoffmann-La Roche case, the Cornrnission 
took a negative decision regarding the part of 
the aid intended for R&D because the re-
search phase concerned by the aid was too 
close to the marketing stage of the medicine. 
In addition, the research in question was, if 
not the main activity of the pharmaceutical 
company concerned, then at least an essential 
activity. Nor was any evidence produced that 
the proposed aid would encourage the firm to 
undertake research activities which it would 
not have undertaken or carried out as fully or 
as speedily without the aid. 
In the Olivetti and SGS-Thomson cases, the 
Italian authorities preferred to withdraw their 
notification in the course of the year and 
abandon their aid plans. The cases involving 
Philips Semiconductors and Océ are still being 
examined by the Commission. 
289. With the exception of a procedure initi-
ated in December against a proposal to grant 
aid to Siemens Bauelemente OHG for the 
production of power semiconductors, the re-
mainder of the R&D aid cases dealt with by 
the Commission (about 120 in the year cov-
ered by the report) did not pose any particular 
difficulties. 
(') OJ C 72, 10.3.1994. 
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2) See also paragraph IV.C.2.3. of this report. 
(
3) 1990 Competition Report, point 219. 
(
4) Case N 305/96, measures to assist centralised combined heat 
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6) 1996 Competition Report, point 215.  77 2.2. Employment and training 
290. Employment has become the Commis-
sion's major concern at a time when the 
Member States, with one or two exceptions, 
are experiencing unparalleled levels of unem-
ployment. Public opinion in the Community is 
finding it increasingly difficult to share the 
objectives of the European Union as long as 
there are no effective solutions to structural 
unemployment in Europe. It must be said, 
however, that the employment aid to which 
Member States sometimes have recourse in 
order to improve the job situation is often not 
an appropriate instrument. Indeed, the prob-
lems are liable to be displaced to other Mem-
ber States. The point of controlling aid is 
particularly to avoid this effect which, in the 
long term, affects the competitiveness of Euro-
pean industry and, therefore, employment. The 
Commission will accordingly ensure that aid 
to employment does not jeopardise the Com-
munity objectives. 
297. Following the extraordinary European 
Council on employment held in Luxembourg 
on 20 and 21 November, the 15 Member 
States adopted guidelines to reinforce action 
by the Union to promote employment. In 
particular, Article 27 of the guidelines recom-
mends, with regard to the competition rales 
and State aid, focusing on 'aid arrangements 
which favour economic efficiency and em-
ployment without causing distortions of com-
petition'. 
292. One of the instruments used by Mem-
ber States to combat unemployment is the 
reduction of labour costs. In order to clarify 
the circumstances in which such measures are 
covered by the State aid rales, the Commis-
sion published a notice in January on monitor-
ing of State aid and reduction of labour 
costs('). It explains the distinction it makes 
between general labour cost reduction meas-
ures and sectoral measures, the latter coming 
under Article 92 of the Treaty. Whilst the 
former do not constitute State aid, the latter 
must be regarded as aid(
2). In general, the 
Commission encourages the Member States to 
opt for a reduction in labour costs in the form 
of general measures rather than in the form of 
aid. For example, the Belgian scheme known 
as 'Maribel quater' (
3) was regarded by the 
Commission as a general measure, since it 
varies social security contributions in all sec-
tors according to the percentage of manual 
workers among the total workforce, which is 
an objective and transparent parameter. The 
measure does not prima facie discriminate 
between firms or sectors. Conversely, the 
French textile plan which reduces labour costs 
in a specific sector at the expense of other 
sectors was regarded as State aid. As it consti-
tuted operating aid, the Cornrnission decided it 
was incompatible with the common market 
and should be repaid (
4). 
293. The Commission is aware that work-
force training is absolutely essential to main-
taining employment and developing the com-
petitiveness of the Union. It therefore encour-
ages firms and Member States to invest in 
training. However, when a Member State takes 
action in the form of State aid, the Commis-
sion, although in favour of training, must 
ensure that the aid does not unjustifiably dis-
tort competition. In order to clarify the cir-
cumstances in which State measures constitut-
ing training aid may be regarded as compat-
ible with the common market, the Commis-
sion has drafted a preliminary framework for 
State aid on the basis of past experience. 
294. The draft framework was presented to 
Member States' experts at a multilateral meet-
ing on 4 November. The Commission hopes to 
adopt it in 1998 following further consulta-
tions with the experts at the beginning of the 
year. 
2.3. Environment 
295. Environmental protection is one of the 
Commission's principal concerns. It has ap-
proved a number of environmental aid 
schemes. 
296. At a multilateral meeting on 15 Janu-
ary, a consensus was reached on the effective-
ness of the guidelines on State aid for environ-
mental protection (
5), which entered into force 
at the beginning of 1994 and were to be 
reviewed by the Commission before the end of 
78 
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1996. It was agreed to continue to apply the 
guidelines until the end of 1999, as originally 
planned. The discussion paper drawn up at the 
meeting also resulted in a more detailed defi­
nition of the type of investment eligible for 
environmental aid. 
297. In 1997, the Commission clarified cer­
tain aspects of the environment guidelines, 
notably with regard to operating aid. The 
Commission does not normally approve oper­
ating aid which relieves firms of costs result­
ing from the pollution or nuisance they cause. 
However, the guidelines provide for an excep­
tion to this principle in certain well-defined 
circumstances. Experience acquired to date 
has shown that operating aid for renewable 
forms of energy, which the Commission as­
sesses on its merits, must, where it is not 
tapered, be granted for no more than five or 
six years. 
298. The Commission approved aid to com­
bined heat and power production in Denmark 
on the basis of the environmental aid guide­
lines. The scheme requires electricity distribu­
tion companies to purchase the electricity pro­
duced in combination with heat by 15 produc­
tion units if the cost of producing the com­
bined electricity and heat exceeds the market 
price. The aid is limited in time (to 2006), is 
degressive and encourages the continuation of 
such operations in an electricity market under­
going liberalisation. When it approved the 
scheme, the Commission gave an undertaking 
that, if similar State aid projects were notified, 
it would adopt the same approach. 
2.4. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
299. Following the publication of the Com­
munity definition of a small and medium-sized 
enterprise(') (SME) and the introduction of 
this definition into the new guidelines on aid 
for SMEs (
2), the Commission asked the Mem­
ber States by letter of 15 January 1997 to 
bring their SME aid schemes into line with the 
Community definition. By the end of the year 
covered by this report, most of the Member 
States had complied. 
2.5. Rescue and restructuring aid 
300. The sharp increase in this type of aid is 
of concern to the Commission in view of the 
advanced development of the common market. 
The fifth Commission survey on State aid in 
the EU in the period 1992-94 (
3) highlighted a 
marked increase in the number of individual 
aid awards. These chiefly include restructuring 
aid for firms in difficulty. In its action plan for 
the single market (
4) presented to the Amster­
dam European Council, the Commission gave 
an undertaking to the Council that it would 
further tighten the rules on rescue and restruc­
turing aid for firms in difficulty. Several 
amendments reaffirming certain principles or 
defining certain points, in particular the appli­
cation of 'one time, last time'(
5), were put 
forward at the multilateral meeting of 
Member States' experts on State aid held on 
4 November. 
301. The Commission attaches considerable 
importance to the need for counter-
concessions to compensate for the distortion 
created by restructuring aid, in particular 
where a firm operates on a market with sur­
plus capacity. It recommends that the counter-
concessions should be in proportion to the size 
of the distortion caused. As in the past, the 
Commission will be less strict regarding the 
counter-concession requirements in the case of 
restructuring aid for SMEs where the latter 
have only a small share of their markets or, in 
particular, if they are located in assisted 
regions. 
302. If a Member State undertakes to priva­
tise a public undertaking which it is restructur­
ing with State aid, the Commission takes note 
of the commitment in its decision since (a) it 
may constitute an additional guarantee of a 
rapid return to viability, and (b) it may be 
possible to eliminate the distortions of compe­
tition by privatising through open bidding (
6). 
In its decision on GAN, the Commission's 
approval was conditional on the French au­
thorities honouring their commitment to sell, 
(') Commission recommendation of 3 April 1996 concerning the 
definition of small and medium-sized enterprises, OJ L 107, 
30.4.1996. 
(
2) Community guidelines on State aid for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, OJ C 213, 23.7.1996. 
(
3) COM(97) 170 final, 16.4.1997. 
(
4) COM(97) 184 final, 6.5.1997. 
(') In its judgment of 5 November 1997 in Case T-149/95 Ducros ν 
Commission, not yet reported, the Court of First Instance 
concluded that the existing guidelines, in particular point 
3.2.2.1, did not point to the incompatibility of restructuring aid 
paid in several instalments. Thus, according to the Court, the 
'one time, last time' principle as currently defined is for 
guidance rather than being mandatory (see paragraph 66 of the 
judgment). 
(
6) The latter point was upheld in the abovementioned judgment of 
the Court of First Instance (paragraph 68 of the judgment).  79 together or separately, GAN and its banking 
subsidiary, CIC. 
2.6. Export aid 
303. According to well-established case-
law ('), aid for the export of goods or services 
to EU or EEA countries is, in general, incom-
patible with the common market. By export 
aid, the Commission means all aid connected 
with the volume or turnover of sales abroad. 
304. On 18 June, the Commission adopted a 
communication on short-term export credit 
insurance, applicable from 1 January 1998 for 
a period of five years. Although it has not until 
now monitored aid for export credits and 
export credit insurance, the conclusions of the 
Council working party on export credits high-
lighted the need for Commission action in the 
area of State aid, as it emerged that export 
credits were creating distortions of competi-
tion at two levels: 
• between exporters in the various Member 
States with regard to trade inside and out-
side the Community; 
• between export credit insurers offering 
cover for trade with Member States and 
certain third countries. The schemes have 
thus stirred up opposition between public 
insurers or insurers with public support and 
private insurers. 
305. The communication identifies the risks 
that can be insured on the market and to which 
the competition rules apply. Member States 
are therefore requested, as an appropriate 
measure, to put an end to the export credit 
insurance aid schemes concerned by the com-
munication within one year from the date of 
its publication. If public or publicly assisted 
bodies operate in this sector, they will have to 
keep separate accounts for the activities cov-
ered by the communication and those that are 
not. 
3. Regional aid 
306. The Commission concluded its efforts 
to codify the rules and ensure equal treatment 
between all Member States in its approach to 
regional aid. Furthermore, recent case-law has 
upheld the Commission in its wish to monitor 
the sectoral impact of all regional aid above a 
given ceiling(
2). In its Pyrsa judgment(
3), the 
Court of Justice held that the location of an 
assisted firm, even in an Article 92(3 )(a) re-
gion, cannot prevent the Commission from 
assessing the impact of the aid on the relevant 
market. The fact that Article 92(3)(a) does not 
contain the condition included in subparagraph 
(c) of the same paragraph, namely that, for aid 
to be compatible, it must not 'adversely affect 
trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest', is not sufficient reason not 
to take account of the aid's impact on the 
market or markets concerned, as the compat-
ibility assessment must be carried out in a 
Community context. 
The Commission will have an opportunity to 
spell out an important criterion of the eligibil-
ity of regional aid in a German scheme to 
grant aid for distance-working to employers 
located in certain assisted regions. In view of 
its considerable doubts that the eligibility of 
any regional aid can be determined by the 
employer's place of business rather than by 
the place of residence of the distance worker, 
the Commission initiated formal proceedings 
against the scheme. 
3.1. Approval of new maps 
307. The Commission pursued its revision of 
the maps of regions eligible for regional aid 
and relevant aid intensity rates. Approval was 
given for new regional aid maps in Italy 
(concerning only Article 92(3)(c) regions), 
Denmark and Finland for the period 1997-99. 
In all cases, the percentage of population 
covered by regional aid has remained basically 
the same, in accordance with Commission 
policy not to increase the coverage of regional 
aid. 
3.2. The new German Länder 
308. Measures to assist firms in the new 
Länder consist for the most part in investment 
aid, which is subject to the rules on regional 
and restructuring aid. However, assessment of 
the latter takes account of a regional specifi-
city that stems from the difficulties caused by 
80  (') See, in particular, Joined Cases 6769 and 11/69 France ν 
Commission [1969] ECR 523. 
(
2) See paragraph IV-A-1.2. of this report concerning the multi-
sectoral guidelines. 
(
3) Case C-169/95 Spain ν Commission (1997) ECR 1-135. IV —STATE AID 
the transition from a planned to a market 
economy. The decisions taken by the Commis-
sion in 1997 concerning firms in the former 
GDR undergoing restructuring indicate, how-
ever, that the ordinary rules on State aid also 
apply to the new German Länder. The Com-
mission initiated proceedings under Article 
93(2) in respect of 20 aid proposals about 
which it had doubts concerning their compat-
ibility with the common market. The proceed-
ings reflect the Commission's determination, 
whilst taking account of the specific condi-
tions in the eastern Länder, to take the same 
strict approach to State aid in all the Commu-
nity regions. 
309. However, the Commission considers 
that aid granted before the end of 1995 cannot 
be taken into account for the application of the 
'one time, last time' principle resulting from 
the guidelines on rescue and restructuring aid 
for firms in difficulty, as the aid was not 
intended to restructure firms in difficulty lo-
cated in a competitive environment but to help 
firms in the former East Germany to move 
from a planned to a market economy. 
310. The fifth survey on State aid in manu-
facturing industry in the EU(') also high-
lighted the strong increase in aid in the new 
Länder in the periods 1990-92 and 1992-94. 
D — Procedures 
577. As in previous years, in 1997, the Com-
mission took several decisions ordering Mem-
ber States to recover aid which had been 
granted without prior notification to the Com-
mission and which was incompatible with the 
common market. By systematically ordering 
recovery of unlawful aid, the Commission also 
safeguards the rights of competitors to operate 
in a market with undistorted competition. 
312. The Court of Justice confirmed that the 
abolition of unlawful aid is the logical conse-
quence of a finding that it is unlawful, thus 
recovery of aid unlawfully granted, for the 
purpose of restoring the previously existing 
situation, cannot in principle be regarded as 
disproportionate to the objectives of the 
Treaty. It was also reiterated that a diligent 
businessman should normally be able to deter-
mine whether the procedural rules in Article 
93 have been complied with(
2). Thus, under-
takings to which aid has been granted cannot, 
in principle, entertain a legitimate expectation 
that the aid is lawful unless it has been granted 
in compliance with the procedure laid down in 
Article 93. The Court added that even the fact 
that the Commission initially decided not to 
raise objections to the aid in issue cannot be 
regarded as capable of having caused the 
recipient undertaking to entertain any legiti-
mate expectation since that decision was chal-
lenged in due time before the Court, which 
annulled it(
3). 
313. Furthermore, the Court has consistently 
held that procedures of internal law should not 
prevent the repayment of unlawful and incom-
patible aid. The point was again illustrated by 
the Court, notably in Alean Deutschland 
GmbH(
4), which states that the competent 
national authorities are required under Com-
munity law to withdraw the decision granting 
unlawful aid, in accordance with a final Com-
mission decision declaring the aid incompat-
ible and requiring it to be recovered, and are 
not entitled to reach any other finding. This 
remains an obligation even if the national 
authority has allowed the time-limit laid down 
for that purpose under national law to elapse 
or if national law excludes recovery because 
the gain no longer exists, in the absence of bad 
faith on the part of the recipient of the aid, or 
if the competent authority is responsible for 
the illegality of the aid decision to such a 
degree that revocation would be tantamount to 
a breach of good faith towards the recipient, 
where the latter could not have had a legiti-
mate expectation that the act was lawful be-
cause the procedure laid down in Article 93 
had not been followed. 
374. By consolidating the Court's strict ap-
proach on recovery of unlawful aid it is made 
clear to Member States and aid recipients that 
new aid must be approved by the Commission 
in order not to risk reimbursement. Recovery 
of aid which is granted without permission 
from the Commission can have severe conse-
quences for the recipient. The fact that a 
company must wind up due to the repayment 
is not in itself sufficient to avoid repayment. 
(') COM(97) 170 final. Table 3. 
(
2) Case C-169/95 Spain ν Commission [1997] ECR 1-135; Case 
C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz ν Alean Deutschland GmbH 
[1997] ECR 1-1591. 
(
3) Case C-169/95 Spain ν Commission [1997] ECR 1-135. 
(
4) Case C-24/95 Land Rheinland-Pfalz ν Alean Deutschland 
GmbH [1997] ECR 1-1591.  81 375. Furthermore, in Textilwerke Deggen-
dorf, the Court of Justice recognised the power 
of the Commission to consider new aid to an 
enterprise incompatible with the common mar-
ket, as long as a prior decision of the Commis-
sion ordering recovery of unlawful aid to the 
same enterprise had not been complied with, 
since the cumulative effect of the aid was to 
distort competition in the common market to a 
significant extent ('). In fact, when examining 
the compatibility of aid, the Commission must 
take all the relevant factors into account in-
cluding, where appropriate, the circumstances 
already considered in a previous decision and 
the obligations which that decision may have 
imposed on a Member State. 
376. In Case C-169/95(
2) it was held that 
individual aid granted without prior notifica-
tion, even if it could be linked ex post facto to 
national rules subsequently authorised as a 
regional aid scheme by the Commission, could 
not in any event be regarded as having been 
granted under the latter scheme. This ruling 
highlights the importance of notifying the 
Commission before any aid is granted. 
377. As regards the admissibility of actions 
against Commission decisions under the 
ECSC Treaty, the Court of First Instance 
found, in two orders of 29 September (
3), that 
a physical or legal person other than undertak-
ings or associations of undertakings may not 
institute proceedings under Article 33 of the 
ECSC Treaty. The Court of First Instance held 
that Article 173 of the EC Treaty was not 
applicable to proceedings for annulment of a 
decision under the ECSC Treaty. 
318. With regard to complaints concerning 
the granting of alleged unlawful aid, the Court 
of First Instance upheld the Commission's 
position in a judgment of 18 December (
4) in 
which it found that, in regard to State aid, 
there was no category of autonomous deci-
sions rejecting complaints. A decision which 
ends the assessment of aid for compatibility 
with the Treaty is always addressed to the 
(') Case C-355/95 P. Textilwerke Deggendorf ν Commission [1997] 
ECR 1-2549. 
(
2) Spain ν Commission [1997] ECR 1-135. 
(
3) Case T-70/97 Walloon Region ν Commission, not yet reported, 
and Case T-4/97, not yet reported. 
(
4) Case T-178/94 Asociación Telefónica de Mutualistas ν Commis-
sion, not yet reported. 
Member State concerned. The letter in which 
the Commission informs the complainant that 
no further action will be taken regarding the 
complaint is thus only a reflection of the 
content of a decision addressed to the Member 
State concerned. An individual may seek legal 
redress before a Community court only if the 
conditions of the fourth indent of Article 173 
of the Treaty are met. 
379. Finally, the Court of First Instance 
judgment of 27 February (
5) has helped to 
clarify the relationship between Articles 92 
and 93 and Article 90(2). The Court decided 
that the Commission's power to assess the 
compatibility of aid under Article 93 also 
covered State aid granted to undertakings re-
ferred to in Article 90(2), in particular those 
which the Member States have entrusted with 
the operation of services of general economic 
interest. Article 90(2) contains a provision 
which allows aid to escape from the prohibi-
tion in Article 92, provided that the sole 
purpose of the aid in question is to offset the 
additional costs incurred in performing the 
particular tasks assigned to the undertaking 
entrusted with the operation of the service of 
general economic interest and that the grant of 
the aid is necessary in order for that undertak-
ing to be able to perform its public service 
obligations under conditions of economic 
equilibrium. 
E — Statistics 
320. Over the year, the Commission regis-
tered 516 notifications of new aid measures or 
assessments of existing aid measures and 140 
cases of unnotified aid in all sectors other than 
agriculture, fisheries, transport and coal. In the 
same year, it decided in 385 cases not to raise 
objections. In 68 cases it decided to initiate 
proceedings under Article 93(2) of the EC 
Treaty or under Article 6(5) of Decision 
2496/96/ECSC. The detailed analysis involved 
resulted inter alia in 18 positive final deci-
sions, nine negative final decisions and five 
conditional final decisions. Lastly, the Com-
mission decided to propose appropriate meas-
ures under Article 93(1) of the EC Treaty in 
respect of three existing aid measures. 
(
5) Case T-106795 Fédération française des sociétés d'assurances 
and Others ν Commission [1997] ECR 11-229. 
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Figure 6: 
Cases registered in 1997 by sector 
Π Transport: 3.70 % 
Π Agriculture: 28.44 % 
■ Coal industry: 0.47 % 
D Fisheries: 5.21 % 
Β Others: 62.18% 
Figure 7: 
Trend in the number of aid cases registered 
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83 Figure 8: 
Trend in the number of decisions taken by the Commission 
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A — Central and eastern Europe 2. Implementing rules 
1. Sofia Conference 
321. The annual conference between the 
competition authorities of the associated coun-
tries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and the Com-
mission was held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 12 and 
13 May. The results of the conference are set 
out in a declaration which assesses the 
progress made by the associated countries in 
adopting the main principles of Community 
competition law. 
Some of the associated countries have carried 
out a review of their national competition law 
with the aim of making it more effective. 
Hungary and Romania adopted new competi-
tion laws which entered into force on 1 Janu-
ary and 1 February. 
Generally speaking, the Sofia Conference 
showed that the competition authorities are 
now fully operational in most of the associated 
countries and that they are handling an in-
creasing number of cases involving infringe-
ments of the kind provided for in Articles 85, 
86 and 90. For that reason, they need further 
assistance from the Commission. There is a 
clear need for training which centres less on 
theory and more on practical aspects of en-
forcement of the competition rules. The Com-
mission has stated its willingness to redirect 
its cooperation along those lines. 
However, the situation as regards the monitor-
ing of State aid is considerably less satisfac-
tory. In most of the associated countries there 
have been major delays in adopting legislation 
and in setting up supervisory authorities. Even 
where they exist, these authorities face many 
difficulties. One of the main problems is a lack 
of transparency on the part of the institutions 
responsible for awarding aid, which makes it 
difficult to compile a precise inventory of aid 
granted. Reforms are in the pipeline in most of 
the associated countries and the Commission 
has given them its full backing. Lastly, the 
Commission has undertaken to draw up State 
aid guidelines in conjunction with the associ-
ated countries which will take into account the 
specific situation of the economies in transi-
tion. 
322. An agreement in principle on the im-
plementing rales for competition aspects of 
State aid in the Czech Republic was reached 
by the Council working party, the European 
Parliament having been consulted. The rules, 
which should be adopted by the Association 
Council in 1998, are based on the general 
principle that State aid is incompatible with 
the operation of market forces. However, dero-
gations may be given for some kinds of aid on 
die basis of Article 92. For a given period, aid 
awarded by the Czech Republic is to be 
assessed in accordance with the rales appli-
cable to Community regions eligible for re-
gional aid. The Community authorities (the 
Commission) and the Czech authorities (Min-
istry of Finance) will assess the compatibility 
with the Europe Agreement of State aid 
granted in the Community and in the Czech 
Republic respectively. Specific arrangements 
have been made for cooperation, assistance 
and transparency. 
3. Enlargement and competition policy 
323. On 15 July, the Commission adopted a 
series of documents on the accession of the 10 
associated countries to the European Commu-
nity. Two documents are of particular rel-
evance to competition policy: the Commission 
opinion and the impact study. 
The Commission opinion states that most of 
the associated countries have ensured that 
their antitrust legislation meets convergence 
requirements. The Commission welcomes the 
setting-up of competition authorities which, in 
principle, are independent of government. 
However, it has reservations as regards the 
enforcement by those authorities of the com-
petition rales, given the lack of practical expe-
rience, the dispersal of supervisory activities 
and the lack of a real competition culture. 
With regard to State aid, the opinion notes 
shortcomings in all the associated countries, 
particularly as regards transparency in the 
granting of aid and as regards the effectiveness 
of the supervisory authorities. 
In its impact study, the Commission focuses 
on the practical difficulties that enlargement of 
the Union to 25 countries and 21 languages 
will entail for its supervisory machinery. In 
spite of efforts to decentralise and streamline 
procedures, there can be no doubt that the 
accession of the associated countries will gen- 85 erate substantial new staffing requirements, 
even if procedural rules are simplified. In 
addition, from the legal viewpoint, enlarge­
ment represents a challenge for the decentrali­
sation policy of the Commission, which must 
ensure that Community competition law is 
enforced in a uniform fashion throughout the 
Union. While the bringing-into-line with Com­
munity law of the associated countries' legis­
lation bodes well for the future, the authorities 
responsible for enforcement still lack the ex­
perience necessary to put competition law into 
practice efficiently, and the Commission has 
some concerns on that score. Lastly, enlarge­
ment will have a very significant impact on 
the Community's policy on State aid for re­
gional purposes. Regions qualifying for re­
gional aid (Article 92(3)(a) and (c)) already 
account for almost 50 % of the Union's popu­
lation, which is regarded as the ceiling. 
Clearly, given the generally lower standard of 
living in the associated countries, the overall 
percentage of the population living in assisted 
regions will increase when those countries 
accede. Since, in mathematical terms, average 
living standards in the Union will fall as a 
result of enlargement, some of the regions 
which are currently eligible under Article 
92(3)(a) might lose their entitlement to aid. 
Β — North America 
1. United States 
7.1. Implementation of the cooperation 
agreement^) 
324. On 4 July, the Commission adopted the 
second report on the implementation of the 
1991 Agreement between the European Com­
munities and the Government of the United 
States of America regarding the application of 
their competition laws ('the Agreement') for 
the period from 1 July 1996 to 31 December 
1996(
2). This report complements the first 
report on the implementation of the Agree­
ment, which covered the period from 10 April 
1995 to 30 June 1996 (
3). It was decided to 
report on this relatively short period of six 
months so that, in subsequent years, it would 
be possible to report on the same calendar 
year as the annual Report on Competition 
Policy. 
The third report covers the period from 1 
January 1997 to 31 December 1997(
4). During 
the period under review, cooperation between 
the Commission and its counterparts in the 
United States has continued to be positive and 
has contributed to the effective resolution of a 
number of cases. 
The Agreement continues to provide a frame­
work for meaningful and useful cooperation 
between the Commission and the United 
States. The cooperation which was described 
in the first and the second report to the 
Council and the European Parliament has con­
tinued to bring benefits on both sides of the 
Atlantic, not only to the competition authori­
ties but also to the companies involved, as it is 
in everyone's interest for compatible solutions 
to be found. 
325. The Boeing/MDD merger was the sub­
ject of intensive cooperation between the 
Commission and the US Federal Trade Com­
mission (FTC)(
5). The case was particularly 
important not just because of the economic 
and political issues involved, but also because 
of the divergent conclusions reached by the 
Commission, which was concerned by the 
competition situation in the large commercial 
jet aircraft market, and the US authorities 
(Federal Trade Commission), which decided 
not to oppose the merger. 
326. Cooperation was particularly close and 
fruitful in the Guinness/Grand Metropolitan 
case(
6). There was a good deal of contact 
between Commission officials and their oppo­
site numbers in the United States throughout 
the course of their respective investigations. 
The Federal Trade Commission sent observers 
to the public hearings held under the Merger 
Regulation procedure. Although the EC and 
US regulators used different product and geo­
graphic market definitions for their respective 
assessments, their mutual contacts enabled 
each party to understand the other's thinking, 
and to refine its analyses accordingly. Once 
negotiations had reached a certain point, the 
parties were prepared to allow discussion to 
86 
(
1) Agreement between the United States of America and the 
European Commission regarding the application of their compe­
tition laws, OJ L 95, 27.4.1995, as amended by OJ L 131, 
15.6.1995. 
(
2) COM(97) 346 final, see 1996 Competition Report, pages 312 to 
318. 
(
3) Adopted on 8 October 1996, COM(96) 479 final, see 1996 
Competition Report, pages 299 to 311. 
(*) See report on the application of the competition rules in the 
European Union. 
(
5) A detailed study of the case and its implications for Europe-US 
relations is set out in Pan III of this report. 
(
6) For more details of the case see Part III of this report. V — INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
take place between the regulators on the pro-
posed remedies. This was valuable in that it 
ensured an element of coordination which 
might not otherwise have been possible. In 
particular, it ensured that the remedies finally 
agreed upon in each of the jurisdictions were 
consistent with one another as regards both 
content and timing. 
327. Cooperation between the Cornrnission 
and the US Department of Justice (DoJ) was 
also intensive in a number of alliance agree-
ments concluded between European and US 
airlines, namely between British Airways and 
American Airlines, Lufthansa and United Air-
lines, SAS and United Airlines, Swissair/ 
Sabena/Austrian Airlines and Delta Air Lines 
and KLM and Northwest. Representatives of 
the US DoJ participated in the oral hearing 
which took place on 3 and 4 February in the 
British Airways/American Airlines case. 
1.2. The draft agreement between 
the European Communities 
and the United States 
on positive comity rules 
328. On 18 June, the Commission adopted a 
proposal to be approved jointly by the Council 
and the Commission after consulting the Par-
liament with a view to concluding an agree-
ment between the European Communities and 
the Government of the United States of 
America on the application of the principle of 
positive comity in the enforcement of their 
competition law. This principle provides that a 
party to the agreement adversely affected by 
anticompetitive behaviour carried out in the 
territory of the other party may request that 
other party to take enforcement action('). 
This new draft agreement is based on the 
positive results of cooperation between the 
Community and US competition authorities, 
which was introduced by the 1991 agreement, 
Article V of which made provision for the 
application of the principle of positive comity. 
The new agreement consolidates it by defining 
the circumstances in which the parties should 
apply these principles. Provision is made for 
one of the parties to defer or suspend its own 
enforcement activities concerning anticom-
petitive practices which are directed princi-
pally towards the other party's territory, as-
suming that it is willing to deal with the 
(') COM(97) 233 final. 
matter. In contrast to the first agreement, this 
draft agreement does not cover mergers, given 
that neither Community law nor US legislation 
would allow public proceedings to be deferred 
or suspended. 
The proposed positive comity agreement is an 
important development in relations with the 
US and represents a commitment on the part 
of the US and the EC to cooperate on antitrust 
enforcement rather than seeking to apply their 
antitrust laws extraterritorially. 
2. Cooperation agreement with Canada 
329. A draft agreement between the Euro-
pean Communities and the Canadian Govern-
ment on the enforcement of their competition 
laws was finalised in July and is still being 
discussed by the institutions. The agreement is 
to be adopted jointly by the Council and 
Commission after Parliament has been con-
sulted. 
The cooperation agreement has become neces-
sary as a result of the growing number of 
cases involving the competition authorities of 
the contracting parties. It is designed to avoid 
contradictory decisions being taken, particu-
larly as regards solutions to identified compe-
tition problems. The draft agreement is very 
similar to the agreement between the Commu-
nities and the United States. 
The main features of the EC-Canadian draft 
agreement are as follows: 
• notification of pending cases involving the 
interests of the other party; 
• cooperation and coordination procedures 
between competition authorities; 
• provisions on positive and traditional comity; 
• compliance with confidentiality rules in ex-
changes ofinformation. 
C —WTO 
1. Trade and competition 
330. The Singapore Conference decided on 
11 December 1996 to 'establish a working 
group to study issues ... relating to the interac-
tion between trade and competition policy,  87 88 
including anticompetitive behaviour, in order 
to identify any areas that may merit considera-
tion in the WTO framework.' 
331. Professor Jenny, the Vice-Chairman of 
the French competition council, was chosen 
by consensus to head the group. It met three 
times in 1997 and decided to meet at least four 
times in 1998 before reporting to the General 
Council in accordance with its terms of refer-
ence. 
332. Positive results were achieved right 
from the outset. First, the working group 
adopted a schedule, which enabled it to plan 
its work and to make progress on matters of 
substance without major problems. The dis-
cussions, held as stipulated in the group's 
terms of reference in conjunction with Unctad, 
showed that few countries had serious doubts 
as to the usefulness of competition rules. At 
most, some of them called for a gradualist 
approach which took account of local charac-
teristics in view of the social impact of intro-
ducing a competition policy. Only the Asian 
countries, particularly Hong Kong/China and 
Singapore, expressed strong reservations. 
2. Telecommunications 
333. On 15 February, the members of the 
WTO reached an agreement on access to the 
market for basic telecommunications services 
('GBT agreement'). Under the agreement, 
which covers more than 93 % of the world 
telecommunications market, 69 governments 
will open up their respective telecommunica-
tions markets to foreign competition. Most of 
the parties have agreed on governing princi-
ples designed to prevent anticompetitive be-
haviour: appropriate measures are to be 
adopted to prevent major suppliers, acting 
either alone or in conjunction with other sup-
pliers, from initiating or maintaining anticom-
petitive practices. These include cross-
subsidisation, the use of information obtained 
from competitors and failing to provide com-
petitors in due time with technical information 
on essential equipment or relevant commercial 
information necessary for supplying services. 
The agreement, currently in the process of 
being ratified, extends the process of liberalis-
ing telecommunications under way within the 
European Union to the rest of the world as 
from the same key date of 1 January 1998. 
D — Other developments 
in international relations 
1. Mediterranean countries 
334. Following the agreements signed with 
Israel, Tunisia and Morocco, negotiations be-
tween the European Union, Jordan and the 
Palestinian Authority were concluded with the 
signing of association agreements which re-
quire the principles of a market economy to be 
put into effect(')· Discussions with Egypt, 
Lebanon, Syria and Algeria are still under 
way. The Commission examined the new Jor-
danian competition law to ensure that it is in 
line with the EU-Jordan association agree-
ment. An exploratory visit was made to Syria 
in connection with competition policy. 
Following requests for technical assistance on 
competition from Tunisia and Algeria, coop-
eration programmes are being set up with 
those countries. 
2. Latin America 
335. It has not escaped the Commission's 
notice that trade between the European Union 
and Latin America has intensified in recent 
years. Between 1993 and 1995, Latin Ameri-
ca's share of the EU's total foreign trade 
growth amounted to about 10.4 %, whereas its 
share of the EU's foreign trade total is less 
than half of that figure. The European Union 
has established a network of framework coop-
eration agreements (
2) with the Latin American 
countries which Mexico rejoined in 1997. 
Accordingly, the Commission is taking a 
greater interest in the legal environment within 
which trade takes place and, in particular, in 
regional competition law. 
336. Although no competition cooperation 
programme comparable to the one set up for 
central and eastern Europe has been devised 
for Latin America, the Commission continued 
to develop its relations with Latin America 
(') Association agreements between the European Union and Tuni-
sia (17.7.1995), Israel (22.12.1995), Morocco (30.1.1996), Jor-
dan (24.11.1997) and the Palestinian Authority (2.6.1997). 
(
2) Interregional framework cooperation agreement with Mercosur, 
signed on 15 December 1995 (OJ L 69, 19.3.1996); framework 
agreement for cooperation with the member countries of the 
Andean Pact (OJ C 25, 21.1.1993); framework agreement with 
the Central American republics (OJ C 177, 18.3.1993); 
framework cooperation agreement with Argentina, signed on 2 
April 1990 (OJ L 295, 26.10.1990). with Brazil, signed on 29 
June 1995 (OJ L 262, 1.11.1995) and Chile, signed on 26 April 
1996 (OJ L209, 19.8.1996). V — INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 
and the Caribbean by arranging study visits 
and responding to numerous requests for in-
formation from the competition authorities. 
As a result, the Commission has had dealings 
with officials from Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, 
Colombia, Peru, Uruguay, Costa Rica and 
Jamaica. Lastly, a number of specific coop-
eration actions were carried out, including a 
compendium of Latin American competition 
law, a list of national supervisory authorities, 
the joint publication with the competition 
authorities of all the countries of the region 
of the Latin American competition bulletin, 
which is posted on the Internet, and a list of 
the technical cooperation needs of each Latin 
American country and of the various regional 
organisations (Mercosur, Andean Pact). 
The Commission, and DG IB in particular, 
has prepared a biennial programme of tech-
nical assistance for the regional organisation 
Mercosur comprising a section on competi-
tion which is to be presented to the Member 
States. 
89 OUTLOOK FOR 1998 
337. In accordance with the commitment 
entered into before the European Parliament, it 
is customary for the Commission to set out its 
competition objectives for the coming year in 
its annual report. 
1. Legislative activities 
338. After a relatively intensive year of leg-
islative and regulatory activity, 1998 will be 
marked by the enforcement and monitoring of 
the numerous enactments during 1997. 
339. The Commission will have to imple-
ment the texts adopted in 1997, particularly 
the new Merger Regulation. The Commission 
will also be responsible for implementing the 
new provisions on agreements of minor im-
portance and on cooperation with the authori-
ties of the Member States, with the dual aim 
of reducing the administrative burden on com-
panies and of focusing the efforts of its super-
visory departments on cases with a real impact 
on the internal market. Lastly, it will continue 
the work begun on reshaping policy on verti-
cal restraints and horizontal agreements. The 
Green Paper on vertical restraints in EC com-
petition policy and the resulting consultations 
will be followed in 1998 by a formal proposal 
designed to modernise the treatment of verti-
cal restrictions on competition. This proposal 
and the ensuing discussions will be an impor-
tant event in 1998. As regards horizontal 
agreements, the Commission is considering 
carrying out in-depth discussions in the light 
of its preliminary findings. 
340. Apart from the formal proposal on ver-
tical restraints, the Commission is not plan-
ning any major new measures for 1998. How-
ever, the new notice on ancillary restrictions, 
which is to replace the 1990 notice, should be 
completed. Work has begun within the Com-
mission on the necessary simplification of 
some procedural aspects, which might involve 
amendment of Regulation No 99/63/EEC, and 
should also give rise to consultations in 1998. 
Lastly, the Commission will ensure that cer-
tain instruments relating to the telecommuni-
cations sector, and in particular the cable 
directive, are finalised. 
341. The Commission is to carry out major 
work in 1998 on Community State aid provi-
sions. It has undertaken to prepare and adopt 
guidelines on the application of the State aid 
rules to measures relating to the direct taxation 
of companies. It is also to adopt in 1998 
provisions which were drawn up in 1997, in 
particular new guidelines on aid for rescuing 
and restructuring firms in difficulty, guidelines 
on training aid and a new Commission direc-
tive on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertak-
ings. 
342. The Council is to adopt a regulation 
setting out new rules on aid to shipbuilding in 
the event of the OECD agreements not being 
implemented in 1998. As regards regulations 
based on Article 94 of the Treaty, as soon as 
Parliament has prepared its opinion on the 
draft authorising regulation, the Council will 
be able formally to adopt it. An agreement in 
principle was reached on the proposal in No-
vember 1997. For its part, the Commission 
should be able to transmit a draft procedural 
regulation to the Council. In accordance with 
Article 94, the Parliament is also to be con-
sulted. 
2. International field 
343. In the international field the Commis-
sion will continue its policy of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation with competition au-
thorities. 
With a view to future enlargement and in 
accordance with the objectives set out in 
Agenda 2000, the Commission is to concen-
trate on fostering a competition culture in 
central and eastern Europe. Helping the coun-
tries concerned to enforce competition law 
will be a priority. The Commission will renew 
calls for an efficient supervisory system for 
State aid to be set up as rapidly as possible. 
The Commission also plans to ensure that its 
proposals on the draft EU-US agreement on 
comity rales and the draft cooperation agree-
ment with Canada can be adopted by the 
Council during the course of 1998. 
3. Supervisory activities 
344. The competition rules must be rigor-
ously enforced if the single market is to 
function in optimal fashion. For that reason 
the Commission is determined to pursue its 
resolute drive against anticompetitive behav-
iour. Important files, like those concerning 
transatlantic airline alliance agreements, 
should be closed during 1998. Some 20 cartels 
were being examined in January 1998 and  91 fines are likely to be levied in several cases. 
The Commission will also continue with its 
work of eliminating abuses of dominant posi-
tions, which proved particularly successful in 
1997. 
345. The Commission expects the number of 
merger notifications to increase further, partly 
in view of the trend over the last four years 
and as businesses anticipate the effects of 
EMU, and partly as a result of the impact of 
amendments to the Merger Regulation regard-
ing eligibility thresholds and the regulation's 
extension to include all full-function joint 
ventures. 
346. The success of liberalisation depends 
on rigorous enforcement of Community com-
petition law. The Commission will therefore 
focus, in 1998, on introducing full competition 
for voice telephony services, working in coop-
eration with national regulatory bodies and, 
where appropriate, with the national competi-
tion authorities. It will also take a close look at 
the behaviour of dominant operators on their 
national markets and at alliance agreements in 
the telecommunications sector. The Commis-
sion will also examine the action taken by the 
Member States pursuant to the directive on 
common rales for the internal market in elec-
tricity, which has to be transposed into na-
tional law by 19 February 1999 at the latest. 
347. In the aid field, the Commission will 
step up its supervisory activities to ensure that 
the conditions laid down in its decisions have 
been correctly implemented by the Member 
States. It has already carried out checks on all 
major aid schemes in the automobile, syn-
thetic fibres, steel and shipbuilding industries. 
Checks will be extended to all aid measures 
coming under the multisectoral framework as 
soon as it is introduced. The Commission will 
also follow up the implementation of restruc-
turing plans by companies awarded restructur-
ing aid in the past. 
348. In view of the specific role assigned to 
competition policy at the extraordinary Euro-
pean Council meeting on employment held in 
Luxembourg, the Commission intends to step 
up its supervision of State aid and to ensure, 
when carrying out assessments, that aid ar-
rangements 'favour economic efficiency and 
employment without causing distortions of 
competition.' 
92 ANNEX — CASES DISCUSSED IN THE REPORT 
1. Articles 85 and 86 
Case 
Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl 
British Dental Trade 
Association (BDTA) 
Carnival Corporation and Airtours 
Hydro Texaco Holdings A/S and Preem 
Michelin and Continental 
Sanofi and Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Smart 
Ford service outlets 
Irish Sugar pic. 
Swedish Match Sverige AB/Skandinavisk 
Tobakskompagni AS 
Belgacom/ 111 Promedia NV 
SWIFT/ La Poste 
Digital Equipment Corporation 
Unisource 
Uniworld 
GEN (Global European network) 
Accord GSM 
Deutsche Telekom AG (DT) 
Santa Cruz Operation Inc/Microsoft 
Sega 
Nintendo 
Joint Operational Service Agreement 
West Coast/Mediterranean Agreement 
New Carribbean Services 
Eurosal III 
Vessel sharing agreements/OOCL/Maersk 
British Airways and American Airlines 
Lufthansa and United Airlines 
SAS and United Airlines 
Swissair/Sabena/Austrian Airlines 
Delta Air Lines and KLM and Northwest 
Elee trabe l/Intermixt 
Target 
Publication 
OJL 1,3.1.1998, p. 10 
OJ C 236, 14.8.1997, p. 9 
OJ C 242, 8.8.1997 
IP/97/740, 4.8.1997 
ΓΡ/97/740, 4.8.1997 
OJL 258, 22.9.1997, p. 1 
ΓΡ/97/80, 31.1.1997 
IP/97/292 
OJC 335, 6.11.1997, p. 3 
JP/97/868 
OJ L 318, 20.11.1997, p.l 





OJ C 185, 18.6.1997, p. 4 




































2. Article 90 
Case 
Infringement proceedings against seven 
Member States 
GSM in Spain 
Infringement proceedings against Italy (GSM) 
VTM 
Italian port legislation 
Port of Genoa 
Athens Airport 
Zaventem Airport 
Swedish alcohol monopoly (Franzén judgment) 
Norwegian alcohol monopoly 




OJ L 244, 6.9.97, p. 18 
OJL 301, 5.11.1997, p. 17 














93 3. Merger control 
Case  Publication  Paragraph numbers 
Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy  OJL 201, 29.7.1997  33 
Boeing/Mac Donnell Douglas  OJ L 336, 8.12.1997  21, 33, 146, 169, 170, 171, 178, 
324 
Guinness/Grand Metropolitan  IP/97/878  33, 146, 163, 164, 176, 325 
Blokker/Toys 'R' Us  IP/97/570  146, 194 
Anglo American Corporation/Lonrho  IP/97/338 and 1102  146, 172 
BT/MCI  OJL 336, 8.12.1997  146, 173 
Coca-Cola Company/Carlsberg  IP/97/787  146, 163, 176 
Siemens/Elektro watt  IP/97/1013  146, 165, 175 
Veba/Degussa  IP/97/1076  146, 192 
Coca-Cola Entreprises/Amalgated Beverages GB OJ L 218. 9.8.1997  146, 163, 164 
Hoogovens/Usines Gustave Boel  IP/97/363  147 
Thyssen/Krupp Stahl  IP/97/751  147 
Aceralia/Arbed  IP/97/1020  147 
Gencor/Lonrho  OJ Lil, 14.1.1997  172 
MCI/WorldCom  IP/98/213  174 
Sehb/Viag/PE-Bewag  IP/97/693  179 
Rheinmetall/British Aerospace/STN Atlas  IP/97/353  180 
Promodès/Casino 
4. State aid 




























































Regeling Bijzondere Financiering 
Risk capital guarantee scheme 
PMU 
Riedel-de Haën AG 
Maribel quater 
Siemens 
MTW and Volkswerft 
MCR Gesellschaft für 
ESF Feralpi GmbH 
metallurgisches Recycling 
Publication 
Case C 62/96 
OJC 338, 8.11.1997 
OJC 338, 8.11.1997 
OJC 338, 8.11.1997 
OJC 202, 2.7.1997 
OJC 250, 15.8.1997 
OJC 163,30.5.1997 
OJC 385, 12.12.1997 
OJ C 201, 1.7.1997 
not yet published 
Council Regulation 1013/97 
not yet published 
not yet published 
Paragraph numbers 
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